Knowledge that Transforms

[This paper presents a general equilibrium model in which private commodities are allocated through competitive markets and public commodities according to government allocation and taxing rules that depend on information communicated to the government by consumers regarding their preferences. A wide range of strategic behavior for consumers in their communication with the government is allowed; in particular, consumers may understate their preferences and be "free riders" if they choose. Although several examples of allocation-taxation schemes falling within the general model are discussed, the major contribution of the paper is the formulation of a particular government allocation-taxation scheme for which the behavioral equilibria are Pareto optimal. That is, given the government rules, consumers find it in their self-interest to reveal their true preferences for public goods.]

[In recent studies of economic organization [9 and 15] it has been found necessary to impose certain restrictions (regularity conditions) on the communication process. Such restrictions limit the class of environments for which the organization is Pareto satisfactory. We show that a class of environments admits a Pareto satisfactory (and regular) resource allocation mechanism if and only if the graph of the Pareto correspondence is a union of continuous functions. We also study the shape of the Pareto set for a given environment and the way that set varies as the environment varies. We present examples showing that near any environment whose Pareto utility frontier is homeomorphic to a simplex there is whose Pareto frontier is badly chopped up. We also give an example of a class of environments for which the Pareto correspondence has no continuous selection through a given point.]

[Available theorems establishing the existence of general equilibrium in models incorporating imperfectly competitive firms rely on the assumption that reaction curves are continuous functions (or convex-valued, upper hemi-continuous correspondences). However, this property has not been derived from conditions on the fundamental data of tastes, technology, and maximizing behavior. We show here that continuity may fail even in extremely simple cases, with the result that equilibrium price and/or quantity choices fail to exist. The non-pathological nature of the examples we present suggests the need for a fundamental re-examination of the way our partial and general equilibrium models of monopolistic competition fit together.]

If there exist heterogeneous capital goods, a steady state may be "paradoxical" in the sense that increasing the rate of interest above the Golden Rule level may lead to an increase in consumption or utility, rather than to the decrease which always occurs in one-sector models. It is shown that, in many cases, a path of capital accumulation which maximizes the minimum consumption or utility level is unlikely to converge to a paradoxi- cal steady state of this kind.

[Under classical assumptions, characterizations are given for two classes of instrumental variable estimators of an equation in a simultaneous system. IV estimators where all instruments are nonstochastic are expressed in terms of multinormal random vectors in exactly the same way as the 2SLS estimator of a just-identified equation. These estimators have no finite moments of positive integral order. The second class, consisting of IV estimators based on certain stochastic instruments, includes the OLS, 2SLS, and modified 2SLS estimators. The inadmissibility (under squared-error loss) of some estimators in this class is considered when the equation being estimated contains two endogenous variables.]

[A decision scheme makes the probabilities of alternatives depend on individual strong orderings of them. It is strategy-proof if it logically precludes anyone's advantageously misrepresenting his preferences. It is unilateral if only one individual can affect the outcome, and duple if it restricts the final outcome to a fixed pair of alternatives. Any strategy-proof decision scheme, it is shown, is a probability mixture of schemes each of which is unilateral or duple. If it guarantees Pareto optimal outcomes, it is a probability mixture of dictatorial schemes. If it guarantees ex ante Pareto optimal lotteries, it is dictatorial.]