In a broad sample of publicly traded firms, we observe that the share of firms annually reporting pre‐tax book losses increased from about 20% to 40% during 1988–2023. We also observe that 68% of those loss firms have positive cash tax payments (taxpaying loss firms). The amount of taxes paid by these loss firms is substantial and increasing over time. Surprisingly, we observe that taxes paid increase with the magnitude of pre‐tax losses. This study seeks to understand the prevalence of taxpaying loss firms. We examine whether both the extensive margin—the likelihood that a loss firm pays taxes—and the intensive margin—the magnitude of taxes paid—are explained by firm characteristics. We find that multinational status, state taxes, consolidation differences, goodwill impairments, asset write‐downs, extraordinary items, discontinued operations, depreciation differences, the frequency and magnitude of losses, and firm size are key determinants of both the likelihood and the amount of taxes paid by loss firms. We find that the decrease in the statutory tax rate included in the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 did not decrease the tax burden on loss firms.

Several studies have documented a significant association between firm size and cumulative abnormal returns surrounding quarterly earnings announcements, after controlling for unexpected earnings. The sign of the association depends on the sign of unexpected earnings. Specifically, in a regression of cumulative abnormal returns on unexpected earnings and firm size, the coefficient on firm size is negative for observations with positive unexpected earnings and is positive for observations with negative unexpected earnings. These results hold after adjusting returns for the firm size return effect. In the absence of an economic rationale for firm size per se to be priced in this manner, we draw on extant capital market literature to identify two potential explanations for the signed‐size effect. Each suggests that firm size may be proxying for some misspecification of the relation between cumulative abnormal returns and unexpected earnings: measurement error in the researcher's proxy for unexpected earnings and constrained estimation of earnings response coefficients. The signed‐size effect remains after incorporating numerous procedures to mitigate the influence of each of these misspecifications. We develop implications of ignoring the anomalous signed‐size effect for studies investigating the association between cumulative abnormal returns and unexpected earnings. Studies affected are those that omit firm size (the estimated earnings response coefficient is biased upward), include firm size as a linear additive variable (the estimated coefficient on firm size is generally not interpretable), and include other variables correlated with firm size (their estimated coefficients are generally biased). Résumé. Plusieurs chercheurs ont démontré l'existence d'une relation significative entre la taille de l'entreprise et les rendements anormaux cumulatifs entourant les annonces de bénéfices trimestriels, compte tenu du contrôle des bénéfices inattendus. Le signe de cette relation (positif ou négatif) dépend de celui des bénéfices inattendus. En termes précis, dans une régression des rendements anormaux cumulatifs par rapport aux bénéfices inattendus à de la taille de l'entreprise, le coefficient relatif à la taille de l'entreprise est négatif pour les observations de bénéfices inattendus positifs, alors qu'il est positif pour les observations de bénéfices inattendus négatifs. Ces résultats persistent une fois les rendements ajustés pour tenir compte de l'incidence de la taille de l'entreprise. Faute de fondements économiques sur lesquels appuyer ce genre d'évaluation en fonction de la taille de l'entreprise en tant que telle, les auteurs ont puisé dans les écrits existants relatifs au marché des capitaux deux explications possibles de l'incidence positive ou négative de la taille: l'erreur de mesure de la variable substitutive des bénéfices inattendus utilisée par le chercheur et l'estimation restreinte des coefficients de réaction aux bénéfices. Dans un cas comme dans l'autre, il semble que la taille de l'entreprise puisse servir de substitut lorsque certaines définitions de la relation entre les rendements anormaux cumulatifs et les bénéfices inattendus sont erronées. L'incidence positive ou négative de la taille demeure après l'application de nombreux procédés visant à atténuer l'influence de chacune de ces erreurs de définition. Les auteurs cernent les conséquences que peut entraîner la négligence de l'incidence positive ou négative anormale de la taille, dans le cas d'études portant sur la relation entre les rendements anormaux cumulatifs et les bénéfices inattendus. Les études en cause sont celles dans lesquelles est omise la taille de l'entreprise (le coefficient de la réaction estimée aux bénéfices étant alors biaisé à la hausse), celles qui font intervenir la taille de l'entreprise à titre de variable additive linéaire (le coefficient estimé relatif à la taille de l'entreprise ne pouvant être interprété, de façon générale) et celles qui font intervenir d'autres variables en corrélation avec la taille de l'entreprise (leurs coefficients estimés étant, dans ce cas, habituellement faussés).

Manufacturing firms can manipulate income by producing in excess of the quantity needed to meet current period demand, thereby allocating part of current period fixed manufacturing overhead costs from cost of goods sold to inventory. Because it is subject to manipulation, the component of earnings due to producing in excess of sales may be of lower quality than the remaining component of earnings. We investigate this possibility using a regression of security returns on unexpected income and an estimate of the change in percent of production added to inventory ( CPAI ). An analytical model indicates that CPAI determines the “earnings surprise” subject to manipulation by overproducing. Assuming the market recognizes this, the coefficient on CPAI should be negative because this low quality component must be deducted from the total “good news” conveyed by the change in reported earnings. Alternatively, CPAI may convey good or bad news to the market that is unrelated to the manipulation of current period earnings. Firms may increase the percent of production added to inventory in anticipation of high levels of future sales. In this case, the estimated coefficient on CPAI should be positive. Or, if the increase in the percent of production added to inventory reflects anticipation of a strike or an unexpected downturn in current sales, the estimated coefficient should be negative. Cross‐sectional tests using a large sample of manufacturing firms indicate a significant positive relation between security returns and CPAI. This finding is consistent with market participants viewing CPAI as a leading indicator of firm performance. Although the results are most supportive of CPAI conveying good news, there is some evidence that CPAI is used by managers to smooth earnings and, for firms classified as smoothing earnings, there is weak evidence that the component of earnings related to CPAI is viewed by market participants to be of lower quality.

