Knowledge that Transforms

Different people may use different strategies, or decision rules, when solving complex decision problems. We provide a new Bayesian procedure for drawing inferences about the nature and number of decision rules present in a population, and use it to analyze the behaviors of laboratory subjects confronted with a difficult dynamic stochastic decision problem. Subjects practiced before playing for money. Based on money round decisions, our procedure classifies subjects into three types, which we label “Near Rational,”“Fatalist,” and “Confused.” There is clear evidence of continuity in subjects' behaviors between the practice and money rounds: types who performed best in practice also tended to perform best when playing for money. However, the agreement between practice and money play is far from perfect. The divergences appear to be well explained by a combination of type switching (due to learning and/or increased effort in money play) and errors in our probabilistic type assignments.

This paper analyses multivariate high frequency financial data using realized covariation. We provide a new asymptotic distribution theory for standard methods such as regression, correlation analysis, and covariance. It will be based on a fixed interval of time (e.g., a day or week), allowing the number of high frequency returns during this period to go to infinity. Our analysis allows us to study how high frequency correlations, regressions, and covariances change through time. In particular we provide confidence intervals for each of these quantities.

In a one principal two-agent model with adverse selection and collusion among agents, we show that delegating to one agent the right to subcontract with the other agent always earns lower profit for the principal compared with centralized contracting. Delegation to an intermediary is also not in the principal’s interest if the agents supply substitutes. It can be beneficial if the agents produce complements and the intermediary is well informed. Earlier versions of this paper have previously been circulated under different

We study inference in structural models with a jump in the conditional density, where location and size of the jump are described by regression curves. Two prominent examples are auction models, where the bid density jumps from zero to a positive value at the lowest cost, and equilibrium job-search models, where the wage density jumps from one positive level to another at the reservation wage. General inference in such models remained a long-standing, unresolved problem, primarily due to nonregularities and computational difficulties caused by discontinuous likelihood functions. This paper develops likelihood-based estimation and inference methods for these models, focusing on optimal (Bayes) and maximum likelihood procedures. We derive convergence rates and distribution theory, and develop Bayes and Wald inference. We show that Bayes estimators and confidence intervals are attractive both theoretically and computationally, and that Bayes confidence intervals, based on posterior quantiles, provide a valid large sample inference method.

This article discusses the history underlying the new literature, describes some of what has been learned thus far, and looks ahead towards making further progress

In this paper we propose a new estimator for a model with one endogenous regressor and many instrumental variables. Our motivation comes from the recent literature on the poor properties of standard instrumental variables estimators when the instrumental variables are weakly correlated with the endogenous regressor. Our proposed estimator puts a random coefficients structure on the relation between the endogenous regressor and the instruments. The variance of the random coefficients is modelled as an unknown parameter. In addition to proposing a new estimator, our analysis yields new insights into the properties of the standard two-stage least squares (TSLS) and limited-information maximum likelihood (LIML) estimators in the case with many weak instruments. We show that in some interesting cases, TSLS and LIML can be approximated by maximizing the random effects likelihood subject to particular constraints. We show that statistics based on comparisons of the unconstrained estimates of these parameters to the implicit TSLS and LIML restrictions can be used to identify settings when standard large sample approximations to the distributions of TSLS and LIML are likely to perform poorly. We also show that with many weak instruments, LIML confidence intervals are likely to have under-coverage, even though its finite sample distribution is approximately centered at the true value of the parameter. In an application with real data and simulations around this data set, the proposed estimator performs markedly better than TSLS and LIML, both in terms of coverage rate and in terms of risk. Copyright Econometric Society 2004.

The asymptotic refinements attributable to the block bootstrap for time series are not as large as those of the nonparametric iid bootstrap or the parametric bootstrap. One reason is that the independence between the blocks in the block bootstrap sample does not mimic the dependence structure of the original sample. This is the join-point problem. In this paper, we propose a method of solving this problem. The idea is not to alter the block bootstrap. Instead, we alter the original sample statistics to which the block bootstrap is applied. We introduce block statistics that possess join-point features that are similar to those of the block bootstrap versions of these statistics. We refer to the application of the block bootstrap to block statistics as the block–block bootstrap. The asymptotic refinements of the block–block bootstrap are shown to be greater than those obtained with the block bootstrap and close to those obtained with the nonparametric iid bootstrap and parametric bootstrap.

An asymmetric information model of a finite horizon “nth order” rational asset price bubble is presented, where (all agents know that)n the asset is worthless. Also, the model has only two agents, so the first order version of the bubble is simpler than other first order bubbles in the literature.

To study the behavior of agents who are susceptible to temptation in infinite horizon consumption problems under uncertainty, we define and characterize dynamic self-control (DSC) preferences. DSC preferences are recursive and separable. In economies with DSC agents, equilibria exist but may be inefficient; in such equilibria, steady state consumption is independent of initial endowments and increases in self-control. Increasing the preference for commitment while keeping self-control constant increases the equity premium.

We develop the measurement theory of polarization for the case in which income distributions can be described using density functions. The main theorem uniquely characterizes a class of polarization measures that fits into what we call the “identity-alienation” framework, and simultanously satisfies a set of axioms. Second, we provide sample estimators of population polarization indices that can be used to compare polarization across time or entities. Distribution-free statistical inference results are also used in order to ensure that the orderings of polarization across entities are not simply due to sampling noise. An illustration of the use of these tools using data from 21 countries shows that polarization and inequality orderings can often differ in practice.