Knowledge that Transforms

We analyze the Vickrey mechanism for auctions of multiple identical goods when the players have both Knightian uncertainty over their own valuations and incomplete preferences.In this model, the Vickrey mechanism is no longer dominant-strategy, and we prove that all dominant-strategy mechanisms are inadequate.However, we also prove that, in undominated strategies, the social welfare produced by the Vickrey mechanism in the worst case is not only very good, but also essentially optimal.

I examine markets for flexible commitment devices populated by agents who value both commitment and ‡exibility, and whose preferences exhibit varying degrees of time inconsistency. I show that, if the agents’ time inconsistency is observable, then both a profit-maximizing monopolist and a welfare-maximizing planner help each agent commit to the efficient level of ‡exibility. If instead the agents’ time inconsistency is unobservable, the monopolist and the planner face a screening problem. I find that, to screen a more time-inconsistent from a less time-inconsistent agent, the monopolist and (possibly) the planner inefficiently curtail the ‡exibility of the device tailored to the first agent, and include unused options in the device tailored to the second agent. My results have important policy implications for designing special savings devices, that use tax incentives to help

We demonstrate the asymptotic equivalence between commonly used test statistics for out-of-sample forecasting performance and conventional Wald statistics. This equivalence greatly simplifies the computational burden of calculating recursive out-of-sample test statistics and their critical values. For the case with nested models, we show that the limit distribution, which has previously been expressed through stochastic integrals, has a simple representation in terms of -distributed random variables and we derive its density. We also generalize the limit theory to cover local alternatives and characterize the power properties of the test.

We study markets in which agents first make investments and are then matched into potentially productive partnerships. Equilibrium investments and the equilibrium matching will be efficient if agents can simultaneously negotiate investments and matches, but we focus on markets in which agents must first sink their investments before matching. Additional equilibria may arise in this sunk-investment setting, even though our matching market is competitive. These equilibria exhibit inefficiencies that we can interpret as coordination failures. All allocations satisfying a constrained efficiency property are equilibria, and the converse holds if preferences satisfy a separability condition. We identify sufficient conditions (most notably, quasiconcave utilities) for the investments of matched agents to satisfy an exchange efficiency property as well as sufficient conditions (most notably, a single crossing property) for agents to be matched positive assortatively, with these conditions then forming the core of sufficient conditions for the efficiency of equilibrium allocations.

This paper introduces time-varying grouped patterns of heterogeneity in linear panel data models. A distinctive feature of our approach is that group membership is left unrestricted. We estimate the parameters of the model using a “grouped fixed-effects” estimator that minimizes a least squares criterion with respect to all possible groupings of the cross-sectional units. Recent advances in the clustering literature allow for fast and efficient computation. We provide conditions under which our estimator is consistent as both dimensions of the panel tend to infinity, and we develop inference methods. Finally, we allow for grouped patterns of unobserved heterogeneity in the study of the link between income and democracy across countries.

This paper considers nonstandard hypothesis testing problems that involve a nuisance parameter. We establish an upper bound on the weighted average power of all valid tests, and develop a numerical algorithm that determines a feasible test with power close to the bound. The approach is illustrated in six applications: inference about a linear regression coefficient when the sign of a control coefficient is known; small sample inference about the difference in means from two independent Gaussian samples from populations with potentially different variances; inference about the break date in structural break models with moderate break magnitude; predictability tests when the regressor is highly persistent; inference about an interval identified parameter; and inference about a linear regression coefficient when the necessity of a control is in doubt.

This paper develops a generalized Roy model with human capital accumulation, moral hazard, and career concerns. We identify and estimate the model with a large panel that matches data on publicly listed firms to information on their executives. The structural estimates obtained are used to decompose the firm‐size pay gap. We find that although total compensation and incentive pay increase with firm size, certainty‐equivalent pay decreases with firm size. In larger firms, and for more highly ranked executives, weaker signal quality about effort results in higher risk premiums. This risk premium accounts for roughly 80 percent of the firm‐size gap in total compensation. Larger firms are also willing to pay more than smaller ones to attract executives. Finally, the estimated coefficients on human capital accumulation from formal education and experience gained from different firms are individually significant, but their collective effect on firm‐size pay differentials nets out.

Abstract: Both aristocratic privileges and constitutional constraints in traditional monarchies can be derived from a ruler's incentive to minimize expected costs of moral-hazard rents for high officials. We consider a dynamic moral-hazard model of governors serving a sovereign prince, who must deter them from rebellion and hidden corruption which could cause costly crises. To minimize costs, a governor's rewards for good performance should be deferred up to the maximal credit that the prince can be trusted to pay. In the long run, we find that high officials can become an entrenched aristocracy with low turnover and large claims on the ruler. Dismissals for bad performance should be randomized to avoid inciting rebellions, but the prince can profit from reselling vacant offices, and so his decisions to dismiss high officials require institutionalized monitoring. A soft budget constraint that forgives losses for low-credit governors can become efficient when costs of corruption are low. [Former title: "Leadership, trust, and power: dynamic moral hazard in high office."

For an arbitrary data set D = {(p, x)} ⊆ (ℝ+m∖ {0}) × ℝ+m, finite or infinite, it is shown that the following three conditions are equivalent: (a) D satisfies GARP; (b) D can be rationalized by a utility function; (c) D can be rationalized by a utility function that is quasiconcave, nondecreasing, and that strictly increases when all its coordinates strictly increase. Examples of infinite data sets satisfying GARP are provided for which every utility rationalization fails to be lower semicontinuous, upper semicontinuous, or concave. Thus condition (c) cannot be substantively improved upon.

Our paper provides a complete characterization of leverage and default in binomial economies with financial assets serving as collateral.First, our Binomial No-Default Theorem states that any equilibrium is equivalent (in real allocations and prices) to another equilibrium in which there is no default.Thus actual default is irrelevant, though the potential for default drives the equilibrium and limits borrowing.This result is valid with arbitrary preferences and endowments, arbitrary promises, many assets and consumption goods, production, and multiple periods.We also show that the no-default equilibrium would be selected if there were the slightest cost of using collateral or handling default.Second, our Binomial Leverage Theorem shows that equilibrium LT V for non-contingent debt contracts is the ratio of the worst-case return of the asset to the riskless rate of interest.Finally, our Binomial Leverage-Volatility theorem provides a precise link between leverage and volatility.