We examine how the presence of multiple supervisory agencies affects firm‐level compliance in form and substance with disclosure regulations. This analysis is important because coordination problems among regulators are frequently present in practice but often overlooked in academic research. We exploit that banks are subject to equivalent risk disclosure rules under securities laws (IFRS 7) and banking regulation (Pillar 3 of the Basel II Accord) but that different regulators start enforcing the rules at different points in time. We find that banks substantially increase their formal risk disclosures upon the adoption of Pillar 3 even if they already had to comply with the same requirements under IFRS 7. The effects are stronger if the central bank is responsible for bank supervision and bank regulators are equipped with more supervisory resources, but are less pronounced if the securities market regulator is an independent entity. In turn, banks facing more market pressures are more compliant with the rules. We further find persistent liquidity benefits of the increased risk disclosures but only after Pillar 3 became effective and its compliance was enforced by the banking regulator. Our results suggest that formal and material compliance with risk disclosure regulation are a function of both the resources of the supervisory agency and its incentive alignment with the regulated firms. In our setting, the banking regulator seems more effective in fulfilling this role

Understanding the role of bank lending in corporate innovation is important to policymakers, practitioners, and academics. We provide new evidence on such a role by exploiting the implementation of SFAS 166/167, which removed the off‐balance sheet status of certain securitized assets of banks. The regulation affects bank lending and thus represents a credit supply shock to borrowing firms. We find that affected banks raise spreads and cut loan amounts after the regulation. Firms that borrow from affected banks reduce R&D investment and the number and quality of the patents they generate. The reduction is concentrated among firms whose banks experience more downward pressure on capital ratios and greater market discipline, and firms that are more dependent on external financing. Additional analyses reveal that information asymmetry between incumbent banks and outsiders with respect to borrowing firms prevent them from switching. The overall findings suggest that bank lending promotes borrowing firms' innovation activities. Policies that restrict bank lending are likely to hurt innovation of borrowers

I investigate whether fair value accounting can contribute to the banking industry's systemic risk. I focus on the adoption of Statement of Financial Accounting Standard No. 115 (SFAS No. 115), which required available‐for‐sale (AFS) securities to be recognized at fair value with unrealized gains and losses included in equity through accumulated other comprehensive income. SFAS No. 115 increased banks' regulatory risk because, at the time, calculation of regulatory capital closely conformed with GAAP equity. I find that systemic risk increased following the adoption of SFAS No. 115. Furthermore, following a subsequent regulatory amendment—which excluded unrealized gains and losses on AFS securities from regulatory capital but did not change their GAAP treatment—systemic risk decreased. Taken together, the evidence suggests that fair value accounting has the potential to increase systemic risk through the explicit inclusion of volatile fair value estimates in regulatory bank capital adequacy assessments. I do not, however, find evidence of fair value accounting impacting systemic risk in its information role; that is, by providing information to a bank's external stakeholders about its financial position and performance. I also show that higher fair value volatility of investment securities, lower bank capital, and larger AFS security holdings increase banks' marginal contribution to systemic risk. My findings should interest regulators and policymakers, as recent regulatory changes in light of Basel III recommendations require unrealized gains and losses on AFS securities to be included in regulatory capital for advanced approaches banks

This study examines the impact of regulatory capital and several of its determinants (i.e., earnings, loan loss provisions, charge-offs and growth) on bank managers' financing decisions and investors' interpretations of those decisions. The analysis is related to two streams of research. We add to the corporate finance literature that seeks to explain the market's reaction to security issuances by developing and testing a refined set of predictions of the demand for debt and equity capital using a sample of capital-regulated firms (banks). We extend the accounting literature that links regulatory capital-management decisions with bank performance by examining whether investors infer that performance. We find that bank managers' financing choices reflect their private information regarding the levels of regulatory capital, earnings, and charge-offs in the issuance year. We document a negative market reaction to capital-increasing issuances and a positive reaction to capital-decreasing issuances. A cross-sectional analysis of that market reaction indicates that investors infer managers' expectations of earnings in the issuance year

This study examines the impact of regulatory capital and several of its determinants (i.e., earnings, loan loss provisions, charge‐offs and growth) on bank managers' financing decisions and investors' interpretations of those decisions. The analysis is related to two streams of research. We add to the corporate finance literature that seeks to explain the market's reaction to security issuances by developing and testing a refined set of predictions of the demand for debt and equity capital using a sample of capital‐regulated firms (banks). We extend the accounting literature that links regulatory capital‐management decisions with bank performance by examining whether investors infer that performance. We find that bank managers' financing choices reflect their private information regarding the levels of regulatory capital, earnings, and charge‐offs in the issuance year. We document a negative market reaction to capital‐increasing issuances and a positive reaction to capital‐decreasing issuances. A cross‐sectional analysis of that market reaction indicates that investors infer managers' expectations of earnings in the issuance year

The mandatory switch from the incurred loss model to the more forward‐looking current expected credit loss (CECL) model was originally scheduled to begin in 2020. However, when the COVID‐19 pandemic started in early 2020, US regulators made the switch voluntary. Our study investigates how banks' exposure to the pandemic affects their decision to adopt CECL as well as adopting banks' pandemic‐era pattern of loan loss provisions. First, consistent with pandemic‐driven economic uncertainty reducing banks' willingness to adopt the new model, we find a negative association between banks' pandemic exposure and their CECL adoption. This association is more pronounced for banks with more lending opportunities, more lending competition, and worse loan quality. Second, compared with non‐adopters, CECL adopters report more loan loss provisions during the pandemic's early period, and less or even negative loan loss provisions during the late period. The latter scenario reflects a reversal of earlier loan loss reserves and is more pronounced for banks with more exposure to states with a higher level of vaccination, consistent with banks having a more positive economic outlook because of improving pandemic conditions. Overall, our study offers useful insights into the adoption and implementation of accounting standards during periods of economic uncertainty

We examine whether bank connections via common mutual fund ownership serve as a contagion channel affecting the systemic risk of the banking system. Examining this relation is important because common mutual fund ownership has increased dramatically over the past 20 years, and a buildup of systemic risk was at the heart of the 2008–2009 financial crisis. We predict and document that the extent of a bank's connection with other banks via common ownership increases its contribution to systemic risk. We further predict and find that this association is primarily driven by passive mutual funds. We provide evidence that common passive ownership results in higher systemic risk through two mechanisms: nondiscretionary sell‐offs of bank stocks and a common pattern of voting. Our results are also robust to two alternate instrumental variable analyses. This study contributes to the literature by documenting an unintended, macro‐level consequence of common mutual fund ownership. Our findings broaden the understanding of common ownership as one mechanism through which systemic risk materializes and should be particularly relevant for regulators who seek to prevent future systemic failures