We examine the competition between a group of Internet retailers who operate in an environment where a price search engine plays a dominant role. We show that for some products in this environment, the easy price search makes demand tremendously price-sensitive. Retailers, though, engage in obfuscation—practices that frustrate consumer search or make it less damaging to firms—resulting in much less price sensitivity on some other products. We discuss several models of obfuscation and examine its effects on demand and markups empirically.
This paper uses control variables to identify and estimate models with nonseparable, multidimensional disturbances. Triangular simultaneous equations models are considered, with instruments and disturbances that are independent and a reduced form that is strictly monotonic in a scalar disturbance. Here it is shown that the conditional cumulative distribution function of the endogenous variable given the instruments is a control variable. Also, for any control variable, identification results are given for quantile, average, and policy effects. Bounds are given when a common support assumption is not satisfied. Estimators of identified objects and bounds are provided, and a demand analysis empirical example is given.
This paper considers large N and large T panel data models with unobservable multiple interactive effects. These models are useful for both micro and macro econometric modelings. In earnings studies, for example, workers ’ motivation, persistence, and diligence combined to influence the earnings in addition to the usual argument of innate ability. In macroeconomics, the interactive effects represent unobservable common shocks and their heterogeneous responses over cross sections. Since the interactive effects are allowed to be correlated with the regressors, they are treated as fixed effects parameters to be estimated along with the common slope coefficients. The model is estimated by the least squares method, which provides the interactive-effects counterpart of the within estimator. We first consider model identification, and then derive the rate of convergence and the limiting distribution of the interactive-effects estimator of the common slope coefficients. The estimator is shown to be √ NT consistent. This rate is valid even in the presence of correlations and heteroskedasticities in both dimensions, a striking contrast with fixed T framework in which serial correlation and heteroskedasticity imply unidentification. The asymptotic distribution is not necessarily centered at zero. Biased corrected estimators are derived. We also derive the constrained estimator and its limiting distribution, imposing additivity coupled with interactive effects. The problem of testing additive versus interactive effects is also studied. We also derive identification conditions for models with grand mean, time-invariant regressors, and common regressors. It is shown that there exists a set of necessary and sufficient identification conditions for those models. Given identification, the rate of convergence and limiting results continue to hold. Key words and phrases: incidental parameters, additive effects, interactive effects, factor
Anscombe and Aumann (1963) wrote a classic characterization of subjective expected utility theory. This paper employs the same domain for preference and a closely related (but weaker) set of axioms to characterize preferences that use second-order beliefs (beliefs over probability measures). Such preferences are of interest because they accommodate Ellsberg-type behavior.
This paper presents simple new multisignal generalizations of the two classic methods used to justify the first-order approach to moral hazard principal–agent problems, and compares these two approaches with each other. The paper first discusses limitations of previous generalizations. Then a state-space formulation is used to obtain a new multisignal generalization of the Jewitt (1988) conditions. Next, using the Mirrlees formulation, new multisignal generalizations of the convexity of the distribution function condition (CDFC) approach of Rogerson (1985) and Sinclair-Desgagné (1994) are obtained. Vector calculus methods are used to derive easy-to-check local conditions for our generalization of the CDFC. Finally, we argue that the Jewitt conditions may generalize more flexibly than the CDFC to the multisignal case. This is because, with many signals, the principal can become very well informed about the agent's action and, even in the one-signal case, the CDFC must fail when the signal becomes very accurate.
The econometric literature of high frequency data often relies on moment estimators which are derived from assuming local constancy of volatility and related quantities. We here study this local-constancy approximation as a general approach to estimation in such data. We show that the technique yields asymptotic properties (consistency, normality) that are correct subject to an ex post adjustment involving asymptotic likelihood ratios. These adjustments are derived and documented. Several examples of estimation are provided: powers of volatility, leverage effect, and integrated betas. The first order approximations based on local constancy can be over the period of one observation or over blocks of successive observations. It has the advantage of gaining in transparency in defining and analyzing estimators. The theory relies heavily on the interplay between stable convergence and measure change, and on asymptotic expansions for martingales.
Uncertainty appears to jump up after major shocks like the Cuban Missile crisis, the assassination of JFK, the OPEC I oil-price shock, and the 9/11 terrorist attacks. This paper offers a structural framework to analyze the impact of these uncertainty shocks. I build a model with a time-varying second moment, which is numerically solved and estimated using firm-level data. The parameterized model is then used to simulate a macro uncertainty shock, which produces a rapid drop and rebound in aggregate output and employment. This occurs because higher uncertainty causes firms to temporarily pause their investment and hiring. Productivity growth also falls because this pause in activity freezes reallocation across units. In the medium term the increased volatility from the shock induces an overshoot in output, employment, and productivity. Thus, uncertainty shocks generate short sharp recessions and recoveries. This simulated impact of an uncertainty shock is compared to vector autoregression estimations on actual data, showing a good match in both magnitude and timing. The paper also jointly estimates labor and capital adjustment costs (both convex and nonconvex). Ignoring capital adjustment costs is shown to lead to substantial bias, while ignoring labor adjustment costs does not. Copyright 2009 The Econometric Society.
This paper considers inference in a broad class of nonregular models. The models considered are nonregular in the sense that standard test statistics have asymptotic distributions that are discontinuous in some parameters. It is shown in Andrews and Guggenberger (2009a) that standard fixed critical value, subsampling, and m out of n bootstrap methods often have incorrect asymptotic size in such models. This paper introduces general methods of constructing tests and confidence intervals that have correct asymptotic size. In particular, we consider a hybrid subsampling/fixed-critical-value method and size-correction methods. The paper discusses two examples in detail. They are (i) confidence intervals in an autoregressive model with a root that may be close to unity and conditional heteroskedasticity of unknown form and (ii) tests and confidence intervals based on a post-conservative model selection estimator. Copyright 2009 The Econometric Society.
We develop a search-theoretic model of financial intermediation in an over-the-counter market and study how trading frictions affect the distribution of asset holdings and standard measures of liquidity. A distinctive feature of our theory is that it allows for unrestricted asset holdings, so market participants can accommodate trading frictions by adjusting their asset positions. We show that these individual responses of asset demands constitute a fundamental feature of illiquid markets: they are a key determinant of trade volume, bid–ask spreads, and trading delays—the dimensions of market liquidity that search-based theories seek to explain.
The English auction is susceptible to tacit collusion when post-auction inter-bidder resale is allowed. We show this by constructing equilibria where, with positive probability, one bidder wins the auction without any competition and divides the spoils by optimally reselling the good to the other bidders. These equilibria interim Pareto dominate (among bidders) the standard value-bidding equilibrium, without requiring the bidders to make any commitment on bidding behavior or post-bidding spoil-division.