[This paper amends the Aumann and Kurz single commodity "Power and Taxes" model in several ways: A linear production technology is assumed, incentive effects are introduced, and tax schedules are restricted to be linear. A theorem is stated which characterizes the linear tax schedules which are the NTU solutions of the model. The solutions of an example are computed, providing a perspective on a result of the Aumann and Kurz model that equilibrium marginal tax rates are not less than 50 per cent. For this example, equilibrium marginal tax rates are less than 50 per cent; incentive effects appear to be responsible for the low tax rates

[In this paper several results are established which provide for the consistent estimation of macroeconomic effects using cross-section data, for general assumptions on the movement of the population distribution over time. We show that macroeconomic effects are always consistently estimated by linear instrumental variables coefficients, where the instruments are determined by the form of distribution movement. This leads to a natural way to assess the biases in OLS coefficients as estimators of macroeconomic effects, provides a nonparametric macroeconomic interpretation of linear instrumental variables coefficients when the true microeconomic behavioral model is unknown, and gives a nonparametric interpretation of standard regression decomposition statistics such as R extasciicircum2 relative to the information costs of nonlinearities in aggregation. All of the results are valid without imposing any testable restrictions on the cross-section data

On etudie la negociation simultanee sur plusieurs resultats par deux negociateurs en prenant les sommes des jeux de negociation et en exigeant des solutions de negociation satisfaisant certains axiomes de (super-) additivite

For many years, social scientists have been interested in obtaining testable definitions of causality (Granger 1969, Sims 1972). Recent works include those of Chamberlain (1982) and Florens and Mouchart (1982). The present paper first clarifies the results of these latter papers by considering a unifying definition of noncausality. Then, log-likelihood ratio (LR) tests for noncausality are derived for qualitative panel data under the minimal assumption that one series is Markov. LR tests for the Markov property are also obtained. Both test statistics have closed forms. These tests thus provide a readily applicable procedure for testing noncausality on qualitative panel data. Finally, the tests are applied to French Business Survey data in order to test the hypothesis that price changes from period to period are strictly exogenous to disequilibria appearing within periods

This paper considers a generalized mean value m(p) defined implicitly for a probability measure p on the reals as the unique y for which J +(x, y) dp(x) = 0, where 0 is skewsymmetric and strictly increasing in its first argument. Conditions on m that are necessary and sufficient for the implicit characterization are given and its relationship to certainty equivalence is discussed

[It is commonly believed that textbook publishers attempt to "kill off" competition from used textbooks through yearly edition changes. In the context of Wicksell's model of durable goods, Peter Swan has shown that such "planned obsolescence" is never optimal: a monopolist seller of durable goods maximizes profits by setting product durability equal to the competitive or socially optimal level, and efficiently extracts consumer surplus through sales price alone. This paper formulates a monopolist seller's choice of price and durability as the solution to a Stackelberg game between the monopolist and consumers. We employ a new equilibrium model of a durable goods market which, unlike Wicksell's model, recognizes that scrappage of durables is endogenously determined. We show that with endogenous scrappage, consumers have a substitution possibility which constrains the profits of a monopolist seller. This constraint on profits causes the monopolist to distort durability from the socially optimal level. We derive conditions under which this distortion takes its most extreme form: the monopolist kills off competition from used durables by producing new assets of zero durability

Randall J. Olsen, D. Alton Smith, George Farkas, Structural and Reduced-Form Models of Choice among Alternatives in Continuous Time: Youth Employment under a Guaranteed Jobs Program, Econometrica, Vol. 54, No. 2 (Mar., 1986), pp. 375-394