Accounting Standards Update (ASU) 2016‐01 requires that unrealized gains and losses on equity investments (equity‐URGL) previously recognized in other comprehensive income now be included in net income. Using a sample of public insurers, we examine how this accounting standard change influences managerial investment decisions, with a particular focus on the moderating effects of compensation contracting and financial reporting practices. We find that prior to ASU 2016‐01, equity‐URGL was positively associated with CEO compensation, but this association dissipates in the post‐adoption period, when equity‐URGL is more frequently excluded from CEO performance metrics. Despite purported concerns about increased earnings volatility due to the new reporting requirements, highly affected insurers do not significantly reduce the size or risk of their equity investment portfolios following ASU 2016‐01, particularly when compensation metrics exclude equity‐URGL. We also find that equity‐URGL is more frequently excluded from non‐GAAP earnings post‐adoption, suggesting that managers adjust financial reporting practices as a response to the change. Moreover, highly affected insurers maintain the size and risk of their equity portfolios when equity‐URGL is excluded from non‐GAAP earnings. These findings suggest that managerial responses to ASU 2016‐01 are influenced by a balance between incentive structures and the costs associated with adjusting investment strategies.

We examine the effects of the 1998 merger of Price Waterhouse ( PW ) and Coopers & Lybrand ( CL ) on the audit quality of the merged firm PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) at both the firm and office levels, where audit quality is surrogated by the auditor's propensity to issue a going‐concern opinion, clients’ likelihood of meeting or beating analysts’ earnings forecasts, and clients’ accrual quality. At the firm level, we find that the merger increased audit quality for PwC relative to the audit quality of the other Big N firms. At the office level, our findings, albeit mixed, collectively suggest that the improvement in firm‐level audit quality was likely driven by the improvement in audit quality at PwC's overlapping offices, that is, offices in cities where both PW and CL had separate offices prior to the merger. Further, our findings suggest that although the PW / CL merger increased auditor concentration in local audit markets with PwC overlapping offices, the merger improved (rather than hurt) audit quality in those markets. Overall, our study contributes to the extant sparse literature on the effect of Big N mergers on audit quality, and is of potential interest to regulators.