This paper examines whether differences in accrual accounting methods across balance sheet accounts influence the time‐series process of earnings. We define earnings quality as the responsiveness of earnings to shifts in permanent earnings and predict that responsiveness will increase in a firm's use of variable rate debt, where accruals move directly with shifts in interest rates. We also predict that responsiveness will decrease in a firm's investment in property plant and equipment because depreciation is largely predetermined and does not respond to shifts in opportunity costs. To test these hypotheses, we regress earnings on lagged earnings and a proxy for permanent earnings (that is, the implied dividend annuity in lagged equity value). Within the context of an adjustment cost model, this regression captures the responsiveness of earnings by the coefficient on lagged price and by one minus the coefficient on lagged earnings. Consistent with this framework, we find the unconstrained estimated coefficients on these two variables to be negatively correlated. Furthermore, consistent with our hypotheses, we find that the coefficient on lagged earnings (lagged price) is positively (negatively) associated with the relative magnitude and life of fixed assets on the balance sheet and negatively (positively) associated with the relative magnitude of variable rate debt on the balance sheet.

Prior research (e.g., Dechow, Huson, and Sloan ) documents that, on average, compensation practices appear to shield CEO pay from income‐decreasing special items. In some circumstances, compensation shielding can be efficient. For example, it may encourage CEOs with earnings‐sensitive pay to take an action that reduces current earnings but nevertheless enhances value. Compensation shielding can be inefficient in other circumstances, such as when a board of directors is captured by an overly powerful CEO or the magnitude of negative special items has been overstated (e.g., by shifting core expenses into special items). This paper explores whether strong governance can explain cross‐sectional variation in compensation shielding, and whether stronger governance and auditing are associated with less shifting of expenses. We find that strong corporate governance mechanisms, as captured by board (and committee) independence, the Sarbanes‐Oxley (2002) Act (SOX) and its related governance reforms, and switches to Big 4 auditors, are all associated with less compensation shielding. While our evidence suggests that strong overall governance is associated with a reduction in manipulation of core earnings through classification shifting in the cross‐section, we find inconclusive evidence to suggest that board independence or SOX influence classification shifting.

This paper uses the residual income valuation technique outlined in Feltham and Ohlson 1996 to examine the relation between stock valuations and accounting numbers for a prototypical banking firm. Prior work of this nature typically assumes a manufacturing setting. This paper contributes to the prior research by clarifying how the approach can be extended to settings where value is created from financial assets and liabilities. Key elements of our model include allowing banks to generate positive net present value from either lending or borrowing activities, and allowing for accounting policy to affect valuation through the loan loss allowance. We validate our model using archival data analysis, and interpret coefficients in light of our modeling assumptions. These results suggest that banks create value more from deposit‐taking activities than from lending activities. Vuong tests confirm that our model outperforms adaptations of the unbiased accounting model of Ohlson 1995 and adaptations of the base model proposed by Beaver, Eger, Ryan, and Wolfson 1989. However, our model is outperformed by the popular net income‐book value model used in many empirical studies, and we can formally reject one of our key modeling assumptions. These tests of our model suggest future avenues for improving upon the theoretical analysis.