We document controlling shareholder (insider) opportunism in an insolvency regime that uses an accounting rule to determine bankruptcy eligibility. Our study sheds light on managerial incentives induced by weak investor protection laws. Using unique data on bankrupt firms from an emerging market, consistent with our prediction, we show insiders intentionally manage earnings downward to understate firm net worth so as to be able to file for bankruptcy. Downward pre‐bankruptcy earnings management is associated with more payments to insiders and weaker performance, post‐filing. A battery of tests suggests our results cannot be fully explained as an artifact of financial distress. Rather, they are consistent with insiders exploiting weak investor protection to extract private benefits at the expense of lenders and outside shareholders. Our study serves as a cautionary tale for all insolvency regimes that use a balance sheet test in an environment with weak creditor protection.

Using novel receivable‐based loan data, we study the effect of aging‐report loan covenants on borrowers' accounts receivable reporting quality. Our purpose is to highlight a channel that lenders use to obtain private information and to understand whether lenders' information acquisition affects the financial reporting quality of borrowers. Compared to receivable‐based borrowers without aging‐report requirements (control firms), borrowers with such requirements (test firms) increase their receivable reporting quality significantly after loan initiations. The shift in reporting quality is more pronounced when borrowers have weak bargaining power. Our results lend support to the argument that lender information access affects borrowers' reporting quality.

We study changes in borrower accounting recognition surrounding initiation of loans requiring the provision of aging schedules to the lender. Our purpose is to understand how scrutiny by lenders of underlying transactions affects financial reporting incentives. We find that allowance for doubtful accounts increases significantly after loan initiation controlling for current and future write-offs, receivable turnover, and the beginning allowance balance. This increase is more pronounced for loans with increased monitoring frequency. We also find that write-offs are less persistent following implementation of bank monitoring, consistent with increased timeliness. Further study of the customer base finds customer concentration declines and credit quality of largest customers improves after initiation of borrowing base loans. Lastly, we find borrowers increase the frequency of allowance-for-doubtful-accounts disclosure in their quarterly financial statements after loan initiation. Our results confirm two notions. Banks add to the oversight that already exists for public, audited companies and banks influence borrowers to adopt more conservative accounting policies. JEL: G14, G21, G24, G28

of Melbourne, and Universite´Paris Dauphine