Knowledge that Transforms

A seller and a buyer bargain over the terms of trade for an object. The seller receives a perfect signal that determines the value of the object to both players, whereas the buyer remains uninformed. We analyze the infinite-horizon bargaining game in which the buyer makes all the offers. When the static incentive constraints permit first-best efficiency, then under some regularity conditions the outcome of the sequential bargaining game becomes arbitrarily efficient as bargaining frictions vanish. When the static incentive constraints preclude first-best efficiency, the limiting bargaining outcome is not second-best efficient and may even perform worse than the outcome from the one-period bargaining game. With frequent buyer offers, the outcome is then characterized by recurring bursts of high probability of agreement, followed by long periods of delay in which the probability of agreement is negligible.

Finite population noncooperative games with linear-quadratic utilities, where each player decides how much action she exerts, can be interpreted as a network game with local payoff complementarities, together with a globally uniform payoff substitutability component and an own-concavity effect. For these games, the Nash equilibrium action of each player is proportional to her Bonacich centrality in the network of local complementarities, thus establishing a bridge with the sociology literature on social networks. This Bonacich–Nash linkage implies that aggregate equilibrium increases with network size and density. We then analyze a policy that consists of targeting the key player, that is, the player who, once removed, leads to the optimal change in aggregate activity. We provide a geometric characterization of the key player identified with an intercentrality measure, which takes into account both a player's centrality and her contribution to the centrality of the others.

We prove the folk theorem for discounted repeated games under private, almost-perfect monitoring. Our result covers all finite, n-player games that satisfy the usual full-dimensionality condition. Mixed strategies are allowed in determining the individually rational payoffs. We assume no cheap-talk communication between players and no public randomization device. Copyright The Econometric Society 2006.

This paper studies the econometrics of computed dynamic models. Since these models generally lack a closed-form solution, their policy functions are approximated by numerical methods. Hence, the researcher can only evaluate an approximated likelihood associated with the approximated policy function rather than the exact likelihood implied by the exact policy function. What are the consequences for inference of the use of approximated likelihoods? First, we find conditions under which, as the approximated policy function converges to the exact policy, the approximated likelihood also converges to the exact likelihood. Second, we show that second order approximation errors in the policy function, which almost always are ignored by researchers, have first order effects on the likelihood function. Third, we discuss convergence of Bayesian and classical estimates. Finally, we propose to use a likelihood ratio test as a diagnostic device for problems derived from the use of approximated likelihoods.

The Lemke–Howson algorithm is the classical method for finding one Nash equilibrium of a bimatrix game. This paper presents a class of square bimatrix games for which this algorithm takes, even in the best case, an exponential number of steps in the dimension d of the game. Using polytope theory, the games are constructed using pairs of dual cyclic polytopes with 2d suitably labeled facets in d-space. The construction is extended to nonsquare games where, in addition to exponentially long Lemke–Howson computations, finding an equilibrium by support enumeration takes on average exponential time.

A contract with multiple agents may be susceptible to collusion. We show that agents' collusion imposes no cost in a large class of circumstances with risk neutral agents, including both uncorrelated and correlated types. In those circumstances, any payoff the principal can attain in the absence of collusion, including the second best level, can be attained in the presence of collusion in a way robust to many aspects of collusion behavior. The collusion-proof implementation generalizes to a setting in which only a subset of agents may collude, provided that noncollusive agents' incentives can be protected via an ex post incentive compatible and ex post individually rational mechanism. Our collusion-proof implementation also sheds light on the extent to which hierarchical delegation of contracts can optimally respond to collusion.

A number of studies, most notably Crémer and McLean (1985, 1988), have shown that in generic type spaces that admit a common prior and are of a fixed finite size, an uninformed seller can design mechanisms that extract all the surplus from privately informed bidders. We show that this result hinges on the nonconvexity of such a family of priors. When the ambient family of priors is convex, generic priors do not allow for full surplus extraction provided that for at least one prior in this family, players' beliefs about other players' types do not pin down the players' own preferences. In particular, full surplus extraction is generically impossible in finite type spaces with a common prior. Similarly, generic priors on the universal type space do not allow for full surplus extraction.

In this paper, we introduce a kernel-based estimation principle for nonparametric models named local partitioned regression (LPR). This principle is a nonparametric generalization of the familiar partition regression in linear models. It has several key advantages: First, it generates estimators for a very large class of semi- and nonparametric models. A number of examples that are particularly relevant for economic applications will be discussed in this paper. This class contains the additive, partially linear, and varying coefficient models as well as several other models that have not been discussed in the literature. Second, LPR-based estimators achieve optimality criteria: They have optimal speed of convergence and are oracle-efficient. Moreover, they are simple in structure, widely applicable, and computationally inexpensive. A Monte Carlo simulation highlights these advantages. Copyright The Econometric Society 2006.

We consider the situation when there is a large number of series, N, each with T observations, and each series has some predictive ability for some variable of interest. A methodology of growing interest is first to estimate common factors from the panel of data by the method of principal components and then to augment an otherwise standard regression with the estimated factors. In this paper, we show that the least squares estimates obtained from these factor-augmented regressions are consistent and asymptotically normal if . The conditional mean predicted by the estimated factors is consistent and asymptotically normal. Except when T/N goes to zero, inference should take into account the effect of “estimated regressors” on the estimated conditional mean. We present analytical formulas for prediction intervals that are valid regardless of the magnitude of N/T and that can also be used when the factors are nonstationary.

Building upon a continuous-time model of search with Nash bargaining in a stationary environment, we analyze the effect of changes in minimum wages on labor market outcomes and welfare. Although minimum wage increases may or may not lead to increases in unemployment in our model, they can be welfare-improving to labor market participants on both the supply and demand sides of the labor market. We discuss identification of the model using Current Population Survey data on accepted wages and unemployment durations, and show that by incorporating a limited amount of information from the demand side of the market it is possible to obtain credible and precise estimates of all primitive parameters. We show that the optimal minimum wage in 1996 depends critically on whether or not contact rates can be considered to be exogenous and we note that the limited variation in minimum wages makes testing this assumption problematic. Copyright The Econometric Society 2006.