Knowledge that Transforms

In an effort to improve the small sample properties of generalized method of mo-ments (GMM) estimators, a number of alternative estimators have been suggested. These include empirical likelihood (EL), continuous updating, and exponential tilt-ing estimators. We show that these estimators share a common structure, being members of a class of generalized empirical likelihood (GEL) estimators. We use this structure to compare their higher order asymptotic properties. We find that GEL has no asymptotic bias due to correlation of the moment functions with their Jacobian, eliminating an important source of bias for GMM in models with endo-geneity. We also find that EL has no asymptotic bias from estimating the optimal weight matrix, eliminating a further important source of bias for GMM in panel data models. We give bias corrected GMM and GEL estimators. We also show that bias corrected EL inherits the higher order property of maximum likelihood, that it is higher order asymptotically efficient relative to the other bias corrected estimators.

This paper studies the impact of credit markets on optimal contracting, when the agent's “interim preference” over upcoming contracts is private information because personal financial decisions affect it via the wealth effect. The main result is a severe loss of incentive provision: equilibrium contracts invariably cause the agent to shirk (i.e., exert minimal effort) if the agent's private financial decision precedes moral hazard contracting. The basic intuition is that committing on another private variable, other than the effort level, exposes the parties to further exploitation of efficient risk-sharing by relaxing the incentive constraint that was binding ex ante, unless the risk-sharing was fully efficient to begin with.

We show that optimal monetary and fiscal policies are time consistent for a class of economies often used in applied work, economies appealing because they are consistent with the growth facts. We establish our results in two steps. We first show that for this class of economies, the Friedman rule of setting nominal interest rates to zero is optimal under commitment. We then show that optimal policies are time consistent if the Friedman rule is optimal. For our benchmark economy in which the time consistency problem is most severe, the converse also holds: if optimal policies are time consistent, then the Friedman rule is optimal.

This paper presents a solution to an important econometric problem, namely the root n consistent estimation of nonlinear models with measurement errors in the explanatory variables, when one repeated observation of each mismeasured regressor is available. While a root n consistent estimator has been derived for polynomial specifications (see Hausman, Ichimura, Newey, and Powell (1991)), such an estimator for general nonlinear specifications has so far not been available. Using the additional information provided by the repeated observation, the suggested estimator separates the measurement error from the "true" value of the regressors thanks to a useful property of the Fourier transform: The Fourier transform converts the integral equations that relate the distribution of the unobserved "true" variables to the observed variables measured with error into algebraic equations. The solution to these equations yields enough information to identify arbitrary moments of the "true, " unobserved variables. The value of these moments can then be used to construct any estimator that can be written in terms of moments, including traditional linear and nonlinear least squares estimators, or general extremum estimators. The proposed estimator is shown to admit a representation in terms of an influence function, thus establishing its root n consistency and asymptotic normality. Monte Carlo evidence and an application to Engel curve estimation illustrate the usefulness of this new approach. Copyright Econometric Society 2004.

Previous research has shown that under a suitable no-jump condition, the price of a defaultable security is equal to its risk-neutral expected discounted cash flows if a modified discount rate is introduced to account for the possibility of default. Below, we generalize this result by demonstrating that one can always value defaultable claims using expected risk-adjusted discounting provided that the expectation is taken under a slightly modified probability measure. This new probability measure puts zero probability on paths where default occurs prior to the maturity, and is thus only absolutely continuous with respect to the risk-neutral probability measure. After establishing the general result and discussing its relation with the existing literature, we investigate several examples for which the no-jump condition fails. Each example illustrates the power of our general formula by providing simple analytic solutions for the prices of defaultable securities.

Fixed effects estimators of panel models can be severely biased because of the well-known incidental parameters problem. We show that this bias can be reduced by using a panel jackknife or an analytical bias correction motivated by large T. We give bias corrections for averages over the fixed effects, as well as model parameters. We find large bias reductions from using these approaches in examples. We consider asymptotics where T grows with n, as an approximation to the properties of the estimators in econometric applications. We show that if T grows at the same rate as n, the fixed effects estimator is asymptotically biased, so that asymptotic confidence intervals are incorrect, but that they are correct for the panel jackknife. We show T growing faster than n-super-1/3 suffices for correctness of the analytic correction, a property we also conjecture for the jackknife. Copyright The Econometric Society 2004.

This paper investigates the effects of financial market globalization on the inequality of nations. The world economy consists of inherently identical countries, which differ only in their levels of capital stock. Each country is represented by the standard overlapping generations model, modified only to incorporate credit market imperfection. An integration of financial markets affects the set of stable steady states, as it changes the balance between the equalizing force of the diminishing returns technology and the unequalizing force of the wealth-dependent borrowing constraint. The model is tractable enough to allow for a complete characterization of the stable steady states. In the absence of the international financial market, the world economy has a unique steady state, which is symmetric and stable. In the presence of the international financial market, symmetry-breaking occurs under some conditions. That is, the symmetric steady state loses its stability and stable asymmetric steady states come to exist. In the stable asymmetric steady states, the world economy is endogenously divided into the rich and poor countries; the borrowing constraints are binding in the poor but not in the rich; the world output is smaller, the rich are richer and the poor are poorer in any of the stable asymmetric steady states than in the (unstable) symmetric steady state.

Intestinal helminths—including hookworm, roundworm, whipworm, and schistosomiasis—infect more than one-quarter of the world’s population. Studies in which medical treatment is randomized at the individual level potentially doubly underestimate the benefits of treatment, missing externality benefits to the comparison group from reduced disease transmission, and therefore also underestimating benefits for the treatment group. We evaluate a Kenyan project in which school-based mass treatment with deworming drugs was randomly phased into schools, rather than to individuals, allowing estimation of overall program effects. The program reduced school absenteeism in treatment schools by one-quarter, and was far cheaper than alternative ways of boosting school participation. Deworming substantially improved health and school participation among untreated children in both treatment schools and neighboring schools, and these externalities are large enough to justify fully subsidizing treatment. Yet we do not find evidence that deworming improved academic test scores.

Agents' valuations are interdependent if they depend on the signals, or types, of all agents. Under the implicit assumption that agents cannot observe their outcome-decision payoffs, previous literature has shown that with interdependent valuations and independent signals, efficient design is impossible. This paper shows that an efficient mechanism exists in an environment where first the final outcome (e.g., allocation of the goods) is determined, then the agents observe their own outcome-decision payoffs, and then final transfers are made.

This paper proposes an asymptotically efficient method for estimating models with conditional moment restrictions. Our estimator generalizes the maximum empirical likelihood estimator (MELE) of Qin and Lawless (1994). Using a kernel smoothing method, we efficiently incorporate the information implied by the conditional moment restrictions into our empirical likelihood-based procedure. This yields a one-step estimator which avoids estimating optimal instruments. Our likelihood ratio-type statistic for parametric restrictions does not require the estimation of variance, and achieves asymptotic pivotalness implicitly. The estimation and testing procedures we propose are normalization invariant. Simulation results suggest that our new estimator works remarkably well in finite samples.