Consider a researcher estimating the parameters of a regression function based on data for all 50 states in the United States or on data for all visits to a website. What is the interpretation of the estimated parameters and the standard errors? In practice, researchers typically assume that the sample is randomly drawn from a large population of interest and report standard errors that are designed to capture sampling variation. This is common even in applications where it is difficult to articulate what that population of interest is, and how it differs from the sample. In this article, we explore an alternative approach to inference, which is partly design‐based. In a design‐based setting, the values of some of the regressors can be manipulated, perhaps through a policy intervention. Design‐based uncertainty emanates from lack of knowledge about the values that the regression outcome would have taken under alternative interventions. We derive standard errors that account for design‐based uncertainty instead of, or in addition to, sampling‐based uncertainty. We show that our standard errors in general are smaller than the usual infinite‐population sampling‐based standard errors and provide conditions under which they coincide.
BESLEY’S PAPER studies the role of civic culture in expanding fiscal capacity in a political economy model of the interaction between policy-making élites and tax-paying citizens. At an equilibrium, (i) élites choose the tax rate t and the composition of expenditures between public goods G and private rents B, while (ii) citizens choose their tax compliancy, 1 − n. Civic culture is defined by a form of intrinsic reciprocity, a reduced disutility for paying taxes when taxes are used to provide public goods rather than transfers and rents to the élites. I read this paper through the eyes of a fascinating and broad agenda on the role of institutions and culture in fostering economic development, which Besley has prominently contributed to; for example, Besley and Persson (2019).1 My comments aim at elucidating the theoretical contribution of the paper to this literature. First of all, I will argue that the results of the paper are bound to hold at least qualitatively in different models as long as they display a fundamental complementarity between civic culture and public good provision, opening the analysis to new and interesting implications. I will then attempt an analysis of the institutional design of the polity of the state, for example, its constitutional frame, legal structure and enforcement mechanisms, political procedures, rights and regulations enforced by official authorities, and so on, in the context of the model. I will illustrate how this analysis produces a rich set of novel implications with regards to institutional change and to the institutional correlates of civic capital, state capacity, and public goods provision. I will also show that the maintained assumption in the model, that élites display commitment when choosing policy, has important implications. Relaxing this assumption also produces interesting implications for the study of culture and institutions. Finally, I will briefly speculate on the dynamics of civic culture which can be obtained in the model if inter-generational cultural transmission is characterized by some form of imperfect altruism on the parts of the parents. Complementarity between civic culture and public good provision. The formal model in the paper focuses on how civic culture affects state capacity and public good provision: civic-minded citizens are more willing to comply with taxation when public goods are provided and this aligns the incentives of élites with those of the citizenry (the élites do not pay taxes but enjoy public goods). At equilibrium, therefore, state capacity and public good provision G increase with the fraction of civic-minded citizens, that is, with civic capital μ. Furthermore, the postulated dynamics of μ (a reduced-form replicator dynamics to capture inter-generational transmission of cultural traits) has the property that μ increases with the provision of public goods G.
We test the longstanding hypothesis that ethnic groups organized around “segmentary lineages” are more prone to conflict. Ethnographic accounts suggest that in such societies, which are characterized by strong allegiances to distant relatives, individuals are obligated to come to the aid of fellow lineage members when they become involved in conflicts. As a consequence, small disagreements often escalate into larger‐scale conflicts involving many individuals. We test for a link between segmentary lineage organization and conflict across ethnic groups in sub‐Saharan Africa. Using a number of estimation strategies, including a regression discontinuity design at ethnic boundaries, we find that segmentary lineage societies experience more conflicts, and particularly ones that are retaliatory, long in duration, and large in scale.
We design a labor market experiment to compare demand‐ and supply‐side policies to tackle youth unemployment, a key issue in low‐income countries. The experiment tracks 1700 workers and 1500 firms over four years to compare the effect of offering workers either vocational training (VT) or firm‐provided training (FT) for six months in a common setting where youth unemployment is above 60%. Relative to control workers, we find that, averaged over three post‐intervention years, FT and VT workers: (i) enjoy large and similar upticks in sector‐specific skills, (ii) significantly improve their employment rates, and (iii) experience marked improvements in an index of labor market outcomes. These averages, however, mask differences in dynamics: FT gains materialize quickly but fade over time, while VT gains emerge slowly but are long‐lasting, leading VT worker employment and earning profiles to rise above those of FT workers. Estimating a job ladder model of worker search reveals the key reason for this: VT workers receive significantly higher rates of job offers when unemployed, thus hastening their movement back into work. This likely stems from the fact that the skills of VT workers are certified and therefore can be demonstrated to potential employers. Tackling youth unemployment by skilling youth using vocational training pre‐labor market entry therefore appears to be more effective than incentivizing firms through wage subsidies to hire and train young labor market entrants.
