[This paper presents a general equilibrium model in which private commodities are allocated through competitive markets and public commodities according to government allocation and taxing rules that depend on information communicated to the government by consumers regarding their preferences. A wide range of strategic behavior for consumers in their communication with the government is allowed; in particular, consumers may understate their preferences and be "free riders" if they choose. Although several examples of allocation-taxation schemes falling within the general model are discussed, the major contribution of the paper is the formulation of a particular government allocation-taxation scheme for which the behavioral equilibria are Pareto optimal. That is, given the government rules, consumers find it in their self-interest to reveal their true preferences for public goods.]
[The sets of local demand functions which would generate either linear or nonlinear schedules in a heterogenous as well as homogeneous space economy are determined by iterative applications of the separation of variables technique for solving differential equations. Nonlinear delivered price schedules which reflect profit maximization objectives are thereby identifiable. In turn, these schedules can be distinguished from those which involve strictly predatory price behavior.]
The Lorenz curve relates the cumulative proportion of income units to the cumulative proportion of income received when units are arranged in ascending order of their income. In the past the curve has been mainly used as a convenient graphic device to represent the size distribution of income and wealth. In this paper the Lorenz curve technique is used as a tool to introduce distributional considerations in economic analysis. The concept has been extended and generalized to study the relationships among the distributions of different economic variables. The generalized Lorenz curves are called concentration curves and the Lorenz curve is only a special case of such curves, the concentration curve for income. Section 2 of the paper gives the derivation of the Lorenz curve. Section 3 provides some theorems relative to the concentration curve of a function and its elasticity, which provide the basis for studying relationships among the distributions of different economic variables. Section 4 discusses applications of the theorems.
Previous attempts to estimate labor supply functions based upon the constrained maximization of a utility function with leisure and income as arguments have assumed that all time not spent at work on the job is leisure time. In this paper we formulate a model of a household in which time is allocated between work on the job, leisure, and housework, where leisure is defined to be net of time spent on housework. The model is estimated under two alternative stochastic specifications and the results compared to those obtained (i) assuming that housework time is exogenous and (ii) assuming that housework time is part of leisure time.
[The fact that preference maximizing consumers generate aggregate excess demand is utilized to prove (i) a statement on the values of the excess demand correspondence and (ii) that the economies having an excess demand function are dense in the set of all economies. This is applied to get a straightforward proof for the existence of an equilibrium distribution.]
FOLLOWING ON SOME informal conjectures by Dummett and Farquharson [3] and Vickery [20] we now have independent proofs by Gibbard [7] and Satterthwaite [17 and 18] that no collective choice rule exists whose social choice functions are singlevalued, strategy-proof, nondictatorial and have a range containing at least three alternatives. Because strategy-proof ness seems desirable and because it is closely related to mainstream economic theory issues of evaluating resource allocation institutions with respect to incentive compatibility (cf. Hurwicz [9]), their theorem has excited considerable attention [5, 6, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 19, and 21]. In this paper, the requirement of singlevaluedness is dropped and explorations are made of the consequences this has on the Gibbard-Satterthwaite results. Let E be the set of all alternatives (which must, by assumption, be mutually incompatible) and N= {1, 2,.. ., n} be the set of individuals. A nonempty subset, v, of E (i.e., an element of 2E _-0}) is an agenda. RE is the set of all complete and transitive binary relations on E; RE is the n-fold Cartesian product of RE. An element, u, of RE is called a profile and if u = (R1, R2,... , Rn), we say that R, is the preference ordering for individual i in u. In the usual way, we use Ri to define strict preference, Pi, and indifference, Ii: xPiy if and only if xRiy and not yRix; xIiy if and only if xRiy and yRix. A social choice function (on V) is a function, C, on Vc2E _{0} into 2E _{0} satisfying C(v) c v. Here V is the set of admissible agenda. The set of all social choice functions on V is called ST. A collective choice rule (on V, U) is a function, F, on UcRE into c6. Here U is the set of admissible profiles. The first constraints on the social choice function in the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem are domain restrictions. They admit only one agenda, V= {E} and then require the collective choice rule to work for all societies, U = RE. The most important constraint they use is singlevaluedness: for each v in V, C(v) contains exactly one element. Of course, there is only one V, namely E, in the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem. The importance of this constraint stems from its use in all the rest of the problem; singlevaluedness is used in their method of formalizing both nondictatorship and strategy-proofness. Let us deal first with nondictatorship. Using singlevaluedness, let C(v) be the unique member of C(v). Then a collective choice rule, F, is nondictatorial if for no i, i = 1, ... , n, is it true that for all (R1,. . . , Rn) =uE U and for all x C(v) in the range of C = F(u), C(v)Pix. Finally, we turn to strategy-proofness. A collective choice rule is strategy-proof at (v, u) if it is not manipulable at (v, u). F is manipulable at (v, u) if, when u = (R1, R2, ... , Rn), there is a u'=
[A social decision function operates on individual weak orderings to produce acyclic social preference. The structure of a general neutral monotonic SDF is studied. It is shown to be characterized by the veto, if individual indifference is banned. With such indifference present, the characterization is by a veto structure, a hierarchy embracing all individuals. The reason for the interest in acyclicity [21, 22] is that it averts the voting paradox, permitting a choicefrom each subset of alternatives. This is for the finite case. When that assumption is dropped, an infinite ascending sequence of preferences prevents a choice. It is shown that this last phenomenon need not be prohibited along with cycles; the absence of such social sequences is implied by their absence from individual preferences.]