Knowledge that Transforms

We present a new method for solving asset pricing models, which yields an analytic price-dividend function of one state variable. To illustrate our method we give a detailed analysis of Abel's asset pricing model. A function is analytic in an open interval if it can be represented as a convergent power series near every point of that interval. In addition to allowing us to solve for the exact equilibrium price-dividend function, the analyticity property also lets us assess the accuracy of any numerical solution procedure used in the asset pricing literature. Copyright The Econometric Society 2005.

We show existence of equilibria in distributional strategies for a wide class of private value auctions, including the first general existence result for double auctions. The set of equilibria is invariant to the tie-breaking rule. The model incorporates multiple unit demands, all standard pricing rules, reserve prices, entry costs, and stochastic demand and supply. Valuations can be correlated and asymmetrically distributed. For double auctions, we show further that at least one equilibrium involves a positive volume of trade. The existence proof establishes new connections among existence techniques for discontinuous Bayesian games.

This paper investigates the driving forces behind informal sanctions in cooperation games and the extent to which theories of fairness and reciprocity capture these forces. We find that cooperators' punishment is almost exclusively targeted toward the defectors, but the latter also impose a considerable amount of spiteful punishment on the cooperators. However, spiteful punishment vanishes if the punishers can no longer affect the payoff differences between themselves and the punished individual, whereas the cooperators even increase the resources devoted to punishment in this case. Our data also discriminate between different fairness principles. Fairness theories that are based on the assumption that players compare their own payoff to the group's average or the group's total payoff cannot explain the fact that cooperators target their punishment at the defectors. Fairness theories that assume that players aim to minimize payoff inequalities cannot explain the fact that cooperators punish defectors even if payoff inequalities cannot be reduced. Therefore, retaliation, i.e., the desire to harm those who committed unfair acts, seems to be the most important motive behind fairness-driven informal sanctions. Copyright The Econometric Society 2005.

We propose a generalized method of moments (GMM) Lagrange multiplier statistic, i.e., the K statistic, that uses a Jacobian estimator based on the continuous updating estimator that is asymptotically uncorrelated with the sample average of the moments. Its asymptotic χ-super-2 distribution therefore holds under a wider set of circumstances, like weak instruments, than the standard full rank case for the expected Jacobian under which the asymptotic χ-super-2 distributions of the traditional statistics are valid. The behavior of the K statistic can be spurious around inflection points and maxima of the objective function. This inadequacy is overcome by combining the K statistic with a statistic that tests the validity of the moment equations and by an extension of Moreira's (2003) conditional likelihood ratio statistic toward GMM. We conduct a power comparison to test for the risk aversion parameter in a stochastic discount factor model and construct its confidence set for observed consumption growth and asset return series. Copyright The Econometric Society 2005.

We extend the standard model of general equilibrium with incomplete markets to allow for default and punishment by thinking of assets as pools. The equilibrating variables include expected delivery rates, along with the usual prices of assets and commodities. By reinterpreting the variables, our model encompasses a broad range of adverse selection and signalling phenomena in a perfectly competitive, general equilibrium framework. Perfect competition eliminates the need for lenders to compute how the size of their loan or the price they quote might affect default rates. It also makes for a simple equilibrium refinement, which we propose in order to rule out irrational pessimism about deliveries of untraded assets. We show that refined equilibrium always exists in our model, and that default, in conjunction with refinement, opens the door to a theory of endogenous assets. The market chooses the promises, default penalties, and quantity constraints of actively traded assets.

In a number of semiparametric models, smoothing seems necessary in order to obtain estimates of the parametric component which are asymptotically normal and converge at parametric rate. However, smoothing can inflate the error in the normal approximation, so that refined approximations are of interest, especially in sample sizes that are not enormous. We show that a bootstrap distribution achieves a valid Edgeworth correction in the case of density-weighted averaged derivative estimates of semiparametric index models. Approaches to bias reduction are discussed. We also develop a higher-order expansion to show that the bootstrap achieves a further reduction in size distortion in the case of two-sided testing. The finite-sample performance of the methods is investigated by means of Monte Carlo simulations from a Tobit model.

How much discretion should the monetary authority have in setting its policy? This question is analyzed in an economy with an agreed-upon social welfare function that depends on the economy's randomly fluctuating state. The monetary authority has private information about that state. Well designed rules trade off society's desire to give the monetary authority discretion to react to its private information against society's need to prevent that authority from giving in to the temptation to stimulate the economy with unexpected inflation, the time inconsistency problem. Although this dynamic mechanism design problem seems complex, its solution is simple: legislate an inflation cap. The optimal degree of monetary policy discretion turns out to shrink as the severity of the time inconsistency problem increases relative to the importance of private information. In an economy with a severe time inconsistency problem and unimportant private information, the optimal degree of discretion is none.

We apply recent econometric advances to study the distribution of commuters' preferences for speedy and reliable highway travel. Our analysis applies mixed logit to combined revealed and stated preference data on commuter choices of whether to pay a toll for congestion-free express travel. We find that motorists exhibit high values of travel time and reliability, and substantial heterogeneity in those values. We suggest that road pricing policies designed to cater to such varying preferences can improve efficiency and reduce the disparity of welfare impacts compared with recent pricing experiments.

This paper is concerned with accuracy properties of simulations of approximate solutions for stochastic dynamic models. Our analysis rests upon a continuity property of invariant distributions and a generalized law of large numbers. We then show that the statistics generated by any sufficiently good numerical approximation are arbitrarily close to the set of expected values of the model's invariant distributions. Also, under a contractivity condition on the dynamics, we establish error bounds. These results are of further interest for the comparative study of stationary solutions and the estimation of structural dynamic models.

We consider an exchange economy in which there are infinitely many consumers and some commodities are bads, that is, cause disutility to consumers. We give an example of such an economy for which there is no competitive equilibrium or its variants (quasi- or pseudo-equilibrium), and an example of the failure of the so-called uniform integrability condition of equilibrium allocations of increasingly populous finite economies. Copyright The Econometric Society 2005.