Knowledge that Transforms

What outcomes can be implemented by the choice of an information structure in binary‐action supermodular games? An outcome is partially implementable if it satisfies obedience (Bergemann and Morris (2016)). We characterize when an outcome is smallest equilibrium implementable (induced by the smallest equilibrium). Smallest equilibrium implementation requires a stronger sequential obedience condition: there is a stochastic ordering of players under which players are prepared to switch to the high action even if they think only those before them will switch. We then characterize the optimal outcome induced by an information designer who prefers the high action to be played, but anticipates that the worst (hence smallest) equilibrium will be played. In a potential game, under convexity assumptions on the potential and the designer's objective, it is optimal to choose an outcome where actions are perfectly coordinated (all players choose the same action), with the high action profile played on the largest event where that action profile maximizes the average potential.

We give two characterizations of Pareto optimality via “near” weighted utilitarian welfare maximization. One characterization sequentially maximizes utilitarian welfare functions using a finite sequence of nonnegative and eventually positive welfare weights. The other maximizes a utilitarian welfare function with a certain class of positive hyperreal weights. The social welfare ordering represented by these “near” weighted utilitarian welfare criteria is characterized by the standard axioms for weighted utilitarianism under a suitable weakening of the continuity axiom.

Does self‐governance, a hallmark of democratic societies, foster norms of generalized cooperation? Does this effect persist, and if so, why? I investigate these questions using a natural experiment in Switzerland. In the Middle Ages, the absence of an heir resulted in the extinction of a prominent noble dynasty. As a result, some Swiss municipalities became self‐governing, whereas the others remained under feudalism for another 600 years. Evidence from a behavioral experiment, the World Values Survey and the Swiss Household Panel consistently show that individuals from historically self‐governing municipalities exhibit stronger norms of cooperation today. Referenda data on voter‐turnout allow me to trace these effects on individually costly and socially beneficial actions for over 150 years. Furthermore, norms of cooperation map into prosocial behaviors like charitable giving and environmental protection. Uniquely, Switzerland tracks every family's place of origin in registration data, which I use to demonstrate persistence from cultural transmission in a context of historically low migration.

We use high‐frequency data on fine particulate matter air pollution (PM 2.5) at the locality level to study the effects of high pollution on daily labor supply decisions in the metropolitan area of Mexico City. We document a negative, non‐linear relationship between PM 2.5 and same‐day labor supply, with strong effects on days with extremely high pollution levels. On these days, the average worker experiences a reduction of around 7.5% of working hours. Workers partially compensate for lost hours by increasing their labor supply on days that follow high‐pollution days. We find that low‐income workers reduce their labor supply significantly less than high‐income workers. Unequal responses to high pollution along other dimensions (job quality, flexibility, gender) matter, but less than income. We provide suggestive evidence that reductions in labor supply due to high pollution are consistent with avoidance behavior.

We propose new confidence sets (CSs) for the regression discontinuity parameter in fuzzy designs. Our CSs are based on local linear regression, and are bias‐aware, in the sense that they take possible bias explicitly into account. Their construction shares similarities with that of Anderson–Rubin CSs in exactly identified instrumental variable models, and thereby avoids issues with “delta method” approximations that underlie most commonly used existing inference methods for fuzzy regression discontinuity analysis. Our CSs are asymptotically equivalent to existing procedures in canonical settings with strong identification and a continuous running variable. However, they are also valid under a wide range of other empirically relevant conditions, such as setups with discrete running variables, donut designs, and weak identification.

We provide a unified approach to stochastic dynamic programming with recursive utility based on an elementary application of Tarski's fixed point theorem. We establish that the exclusive source of multiple values is the presence of multiple recursive utilities consistent with the given aggregator, each yielding a legitimate value of the recursive program. We also present sufficient conditions ensuring a unique value of the recursive program in some circumstances. Overall, acknowledging the unavoidable failure of uniqueness in general, we argue that the greatest fixed point of the Bellman operator should have a privileged position.

We investigate optimal project management in a setting plagued by an indefinite number of setbacks that are discovered en route to project completion. The contractor can cover up delays in progress due to shirking either by making false claims of setbacks or by postponing the reports of real ones. The sponsor optimally induces work and honest reporting via a soft deadline and a reward for completion that specifies a bonus for early delivery. Late‐stage setbacks trigger randomization between minimally feasible project extension and (inefficient) cancellation. Because extensions may be granted repeatedly, arbitrarily large overruns in schedule and budget are possible after which the project may still be canceled.

A burgeoning literature in labor economics is focused on modeling employer labor market power, generally finding nontrivial estimates of monopsony power. A smaller literature also simultaneously incorporates product market power. Deb, Eeckhout, Patel, and Warren (2024) is an example of applying an oligopoly‐oligopsony model to the U.S. labor market, arguing for important effects on wage levels and inequality from rising market power. I support combining IO and labor as a fruitful way of studying wages and business dynamism, but argue for looking more broadly at (i) differential degrees of employer power in labor and product markets; (ii) investigating the dynamic sources of markups (e.g., through innovation), and (iii) considering wage bargaining models, not just wage posting models, which have some starkly different implications for wage setting.

Supply chain disturbances can lead to substantial increases in production costs. To mitigate these risks, firms may take steps to reduce their reliance on volatile suppliers. We construct a model of endogenous network formation to investigate how these decisions affect the structure of the production network and the level and volatility of macroeconomic aggregates. When uncertainty increases in the model, producers prefer to purchase from more stable suppliers, even though they might sell at higher prices. The resulting reorganization of the network tends to reduce macroeconomic volatility, but at the cost of a decline in aggregate output. The model also predicts that more productive and stable firms have higher Domar weights—a measure of their importance as suppliers—in the equilibrium network. We provide a basic calibration of the model using U.S. data to evaluate the importance of these mechanisms.