We study preferences estimated from finite choice experiments and provide sufficient conditions for convergence to a unique underlying “true” preference. Our conditions are weak and, therefore, valid in a wide range of economic environments. We develop applications to expected utility theory, choice over consumption bundles, and menu choice. Our framework unifies the revealed preference tradition with models that allow for errors.

Regulation requiring insiders to publicly disclose their stock trades after the fact complicates the trading decisions of informed, rent-seeking insiders. Given this requirement, we present an insider's equilibrium trading strategy in a multiperiod rational expectations framework. Relative to Kyle (1985), price discovery is accelerated and insider profits are lower. The strategy balances immediate profits from informed trades against the reduction in future profits following trade disclosure and, hence, revelation of some of the insider's information. Our results offer a novel rationale for contrarian trading: dissimulation, a phenomenon distinct from manipulation, may underlie insiders' trading decisions.

This paper reports both theoretical results and also computational experience with a method for approximating a competitive equilibrium in a piecewise linear economy. The algorithm consists of solving a sequence of linear programs, alternating between: (a) a problem which ensures a balancing bundle of choices and generates a price vector; and (b) a problem which indicates the maximum level of utility attainable by each household--given the initial resource endowments-and also given the prices generated at the current iteration of the master problem. Each subproblem provides a utility vector. The master problem determines a convex combination of the utility vectors generated at previous iterations. This convex combination is chosen so as to minimize the distance between the quantityconsistent and the price-consistent set. For the sequence of sub and master problems to approach a competitive equilibrium, this distance must approach zero. Thus far, the algorithm has failed whenever all equilibria are unstable, and it has converged rapidly when there are stable equilibria. It will be shown that the algorithm does not cycle. It will also be shown that if the sequence of solutions (obtained from the algorithm) converges, then it converges to a Walrasian equilibrium.

This paper provides necessary and sufficient conditions for it to be optimal to base decisions on estimates of the parameters that characterize a decision problem (e.g., profit maximization with an estimated price elasticity of demand). We show that the separation of parameter estimation from decision making generally yields lower utility than an integrated approach which takes account of estimation uncertainty. We evaluate the decision in the parameter estimation method and show that the resulting utility loss can be substantial. MANY ACTUAL DECISIONS are based on statistical estimates of parameters that help to characterize the decision environment. For example, a firm maximizing the expected utility of profit might find that its input and output decisions depend on unknown parameters of its demand function. Econometric estimates of such parameters might then be derived and utilized in making these decisions. The first purpose of this paper is to rigorously investigate whether it is correct to make decisions in this manner; in general, it is not. The second purpose is to investigate the decis'ion bias in decisions based on commonly employed parameter estimates. We will determine, for example, whether a price setting monopolist is mistakenly setting prices too high or too low when he bases his pricing decision on the maximum likelihood estimate of his demand equation. Finally, we provide a detailed numerical example to show that basing decisions on conventional parameter estimates can lead to large losses of utility. In Section 2, we introduce all notation, explain the procedure commonly used when basing decisions on values of unknown underlying parameters, and exhibit the decision-theoretic correct alternative procedure. When the optimal decisions under these two procedures are identical, we call the proper. We use the term summary value to refer not only to standard parameter estimates but to any single substituted for an unknown parameter in order to make decisions. This generalized concept is necessary because a that is appropriate for making decisions, in a sense defined below, need not have any of the properties of conventional parameter estimators. In Section 3, we derive under general assumptions necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of proper values that are independent of the decision maker's utility function, U( ). This independence restriction is