Abstract This paper examines the relation between earnings and operating cash flow to derive and test an indicator of financial statement fraud. Accrual measurement concepts indicate that financial statement fraud should be associated with high levels of earnings relative to operating cash flow. We demonstrate that the excess of earnings over operating cash flow is extreme in most fraud cases in years immediately prior to the fraud discovery based on a sample of 56 fraud cases from 1978 to 1991. We compare the distribution of the earnings minus operating cash flow variable for fraud firms with that for a sample of 60,453 firm‐years for firms listed on COMPUSTAT. We test a logistic regression model in which the discovery/nondiscovery of fraud is the dependent variable, and earnings minus operating cash flow is the explanatory variable. Other control variables are included in the model based on prior studies. Results are consistent with expectations derived from accrual measurement theory. We then examine the predictive ability of the model using our sample of fraud firms and a sample of nonfraud firms in the same four‐digit SIC code industries. Observations for the fraud firms are for the fiscal year prior to the discovery of fraud. Observations for the nonfraud firms are for the same fiscal years as the fraud firms in the same industries. The predictive ability of the model, including the excess of earnings over operating cash flow, is substantially higher than the predictive ability of the model omitting this variable. We conclude that the earnings‐operating cash flow relation provides important information for those interested in identifying financial statement fraud, especially when considered in conjunction with other factors associated with fraud risk.

Abstract We investigate capital investment problems when a manager knows the costs of a set of available projects, while the owner only holds probabilistic beliefs about these costs. With mutually exclusive projects, an optimal policy can be defined by a series of cost targets, one for each of the possible projects. The project with the lowest reported cost relative to the target is chosen, and funded as if the cost were equal to the target. The optimal investment policy can deviate from a traditional policy of selecting the project with the highest, positive net present value (NPV) in a number of ways. First, under‐investment arises to limit the manager's ability to capture the economic rents. Second, when investment takes place, it is not always the project with the highest NPV that is implemented. Third, projects with lower cost variability can be favored. We extend the analysis to non‐mutually exclusive projects. With two independent projects, batch processing is superior to individual appraisal whenever both optimal individual appraisal cost targets are interior. Individual appraisal ignores the impact of individual targets on incentives to report the costs of other potential projects. Batch processing can improve individual assessment by cost effective switching of investment away from the individual projects and into the batch as a whole. The results suggest that the common practice of analyzing batches of capital requests in an annual capital budgeting cycle provides advantages in the organization's attempt to deal with asymmetric information and incentive problems.

Abstract This paper examines how market prices, volume, and traders' dividend expectations respond to public information releases in laboratory markets for a long‐lived financial asset. The objective is to study deviations from the symmetric information risk‐neutral rational expectations (RE) benchmark, which predicts no trade in such settings. The results of a series of double‐auction and call markets are reported in which traders manage a portfolio of cash and asset shares over 15 rounds of trading. A public signal regarding the value of the liquidating dividend is released every third round, and traders' subjective expectations of the liquidating dividend are elicited each round as cash‐motivated forecasts. We find that, despite the public dividend signal, traders' dividend forecasts are heterogeneous. Forecasts and prices both underreact to the public signals, with prices under‐reacting more than forecasts. In general, price changes are not closely associated with public signals, and there is greater excess price volatility in double auctions than in call markets. Forty‐three percent of trades are inconsistent with the trader's forecasts, and inconsistent trades occur more frequently in the double‐auction markets. On average, approximately 10 percent of the outstanding shares are traded in each round, and trading volume is increasing in the mean absolute forecast revision and decreasing in the contemporaneous dispersion in forecasts. These results suggest that differential processing of the public signal and/or speculative trading for short‐term gain may help to explain why symmetric information RE predictions are often not supported in empirical and experimental settings. They also suggest that market reactions to public information releases may be influenced by market microstructure.