Knowledge that Transforms

Each agent in a finite set requests an integer quantity of an idiosyncratic good; the resulting total cost must be shared among the participating agents. The Aumann–Shapley prices are given by the Shapley value of the game where each unit of each good is regarded as a distinct player. The Aumann–Shapley cost-sharing method charges to an agent the sum of the prices attached to the units she consumes. We show that this method is characterized by the two standard axioms of Additivity and Dummy, and the property of No Merging or Splitting: agents never find it profitable to split or to merge their consumptions. We offer a variant of this result using the No Reshuffling condition: the total cost share paid by a group of agents who consume perfectly substitutable goods depends only on their aggregate consumption. We extend this characterization to the case where agents are allowed to consume bundles of goods.

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This paper develops theoretical foundations for an error analysis of approximate equilibria in dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models with heterogeneous agents and incomplete financial markets. While there are several algorithms that compute prices and allocations for which agents' first-order conditions are approximately satisfied (“approximate equilibria”), there are few results on how to interpret the errors in these candidate solutions and how to relate the computed allocations and prices to exact equilibrium allocations and prices. We give a simple example to illustrate that approximate equilibria might be very far from exact equilibria. We then interpret approximate equilibria as equilibria for close-by economies; that is, for economies with close-by individual endowments and preferences. We present an error analysis for two models that are commonly used in applications, an overlapping generations (OLG) model with stochastic production and an asset pricing model with infinitely lived agents. We provide sufficient conditions that ensure that approximate equilibria are close to exact equilibria of close-by economies. Numerical examples illustrate the analysis.

This paper uses the marginal treatment effect (MTE) to unify the nonparametric literature on treatment effects with the econometric literature on structural estimation using a nonparametric analog of a policy invariant parameter; to generate a variety of treatment effects from a common semiparametric functional form; to organize the literature on alternative estimators; and to explore what policy questions commonly used estimators in the treatment effect literature answer. A fundamental asymmetry intrinsic to the method of instrumental variables (IV) is noted. Recent advances in IV estimation allow for heterogeneity in responses but not in choices, and the method breaks down when both choice and response equations are heterogeneous in a general way.

Repeated games with unknown payoff distributions are analogous to a single decision maker's “multi-armed bandit” problem. Each state of the world corresponds to a different payoff matrix of a stage game. When monitoring is perfect, information about the state is public, and players are sufficiently patient, the following result holds: For any function that maps each state to a payoff vector that is feasible and individually rational in that state, there is a sequential equilibrium in which players experiment to learn the realized state and achieve a payoff close to the one specified for that state.

This paper provides weak conditions under which there is nonparametric interval identification of local features of a structural function that depends on a discrete endogenous variable and is nonseparable in latent variates. The function delivers values of a discrete or continuous outcome and instruments may be discrete valued. Application of the analog principle leads to quantile regression based interval estimators of values and partial differences of structural functions. The results are used to investigate the nonparametric identifying power of the quarter-of-birth instruments used in Angrist and Krueger's 1991 study of the returns to schooling.

The ability of quantile regression models to characterize the heterogeneous impact of variables on different points of an outcome distribution makes them appealing in many economic applications. However, in observational studies, the variables of interest (e.g., education, prices) are often endogenous, making conventional quantile regression inconsistent and hence inappropriate for recovering the causal effects of these variables on the quantiles of economic outcomes. In order to address this problem, we develop a model of quantile treatment effects (QTE) in the presence of endogeneity and obtain conditions for identification of the QTE without functional form assumptions. The principal feature of the model is the imposition of conditions that restrict the evolution of ranks across treatment states. This feature allows us to overcome the endogeneity problem and recover the true QTE through the use of instrumental variables. The proposed model can also be equivalently viewed as a structural simultaneous equation model with nonadditive errors, where QTE can be interpreted as the structural quantile effects (SQE).

For stationary time series models with serial correlation, we consider generalized method of moments (GMM) estimators that use heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent (HAC) positive definite weight matrices and generalized empirical likelihood (GEL) estimators based on smoothed moment conditions. Following the analysis of Newey and Smith (2004) for independent observations, we derive second order asymptotic biases of these estimators. The inspection of bias expressions reveals that the use of smoothed GEL, in contrast to GMM, removes the bias component associated with the correlation between the moment function and its derivative, while the bias component associated with third moments depends on the employed kernel function. We also analyze the case of no serial correlation, and find that the seemingly unnecessary smoothing and HAC estimation can reduce the bias for some of the estimators.

We study the monotonicity of the equilibrium bid with respect to the number of bidders n in affiliated private-value models of first-price sealed-bid auctions and prove the existence of a large class of such models in which the equilibrium bid function is not increasing in n. We moreover decompose the effect of a change in n on the bid level into a competition effect and an affiliation effect. The latter suggests to the winner of the auction that competition is less intense than she had thought before the auction. Since the affiliation effect can occur in both private- and common-value models, a negative relationship between the bid level and n does not allow one to distinguish between the two models and is also not necessarily (only) due to bidders taking account of the winner's curse.

Entropy is a classical statistical concept with appealing properties. Establishing asymptotic distribution theory for smoothed nonparametric entropy measures of dependence has so far proved challenging. In this paper, we develop an asymptotic theory for a class of kernel-based smoothed nonparametric entropy measures of serial dependence in a time-series context. We use this theory to derive the limiting distribution of Granger and Lin's (1994) normalized entropy measure of serial dependence, which was previously not available in the literature. We also apply our theory to construct a new entropy-based test for serial dependence, providing an alternative to Robinson's (1991) approach. To obtain accurate inferences, we propose and justify a consistent smoothed bootstrap procedure. The naive bootstrap is not consistent for our test. Our test is useful in, for example, testing the random walk hypothesis, evaluating density forecasts, and identifying important lags of a time series. It is asymptotically locally more powerful than Robinson's (1991) test, as is confirmed in our simulation. An application to the daily S&P 500 stock price index illustrates our approach.