This paper uses stock market data to investigate the popular claim that investors are misled by the “pro forma” earnings numbers conspicuously featured in the press releases of some U.S. firms. We first document the frequency and magnitude of pro forma earnings in press releases issued during June through August 2000, and describe the 433 firms that engaged in this financial disclosure strategy. Our test period predates public expressions of concern by trade associations and regulators that pro forma earnings may mislead investors and the subsequent issuance of guidelines and rules on the disclosure of pro forma earnings numbers. We use two complementary approaches to determine whether the share prices that investors assign to pro forma firms are systematically higher than the prices assigned to other firms. Our market‐multiples tests for differences in price levels find some evidence suggesting that pro forma firms may be priced higher than firms that do not use the disclosure strategy. This apparent overpricing is not, however, related to the pro forma earnings numbers themselves. Our narrow‐window stock returns tests reveal no evidence of a stock return premium for pro forma firms at the quarterly earnings announcement date. Collectively, the results cast doubt on the notion that investors are, on average, misled by pro forma earnings disclosures despite the widespread concern expressed in the financial press and by regulators.

This study examines the influence of accounting and capital market measures of firm performance on the reputations of corporate chief executives (CEOs). The empirical tests rely on pooled time‐series cross‐sectional data for approximately 900 top executives in about 500 firms drawn from 36 industries over the 1975–1987 period. CEO reputation measures are derived from securities analysts' annual evaluations of executive performance as reported by Financial World magazine. The study's results document a positive incremental association between profit performance and reputation, a finding consistent with the notion that accounting earnings convey information about CEO productivity beyond that present in stock returns. However, the sensitivity of CEO reputation to stock returns and earnings performance is modest, and the earnings‐reputation relation varies considerably across industry groups. Résumé. Les auteurs s'intéressent ici à l'influence qu'exercent sur la réputation des directeurs généraux de sociétés les mesures de la performance de l'entreprise relevant de la comptabilité et du marché des capitaux. Leurs tests empiriques s'appuient sur les données transversales de séries chronologiques groupées relatives à environ 900 cadres supérieurs de quelque 500 entreprises provenant de 36 secteurs d'activité, relevées entre 1975 et 1987. Les « mesures » de la réputation des directeurs généraux de sociétés sont dérivées de l'évaluation annuelle de la performance des cadres, produite par les analystes en valeurs mobilières, dont fait état le magazine Financial World. Les résultats obtenus révèlent une association prenant la forme d'un écart marginal positif entre la performance, en termes de profits, et la réputation, constatation qui corrobore la notion selon laquelle les bénéfices comptables livrent, au sujet de la productivité des directeurs généraux de sociétés, de l'information que ne livre pas le rendement des actions. La sensibilité de la réputation des directeurs généraux de sociétés au rendement de l'action et aux bénéfices est cependant modérée, et la relation bénéfices‐réputation varie largement selon les groupes sectoriels.

We gain unique insights into materiality judgments about accounting errors by examining SEC comment letter correspondence. We document that managers typically use multiple quantitative benchmarks in their materiality analyses, with earnings being the most common benchmark. In most of the cases we review, managers deem the error immaterial despite its exceeding the traditional “5 percent of earnings” rule of thumb, often in multiple periods and by a large degree. Instead of attempting to conceal these overages, managers tend to forthrightly acknowledge them, often asserting that the benchmark is abnormally low during the violation period. We find that 17–26 percent of these “low benchmark” assertions are suspect (although none of these “low benchmark” assertions are challenged by the SEC). We also document substantial variation in the extent to which qualitative factors are mentioned as considerations. The SEC generally is deferential toward managers' arguments and judgments but is more likely to challenge immateriality claims when managers admit there are qualitative factors that indicate errors are material.