[This paper presents general results on the existence and properties of expected-utility-maximizing search rules for problems in which searchers may choose both the number of periods in which samples are taken and the size of the sample taken in each period. These rules include fixed-sample-size rules and sequential rules as special cases. Also presented are conditions sufficient for sequential and fixed-sample-size rules to be optimal.]
[This paper studies the limits of contracting as a method for achieving efficient allocation, with particular attention to how informational asymmetries interact with the timing of commitment to a mechanism. There are arguments to suggest, in the spirit of the Coase "Theorem," that if agents can agree on a mechanism before observing their private information (or, a fortiori, if information is perfect or symmetric), they can realize an incentive-efficient allocation. If, however, agents observe their private information before contracting, there may be further restrictions, due to information leakage during the process of bargaining over mechanisms, on what they can achieve by contract. These restrictions are characterized and compared to those proposed for this setting by Holmstrom and Myerson [6]. It is also shown that there is at least one specification of the rules that govern mechanism design that makes it possible for agents to achieve, contracting after they observe their private information, the same incentive-efficient allocations that are attainable when they can commit themselves to a mechanism before observing their private information.]
On caracterise les axiomes faible et fort de preference revelee en termes de m-rationalite. Cette caracterisation eclaire le lien fondamental avec les axiomes de comportement de Richter pour la g-rationalite. L'approche presentee ici, est motivee par un operateur de complementarite, defini sur des preferences, qui montre le rapport logique entre ces deux concepts de choix rationnel
This paper considers a market where pairs of agents who are interested in carrying out a transaction are brought together by a stochastic process and, upon meeting, initiate a bargaining process over the terms of the transaction.The basic bargaining problem is treated with the strategic approach.The paper derives the steady state equilibrium agreements; analyzes their dependence on market conditions such as the relative numbers of agents of different types; and discusses their relations with the competitive equilibrium outcome and other results in the search equilibrium literature.1133
We study two-sided in which agents are buyers and sellers or firms and workers or men and women. The agents are to form partnerships (which provide them with satisfaction) and at the same time make monetary transfers (e.g. salaries or dowries). The core of this market game is shown to have a particularly nice structure so that precise answers can be given to questions concerning comparative statics and manipulability. THE IDEA OF USING Walrasian equilibrium as a mechanism for making allocations with desirable properties of fairness and efficiency has been studied extensively. The scheme involves having agents specify their supply and demand functions. The competitive equilibria are then calculated and allocations are made accordingly. In general this procedure may run into two difficulties: first, nonuniqueness-if there are several equilibria there may be no fair way to decide which one should be implemented; and second, manipulability-if there is only one equilibrium an informed agent may be able to influence it by suitably falsifying his demand data. However, as we will show here, using the Walrasian mechanism does work remarkably well for a certain class of important markets. These are the matching markets of our title and they include for single items, like houses, where it is assumed that traders do not wish to acquire more than one item. They also include labor in which it is desired to match workers with jobs at suitable salaries, academic markets in which students are to be assigned to educational institutions, marriage markets where men and women are matched through negotiating of dowries. It turns out that in these both the problems of nonuniqueness and manipulability can be resolved in a
[The existence of equilibrium and Pareto optimal allocations in economies with an infinite number of commodities is studied. It is shown that any topology stronger than the Mackey topology might lead to the nonexistence of nontrivial Pareto optimal allocations. I.e., there exists a well behaved economy with preferences that are continuous in this topology and without individually rational Pareto optimal allocations. A converse of this theorem, a slight modification of Bewley's [2] existence of equilibrium theorem, is also proved. Using a characterization of the Mackey topology in terms of impatience of consumers, due to Brown and Lewis [3], an interpretation of the theorem above is given: a topology is such that continuity with respect to it implies existence of nontrivial Pareto optimal allocations if and only if it also implies impatience on the part of the consumers.]
On montre a partir de l'evidence de Monte Carlo que les differences dans la forme fonctionnelle des restrictions non lineaires sont importantes dans les petites tailles d'echantillons
[Rational expectations equilibria are analyzed as incentive compatible mechanisms. The sense in which they can be implemented is made precise. Then, a welfare analysis of these equilibria is carried out within the class of mechanisms having the same incentive compatibility properties and the same communication constraints.]