The paper considers the OLS, the IV, and two method-of-moments estimators, MM and MMK, of the coefficients of a single equation, where the explanatory variables are correlated with the disturbance term. The MM and MMK estimators are generalizations of the LIML and LIMLK estimators, respectively. Multivariate first-order approximations to the distributions are derived under normality, using a parameter sequence where the number of instruments increases as the number of observations increases. Numerical results show these approximations are more accurate, compared to large-sample approximations, even if the number of instruments is small. The moments of the multivariate limit distributions of the MM and MMK estimators can be consistently estimated under a variety of parameter sequences, including the large-sample sequence. The new approximate confidence regions perform well in terms of exact levels, compared to traditional ones. The IV estimator of the coefficient of a single explanatory endogenous variable is interpreted as a shrinkage estimator, which is dominated, in practical cases, by the MM and MMK estimators in terms of nearness to the true value in the sense of Pitman.

This paper is concerned with the refined asymptotic properties of several tests for the admissibility of a subset of (overidentifying) instrumental variables. It derives maximum likelihood and linearized maximum likelihood tests and calculates size corrections to the order 1/T. The local power function of the size-corrected tests is the same to the order 1/T, irrespectively of the form of the test statistic or the limited information estimator used in its computation. Futher, it compares these tests with two previously proposed tests. The size and the power of the original and the size-corrected tests are compared by Monte Carlo experiments. Copyright 1994 by The Econometric Society.

We establish conditions which (in various settings) guarantee the existence of equilib-ria described by ergodic Markov processes with a Borel state space S. Let 9(S) denote the probability measures on S, and let s- G(s) c 4?(S) be a (possibly empty-valued) correspondence with closed graph characterizing intertemporal consistency, as prescribed by some particular model. A nonempty measurable set J c S is self-justified if G(s) n 9?(J) is not empty for all s E J. A time-homogeneous Markov equilibrium (THME) for G is a self-justified set J and a measurable selection TI: J-9 _(J) from the restriction of G to J. The paper gives sufficient conditions for existence of compact self-justified sets, and applies the theorem: If G is convex-valued and has a compact self-justified set, then G has an THME with an ergodic measure. The applications are (i) stochastic overlapping generations equilibria, (ii) an extension of the Lucas (1978) asset market equilibrium mnodel to the case of heterogeneous agents, and (iii) equilibria for discounted stochastic games with uncountable state spaces.

The paper analyzes a first price, sealed bid auction with a random reservation price where the object has an unknown common value, but one buyer has better information than the others. We permit the reservation price to be correlated with the information of the informed buyer, which reflects both his assessment of the value of the object and probability of rejection at any bid. Assuming all random variables are affiliated, we establish the following results. (1) The rate of increase in the distribution of the uninformed bidder is never greater than the rate of increase in the distribution of the informed bid. (2) The distributions are identical at bids above the support of the reservation price. (3) The informed buyer is more likely to submit low bids. We demonstrate that these restrictions are satisfied by bid data from the federal sales of offshore drainage leases.

A model of trade with m buyers and m sellers is considered in which price is set to equate revealed demand and supply. In a Bayesian Nash equilibrium, each trader acts not as a price-taker, but instead misrepresents his true demand/supply to influence price in his favor. This causes inefficiency. We show that in any equilibrium the amount by which a trader misreports is O(1/m) and the corresponding inefficiency is O(1/m2). The indeterminacy and the inefficiency that is caused by the traders' bargaining behavior in small markets thus rapidly vanishes as the market increases in size.