We study preferences over lotteries in which both the prize and the payment date are uncertain. In particular, a time lottery is one in which the prize is fixed but the date is random. With Expected Discounted Utility, individuals must be risk seeking over time lotteries (RSTL). In an incentivized experiment, however, we find that almost all subjects violate this property. Our main contributions are theoretical. We first show that within a very broad class of models, which includes many forms of nonexpected utility and time discounting, it is impossible to accommodate even a single violation of RSTL without also violating a property we termed Stochastic Impatience, a risky counterpart of standard Impatience. We then present two positive results. If one wishes to maintain Stochastic Impatience, violations of RSTL can be accommodated by keeping Independence within periods while relaxing it across periods. If, instead, one is willing to forego Stochastic Impatience, violations of RSTL can be accommodated with a simple generalization of Expected Discounted Utility, obtained by imposing only the behavioral postulates of Discounted Utility and Expected Utility.
In this paper, we study how occupation (or industry) tradability shapes local labor‐market adjustment to immigration. Theoretically, we derive a simple condition under which the arrival of foreign‐born labor into a region crowds native‐born workers out of (or into) immigrant‐intensive jobs, thus lowering (or raising) relative wages in these occupations, and we explain why this process differs within tradable versus within nontradable activities. Using data for U.S. commuting zones over the period 1980–2012, we find—consistent with our theory—that a local influx of immigrants crowds out employment of native‐born workers in more relative to less immigrant‐intensive nontradable jobs, but has no such effect across tradable occupations. Further analysis of occupation labor payments is consistent with adjustment to immigration within tradables occurring more through changes in output (versus changes in prices) when compared to adjustment within nontradables, thereby confirming our model's theoretical mechanism. We then use the model to explore the quantitative consequences of counterfactual changes in U.S. immigration on real wages at the occupation and region level.
We provide a tractable, quantitatively‐oriented theory of innovation and technology diffusion to explore the role of international trade in the process of development. We model innovation and diffusion as a process involving the combination of new ideas with insights from other industries or countries. We provide conditions under which each country's equilibrium frontier of knowledge converges to a Fréchet distribution, and derive a system of differential equations describing the evolution of the scale parameters of these distributions, that is, countries' stocks of knowledge. The model remains tractable with many asymmetric countries and generates a rich set of predictions about how the level and composition of trade affect countries' frontiers of knowledge. We use the framework to quantify the contribution of bilateral trade costs to long‐run changes in TFP and individual post‐war growth miracles. For our preferred calibration, we find that both gains from trade and the fraction of variation of TFP growth accounted for by changes in trade more than double relative to a model without diffusion.
This paper explores the role of civic culture in expanding fiscal capacity by developing a model based on reciprocal obligations: citizens pay their taxes and the state provides public goods. Civic culture evolves over time according to the relative payoff of civic‐minded and materialist citizens. A strong civic culture manifests itself as high tax revenues sustained by high levels of voluntary tax compliance and provision of public goods. This captures the idea of government as a reciprocal social contract between the state and its citizens. The paper highlights the role of political institutions and common interests in the emergence of civic culture.
Savage (1954) provided the first axiomatic characterization of expected utility without relying on any given probabilities or utilities. It is the most famous preference axiomatization existing. This note shows that Savage's axiom P3 is implied by the other axioms, which reveals its redundancy. It is remarkable that this was not noticed before as Savage's axiomatization has been studied and taught by hundreds of researchers for more than six decades.
In this paper, we show that stable outcomes exist in matching environments with complementarities, such as social media platforms or markets for patent licenses. Our results apply to both nontransferable and transferable utility settings, and allow for multilateral agreements and those with externalities. In particular, we show that stable outcomes in these settings are characterized by the largest fixed point of a monotone operator, and so can be found using an algorithm; in the nontransferable utility case, this is a one‐sided deferred acceptance algorithm, rather than a Gale–Shapley algorithm. We also give a monotone comparative statics result as well as a comparative static on the effect of bundling contracts together. These illustrate the impact of design decisions, such as increased privacy protections on social media, or the use of antitrust law to disallow patent pools, on stable outcomes.