Knowledge that Transforms

The theory of global games has shown that coordination games with multiple equilibria may have a unique equilibrium if certain parameters of the payoff function are private information instead of common knowledge. We report the results of an experiment designed to test the predictions of this theory. Comparing sessions with common and private information, we observe only small differences in behavior. For common information, subjects coordinate on threshold strategies that deviate from the global game solution towards the payoff-dominant equilibrium. For private information, thresholds are closer to the global game solution than for common information. Variations in the payoff function affect behavior as predicted by comparative statics of the global game solution. Predictability of coordination points is about the same for both information conditions.

The holdup problem arises when parties negotiate to divide the surplus generated by their relationship specific investments. We study this problem in a dynamic model of bargaining and investment which, unlike the stylized static model, allows the parties to continue to invest until they agree on the terms of trade. The investment dynamics overturns the conventional wisdom dramatically. First, the holdup problem need not entail underinvestment when the parties are sufficiently patient. Second, inefficiencies can arise unambiguously in some cases, but they are not caused by the sharing of surplus per se but rather by a failure of an individual rationality constraint. Copyright The Econometric Society 2004.

We establish consistency and asymptotic normality of the quasi-maximum likelihood estimator in the linear ARCH model. Contrary to the existing literature, we allow the parameters to be in the region where no stationary version of the process exists. This implies that the estimator is always asymptotically normal.

this paper, we study the use of these intervals as CIs for the partially identified parameter f(P,#). Our most basic finding is Lemma 2.1: Lemma 2.1 Let CN0 0, CN1 0, # #, and P #P

This paper investigates asymptotic properties of the maximum likelihood estimator and the quasi-maximum likelihood estimator for the spatial autoregressive model. The rates of convergence of those estimators may depend on some general features of the spatial weights matrix of the model. It is important to make the distinction with different spatial scenarios. Under the scenario that each unit will be influenced by only a few neighboring units, the estimators may have -rate of convergence and be asymptotically normal. When each unit can be influenced by many neighbors, irregularity of the information matrix may occur and various components of the estimators may have different rates of convergence.

We study the long-run sustainability of reputations in games with imperfect public monitoring. It is impossible to maintain a permanent reputation for playing a strategy that does not play an equilibrium of the game without uncertainty about types. Thus, a player cannot indefinitely sustain a reputation for noncredible behavior in the presence of imperfect monitoring.

Several experimental studies have provided evidence that suggest indifference curves have a kink around the current endowment level. These results, which clearly contradict closely held economic doctrines, have led some influential commentators to call for an entirely new economic paradigm to displace conventional neoclassical theory—e.g., prospect theory, which invokes psychological effects. This paper pits neoclassical theory against prospect theory by investigating data drawn from more than 375 subjects actively participating in a well-functioning marketplace. The pattern of results suggests that prospect theory adequately organizes behavior among inexperienced consumers, but consumers with intense market experience behave largely in accordance with neoclassical predictions. Moreover, the data are consistent with the notion that consumers learn to overcome the endowment effect in situations beyond specific problems they have previously encountered. This “transference of behavior” across domains has important implications in both a positive and normative sense.

In this paper we investigate methods for testing the existence of a cointegration relationship among the components of a nonstationary fractionally integrated (NFI) vector time series. Our framework generalizes previous studies restricted to unit root integrated processes and permits simultaneous analysis of spurious and cointegrated NFI vectors. We propose a modified F-statistic, based on a particular studentization, which converges weakly under both hypotheses, despite the fact that OLS estimates are only consistent under cointegration. This statistic leads to a Wald-type test of cointegration when combined with a narrow band GLS-type estimate. Our semiparametric methodology allows consistent testing of the spurious regression hypothesis against the alternative of fractional cointegration without prior knowledge on the memory of the original series, their short run properties, the cointegrating vector, or the degree of cointegration. This semiparametric aspect of the modelization does not lead to an asymptotic loss of power, permitting the Wald statistic to diverge faster under the alternative of cointegration than when testing for a hypothesized cointegration vector. In our simulations we show that the method has comparable power to customary procedures under the unit root cointegration setup, and maintains good properties in a general framework where other methods may fail. We illustrate our method testing the cointegration hypothesis of nominal GNP and simple-sum (M1, M2, M3) monetary aggregates.

GARCH models are commonly used as latent processes in econometrics, financial economics, and macroeconomics. Yet no exact likelihood analysis of these models has been provided so far. In this paper we outline the issues and suggest a Markov chain Monte Carlo algorithm which allows the calculation of a classical estimator via the simulated EM algorithm or a Bayesian solution in O(T) computational operations, where T denotes the sample size. We assess the performance of our proposed algorithm in the context of both artificial examples and an empirical application to 26 UK sectorial stock returns, and compare it to existing approximate solutions.

We establish the existence of pure strategy equilibria in monotone bidding functions in first-price auctions with asymmetric bidders, interdependent values, and affiliated one-dimensional signals. By extending a monotonicity result due to Milgrom and Weber (1982), we show that single crossing can fail only when ties occur at winning bids or when bids are individually irrational. We avoid these problems by considering limits of ever finer finite bid sets such that no two bidders have a common serious bid, and by recalling that single crossing is needed only at individually rational bids. Two examples suggest that our results cannot be extended to multidimensional signals or to second-price auctions. Copyright The Econometric Society 2004.