We provide a nonparametric characterization of a general collective model for household consumption, which includes externalities and public consumption. Next, we establish testable necessary and sufficient conditions for data consistency with collective rationality that only include observed price and quantity information. These conditions have a similar structure as the generalized axiom of revealed preference for the unitary model, which is convenient from a testing point of view. In addition, we derive the minimum number of goods and observations that enable the rejection of collectively rational household behavior.

Kitamura and Stoye (2018) recently proposed a nonparametric statistical test for random utility models of consumer behavior. The test is formulated in terms of linear inequality constraints and a quadratic objective function. While the nonparametric test is conceptually appealing, its practical implementation is computationally challenging. In this paper, we develop a column generation approach to operationalize the test. These novel computational tools generate considerable computational gains in practice, which substantially increases the empirical usefulness of Kitamura and Stoye's statistical test.

We propose a method to set identify bounds on the sharing rule for a general collective household consumption model. Unlike the effects of distribution factors, the level of the sharing rule cannot be uniquely identified without strong assumptions on preferences across households. Our new results show that, though not point identified without these assumptions, strong bounds on the sharing rule can be obtained. We get these bounds by applying revealed preference restrictions implied by the collective model to the household's continuous aggregate demand functions. We obtain informative bounds even if nothing is known about whether each good is public, private, or assignable within the household, though having such information tightens the bounds. We apply our method to US PSID data, obtaining narrow bounds that yield useful conclusions regarding the effects of income and wages on intrahousehold resource sharing, and on the prevalence of individual (as opposed to household level) poverty.