Knowledge that Transforms

As applied to the behavior of homeowners with mortgages, option theory predicts that mortgage prepayment or default will be exercised if the call or put option is ‘in the money’ by some specific amount. Our analysis: tests the extent to which the option approach can explain default and prepayment behavior; evaluates the practical importance of modeling both options simultaneously; and models the unobserved heterogeneity of borrowers in the home mortgage market. The paper presents a unified model of the competing risks of mortgage termination by prepayment and default, considering the two hazards as dependent competing risks that are estimated jointly. It also accounts for the unobserved heterogeneity among borrowers, and estimates the unobserved heterogeneity simultaneously with the parameters and baseline hazards associated with prepayment and default functions. Our results show that the option model, in its most straightforward version, does a good job of explaining default and prepayment, but it is not enough by itself. The simultaneity of the options is very important empirically in explaining behavior. The results also show that there exists significant heterogeneity among mortgage borrowers. Ignoring this heterogeneity results in serious errors in estimating the prepayment behavior of homeowners.

Threshold models have a wide variety of applications in economics. Direct applications include models of separating and multiple equilibria. Other applications include empirical sample splitting when the sample split is based on a continuously-distributed variable such as firm size. In addition, threshold models may be used as a parsimonious strategy for nonparametric function estimation. For example, the threshold autoregressive model (TAR) is popular in the nonlinear time series literature. Threshold models also emerge as special cases of more complex statistical frameworks, such as mixture models, switching models, Markov switching models, and smooth transition threshold models. It may be important to understand the statistical properties of threshold models as a preliminary step in the development of statistical tools to handle these more complicated structures. Despite the large number of potential applications, the statistical theory of threshold estimation is undeveloped. It is known that threshold estimates are super-consistent, but a distribution theory useful for testing and inference has yet to be provided. This paper develops a statistical theory for threshold estimation in the regression context. We allow for either cross-section or time series observations. Least squares estimation of the regression parameters is considered. An asymptotic distribution theory for the regression estimates (the threshold and the regression slopes) is developed. It is found that the distribution of the threshold estimate is nonstandard. A method to construct asymptotic confidence intervals is developed by inverting the likelihood ratio statistic. It is shown that this yields asymptotically conservative confidence regions. Monte Carlo simulations are presented to assess the accuracy of the asymptotic approximations. The empirical relevance of the theory is illustrated through an application to the multiple equilibria growth model of Durlauf and Johnson (1995).

This paper examines Markov perfect equilibria of general, finite state stochastic games. Our main result is that the number of such equilibria is finite for a set of stochastic game payoffs with full Lebesgue measure. We further discuss extensions to lower dimensional stochastic games like the alternating move game.

Document de travail IDEI ; 75 (C13 IDEI 75) Diffusion du document : IDEI Manufacture des Tabacs 21 allées de Brienne 31000 Toulouse (FRA) <br/>75

This paper is concerned with asymptotic properties on the accuracy of numerical solutions. It is shown that the approximation error of the policy function is of the same order of magnitude as the size of the Euler equation residuals. Moreover, for bounding this approximation error the most relevant parameters are the discount factor and the curvature of the return function. These findings provide theoretical foundations for the construction of tests to assess the performance of alternative computational methods.

This paper analyzes choice-theoretic costly enforcement in an intertemporal contracting model with a differentially informed investor and entrepreneur. An intertemporal contract is modeled as a mechanism in which there is limited commitment to payment and enforcement decisions. The goal of the analysis is to characterize the effect of choice-theoretic costly enforcement on the structure of optimal contracts. The paper shows that simple debt is the optimal contract when commitment is limited and costly enforcement is a decision variable (Theorem 1). In contrast, stochastic contracts are optimal when agents can commit to the ex-ante optimal decisions (Theorem 2). The paper also shows that the costly state verification model can be viewed as a reduced form of an enforcement model in which agents choose payments and strategies as part of a perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium.