"Caption title

Cover title

This paper empirically investigates how sentences to be assigned at trial impact plea bargaining. The analysis is based on the model of bargaining with asymmetric information by Bebchuk, 1984. I provide conditions for the nonparametric identification of the model, propose a consistent nonparametric estimator, and implement it using data on criminal cases from North Carolina. Employing the estimated model, I evaluate how different sentencing reforms affect the outcome of criminal cases. My results indicate that lower mandatory minimum sentences could greatly reduce the total amount of incarceration time assigned by the courts, but may increase conviction rates. In contrast, the broader use of non‐incarceration sentences for less serious crimes reduces the number of incarceration convictions, but has a very small effect over the total assigned incarceration time. I also consider the effects of a ban on plea bargains. Depending on the case characteristics, over 20 percent of the defendants who currently receive incarceration sentences would be acquitted if plea bargains were forbidden.

Institutional and Behavioral Economics, Labor and Human Capital

[Under classical assumptions, characterizations are given for two classes of instrumental variable estimators of an equation in a simultaneous system. IV estimators where all instruments are nonstochastic are expressed in terms of multinormal random vectors in exactly the same way as the 2SLS estimator of a just-identified equation. These estimators have no finite moments of positive integral order. The second class, consisting of IV estimators based on certain stochastic instruments, includes the OLS, 2SLS, and modified 2SLS estimators. The inadmissibility (under squared-error loss) of some estimators in this class is considered when the equation being estimated contains two endogenous variables.]

Roberto S. Mariano, Approximations to the Distribution Functions of the Ordinary Least-Squares and Two-Stage Least-Squares Estimators in the Case of Two Included Endogenous Variables, Econometrica, Vol. 41, No. 1 (Jan., 1973), pp. 67-77

[This paper deals with two single-equation estimators in a set of simultaneous linear stochastic equations--namely, ordinary least squares (OLS) and two-stage least squares (2SLS). Under the assumption that all predetermined variables in the model are exogenous, necessary and sufficient conditions are obtained for the existence of even moments of the above estimators. It is shown that for the general case with an arbitrary number of included endogenous variables, even moments of the 2SLS estimator are finite if and only if the order is less than K2 - G1 + 1. Furthermore, even moments of the OLS estimator exist if and only if the order is less than N - K1 - G1 + 1, where N is the sample size, G1 + 1 is the number of included endogenous variables, K1 and K2 respectively are the number of included and excluded exogenous variables in the equation to be estimated.]

We analyze trading speed and fragmentation in asset markets. In our model, trading venues make technological investments and compete for investors who choose where and how much to trade. Faster venues charge higher fees and attract speed-sensitive investors. Competition among venues increases investor participation, trading volume, and allocative e ffi ciency, but entry and fragmentation can be excessive, and speeds are generically ine ffi cient. Regulations that protect transaction prices (e.g., Securities and Exchange Commission trade-through rule) lead to greater fragmentation. Our model sheds light on the experience of European and U.S. markets since the implementation of Markets in Financial Instruments Directive and Regulation National Markets System.

We study elections that simultaneously decide multiple issues, where voters have independent private values over bundles of issues. The innovation is in considering nonseparable preferences, where issues may be complements or substitutes. Voters face a political exposure problem: the optimal vote for a particular issue will depend on the resolution of the other issues. Moreover, the probabilities that the other issues will pass should be conditioned on being pivotal. We prove that equilibrium exists when distributions over values have full support or when issues are complements. We then study large elections with two issues. There exists a nonempty open set of distributions where the probability of either issue passing fails to converge to either 1 or 0 for all limit equilibria. Thus, the outcomes of large elections are not generically predictable with independent private values, despite the fact that there is no aggregate uncertainty regarding fundamentals. While the Condorcet winner is not necessarily the outcome of a multi-issue election, we provide sufficient conditions that guarantee the implementation of the Condorcet winner. © 2012 The Econometric Society.