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Efficient Use of Information and Social�Value�of�Information

Econometrica 2007 75(4), 1103-1142 open access
This paper analyzes equlibrium and welfare for a tractable class of economies (games) with externalities, strategic complementarity or substitutability, and heterogenous information. First, we characterize the equilibrium use of information; complementarity heightens the sensitivity of equilibrium actions to public information, raising aggregate volatility, whereas substitutability heightens the sensitivity to private information, cross-sectional dispersion. Next, we define and characterize an efficiency benchmark designed to address whether the equilibrium use of information is optimal from a social perspective; the efficient use of information reflects the social value of aligning choices across agents. Finally, we examine the comparative statics of equilibrium welfare with respect to the information structure; the social value of information is best understood by classifying economies according to the inefficiency, if any, in the equilibrium use of information. We conclude with a few applications, including production externalities, beauty contests, business cycles, and large Cournot and Bertrand games.

Can Deficits Finance Themselves?

Econometrica 2024 92(5), 1351-1390 open access
We ask how fiscal deficits are financed in environments with two key features: (i) nominal rigidity, and (ii) a violation of Ricardian equivalence due to finite lives or liquidity constraints. In such environments, deficits can contribute to their own financing through two channels: a boom in real economic activity, which expands the tax base; and a surge in inflation, which erodes the real value of nominal government debt. Our main theoretical result establishes that this mechanism becomes more potent as fiscal adjustment is delayed, leading to full self‐financing in the limit: if the monetary authority does not lean too heavily against the fiscal stimulus, then the government can run a deficit today, refrain from tax hikes or spending cuts in the future, and still see its debt converge back to its initial level. We further demonstrate that a significant degree of self‐financing is achievable when the theory is disciplined by empirical evidence on marginal propensities to consume, nominal rigidities, the monetary policy reaction, and the speed of fiscal adjustment.