While managers' career concerns have been shown to be influential in shaping their decisions, there is little evidence of the impact such concerns may have on managers' tax avoidance incentives. This study examines the causal effect of managers' career concerns on tax avoidance using the staggered recognition by state courts of the inevitable disclosure doctrine (IDD), a trade secret protection doctrine that places greater restrictions on managers from joining or forming a rival company. We argue that the IDD recognition increases the cost of job loss for managers whose current jobs may be in jeopardy, thereby increasing their incentive to avoid taxes in order to positively change their current employer's evaluation of their ability. The IDD recognition also reduces outside opportunities for high‐ability managers, and thereby reduces their incentive to avoid taxes in order to positively change external employers' evaluation of their ability. Using a difference‐in‐differences design, we provide evidence consistent with these predictions. We further show these effects are stronger for CEOs in their early years of service in the focal firms when the market is more uncertain about their ability. Our findings suggest that managers take into account the impact of tax avoidance on their career outcomes when making tax avoidance decisions.

We examine the effects of the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act's (TCJA) interest deduction limitation on suppliers. Using a difference‐in‐differences design, we find that suppliers with customers subject to the limitation (“affected suppliers”) report increased accounts receivable of between 11.2% and 14.9% relative to their pre‐TCJA average accounts receivable. Using a triple differences design, we provide more granular evidence by documenting that the limitation's effects on affected suppliers' accounts receivable are driven by suppliers with customers that report increased trade credit use (i.e., higher accounts payable). In cross‐sectional analyses, we find that the effects are stronger when suppliers are smaller, have higher peer product similarity, operate in industries with low entry barriers, or are in the early stage of their life cycle, consistent with suppliers with weaker bargaining power providing more trade credit to customers compared to other suppliers. Turning to supplier consequences of increased accounts receivable, we find that affected suppliers' days sales outstanding and operating cycles increase. Next, we use path analyses to find that affected suppliers experience lower cash flows and higher risks due to their increased accounts receivable. Overall, our study provides evidence that the interest deduction limitation yielded externalities on affected firms' supply chains.

We conduct a field survey to investigate whether current mid-level and future entry-level managers (collectively managers) subjectively value stock options and restricted stock consistent with economic theory. We find that managers, on average, subjectively value stock options at greater than their Black-Scholes value and greater than fair-value equivalent restricted stock. This result contrasts with conventional economic wisdom that risk-averse employees discount the Black-Scholes value of an option. With respect to stock options, our results also reveal that managers, on average, have a lottery ticket mentality when subjectively valuing options, they value shorter vesting periods, and they value longer terms to maturity. With respect to stock options and restricted stock, we find that managers tend to extrapolate recently rising stock price trends to arrive at their subjective values. Overall, our results suggest that in some cases standard economic theory does not accurately reflect how managers appear to subjectively value stock options and restricted stock.

We exploit an exogenous shock to analyst coverage as a result of brokerage house mergers and closures to examine whether financial analysts influence the tax‐planning activities of the firms they cover. Using a difference‐in‐differences design, we find that, on average, firms affected by broker mergers and/or closures experience a reduction in their GAAP (cash) effective tax rates (ETR) of 2.5 percent (2.6 percent), relative to control firms, translating into average tax expense (cash tax) savings of $34 ($35) million. The treatment effect is more pronounced among firms with lower pre‐event analyst coverage. To explore how analysts affect tax planning, we further document that the treatment effect is greater among firms that lose an analyst who provided an implied ETR forecast in the past, suggesting that analysts influence tax planning via their tax‐specific research efforts. In addition, we find that after merger/closure, weakly governed firms increase their use of aggressive tax strategies, and financially distressed firms experience a larger reduction of cash effective tax rates, relative to control firms. Overall, we provide evidence that a shock to analyst coverage sufficiently changes the cost‐benefit trade‐off of tax planning.

In this study, we examine the effect of increased tax transparency on the tax planning behavior of European banks. In 2014, the European Union introduced public country‐by‐country reporting requirements to the banking industry. Treating this new requirement as an exogenous shock, we find limited evidence consistent with a decline in income shifting by the banks' financial affiliates in the post‐adoption period (starting from 2015). We do not, however, find robust evidence of a significant change in the consolidated book effective tax rates among the affected banks. Our findings suggest that increased transparency from public country‐by‐country reporting can deter tax‐motivated income shifting but that it did not appear to materially influence the banks' overall tax avoidance. Our findings have policy implications for the ongoing debate between the European Parliament, the Organisation for Economic Co‐operation and Development, and accounting standard‐setting bodies on whether to require multinationals to publish country‐by‐country reports.

We examine the association between corporate tax aggressiveness and the profitability of insider trading under the assumption that insider trading profits reflect managerial opportunism. We document that insider purchase profitability, but not sales profitability, is significantly higher on average in more tax aggressive firms. We also find that the positive association between tax aggressiveness and insider purchase profitability is attenuated for firms with more effective monitoring and is accentuated for firms with a more opaque information environment. In addition, we provide empirical evidence that tax aggressiveness is significantly associated with greater insider sales volume in the fiscal year prior to a stock price crash. Finally, we find that the association between tax aggressiveness and insider purchase profitability weakens after the introduction of FIN 48, consistent with the increased transparency of tax positions under the new disclosure requirement reducing insiders' information advantage and hence their ability to profit from insider trading. To the extent that insider trading profits reflect managerial opportunism, our results are consistent with managers exploiting the opacity arising from tax aggressive activities to extract rent from shareholders, particularly those shareholders who sold their shares to the managers. Our findings are particularly important in light of the number of studies relying on the agency view of tax avoidance to develop arguments or to draw inferences.