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Do Political Connections Induce More or Less Opportunistic Financial Reporting? Evidence from Close Elections Involving SEC‐Influential Politicians*

Contemporary Accounting Research 2021 38(2), 1177-1203
This study explores close US congressional elections involving politicians who have influence over the SEC to examine the effect of firms' political connections on their financial reporting. This question is important in understanding the overall effect of political connections on financial reporting. Our difference‐in‐differences tests reveal no evidence that firms experiencing a relative increase in political connections report more opportunistically after close elections in anticipation of preferential treatment by the SEC in its enforcement actions. In contrast, we find evidence that these firms report less opportunistically in response to an increase in their connections with SEC‐influential politicians. Further tests show that our findings are unlikely to be driven by capital market pressure, managerial equity incentives, or corporate governance. Overall, our results are consistent with political connections mitigating opportunistic reporting through enhanced scrutiny by the SEC of politically connected firms' financial reporting. Our findings provide new insights into the interactions among political connections, SEC oversight, and financial reporting by showing how politically connected firms alter their financial reporting in anticipation of differential treatment by the SEC.

Earnings Announcement Disclosures and Changes in Analysts' Information

Contemporary Accounting Research 2017 34(1), 343-373
This study examines how financial disclosures with earnings announcements affect sell‐side analysts' information about future earnings, focusing on disclosures of financial statements and management earnings forecasts. We find that disclosures of balance sheets and segment data are associated with an increase in the degree to which analysts' forecasts of upcoming quarterly earnings are based on private information. Further analyses show that balance sheet disclosures are associated with an increase in the precision of both analysts' common and private information, segment disclosures are associated with an increase in analysts' private information, and management earnings forecast disclosures are associated with an increase in analysts' common information. These results are consistent with analysts processing balance sheet and segment disclosures into new private information regarding near‐term earnings. Additional analysis of conference calls shows that balance sheet, segment, and management earnings forecast disclosures are all associated with more discussion related to these items in the questions‐and‐answers section of conference calls, consistent with analysts playing an information interpretation role with respect to these disclosures.

Further Evidence on the Relation between Analysts' Forecast Dispersion and Stock Returns*

Contemporary Accounting Research 2009 26(2), 329-357 open access
Prior research reports seemingly conflicting evidence and interpretations concerning the relation between dispersion in analysts' earnings forecasts and stock returns. Diether et al. (2002) and Johnson (2004) find a negative relation between levels of dispersion in analysts' forecasts and future stock returns. Yet, changes in forecast dispersion are negatively associated with contemporaneous stock returns (L'Her and Suret 1996). We demonstrate that levels and changes in dispersion reflect different theoretical constructs. Changes in dispersion primarily reflect changes in information asymmetry whereas levels of dispersion primarily reflect levels of uncertainty. Further, the uncertainty component of dispersion levels reflects idiosyncratic risk that is negatively associated with future stock returns. These findings provide support for Johnson's (2004) explanation that dispersion levels reflect idiosyncratic uncertainty that increases the option value of the firm and generally refute Diether et al.'s (2002) explanation that dispersion levels reflect information asymmetry. In addition, we reconcile L'Her and Suret's (1996) findings with the findings of Johnson (2004). We find that the negative association between changes in dispersion and contemporaneous stock returns is not due to increased uncertainty but rather increased information asymmetry.

Analysts' Cultural Long‐Term Orientation and Their Information Production

Contemporary Accounting Research 2026 open access
We study how analysts' inherited cultural attitudes to time orientation affect their production of long‐term information and the profitability of their stock recommendations. We find that analysts from long‐term‐oriented cultures exhibit a longer forecast horizon and issue more long‐term forecasts. They also produce more accurate long‐term forecasts and ask more long‐term‐focused questions during conference calls, eliciting greater long‐term disclosure from managers. In addition, they are more likely to use discounted valuation models that explicitly incorporate expectations about firms' long‐term prospects. Further, their stock recommendations are more profitable, consistent with their production of long‐term information enhancing valuation. Our findings highlight the role of cultural long‐term orientation in shaping analysts' information production in capital markets.

Common Institutional Ownership and Earnings Management*

Contemporary Accounting Research 2021 38(1), 208-241
This study examines the relation between earnings management and block ownership of same‐industry peer firms by a common set of institutional investors (common institutional ownership). This relation is important given the tremendous growth of common institutional ownership and the significant influence of blockholders on financial reporting. We hypothesize that common institutional ownership mitigates earnings management by enhancing institutions' monitoring efficiency and by encouraging institutions to internalize the negative externality of a firm's earnings management on peer firms' investments. Consistent with our hypothesis, we find that higher common institutional ownership is related to less earnings management. Analyses of a quasi‐natural experiment based on financial institution mergers show that this negative relation is unlikely to be driven by the endogeneity of common institutional ownership. Cross‐sectional tests provide evidence that the negative relation is stronger among firms for which common institutional ownership is likely to generate a greater reduction in institutions' information acquisition and processing costs, and among firms whose severe financial misstatements are more likely to distort co‐owned peer firms' investments, supporting both mechanisms underlying our hypothesis. Our findings inform the ongoing debate on the costs and benefits of common institutional ownership by highlighting an important benefit: the enhanced monitoring of financial reporting.

Home Country Investor Protection, Ownership Structure and Cross‐Listed Firms' Compliance with SOX‐Mandated Internal Control Deficiency Disclosures

Contemporary Accounting Research 2013 30(4), 1490-1523 open access
We examine whether home country investor protection and ownership structure affect cross‐listed firms' compliance with SOX ‐mandated internal control deficiency ( ICD ) disclosures. We develop a proxy for the likelihood of cross‐listed firms' ICD misreporting during the Section 302 reporting regime. For cross‐listed firms domiciled in weak investor protection countries, we have three main findings. First, firms whose managers control their firms and have voting rights in excess of cash flow rights are more likely to misreport ICD than other firms during the Section 302 reporting regime. Second, there is a positive association between the likelihood of ICD misreporting and voluntary deregistration from the SEC prior to the Section 404 effective date. Third, for firms that chose not to deregister, there is a positive association between the likelihood of ICD misreporting and the reporting of previously undisclosed ICD s during the Section 404 reporting regime. We do not find similar evidence for cross‐listed firms domiciled in strong investor protection countries. Our findings are consistent with the hypothesis that, for cross‐listed firms domiciled in weak investor protection countries, managers who have the ability and incentive to expropriate outside minority shareholders are reluctant to disclose ICD s in order to protect their private control benefits. The results of our study should be of interest to regulators who wish to identify noncompliant firms for closer supervision, investors who wish to identify ex ante red flags for poor financial disclosure quality, and researchers who wish to understand the economic forces governing cross‐listed firms' financial disclosure behavior.