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Some Exact Distribution Theory for Maximum Likelihood Estimators of Cointegrating Coefficients in Error Correction Models

Econometrica 1994 62(1), 73
The author derives some exact finite sample disbibutions and characterizes the tail behavior of maximum likelihood estimators of the cointegrating coefficients in error correction models. The reduced rank regression estimator has a distribution with Cauchy-like tails and no finite moments of integer order. The maximum likelihood estimator of the coefficients in a particular triangular system representation has matrix t-distribution tails with finite integer moments to order T - n + r, where T is the sample size, n is the total number of variables, and r is the dimension of cointegration space. This helps explain some recent simulation studies where extreme outliers occur more frequently for the reduced rank regression estimator than for alternative asymptotically efficient procedures based on triangular representation. Copyright 1994 by The Econometric Society.

The Value Allocation of an Economy with Differential Information

Econometrica 1994 62(4), 881
[We analyze the Shapley value allocation of an economy with differential information. Since the intent of the Shapley value is to measure the sum of the expected marginal contributions made by an agent to any coalition to which he/she belongs, the value allocation of an economy with differential information provides an interesting way to measure the information advantage of an agent. This feature of the Shapley value allocation is not necessarily shared by the rational expectation equilibrium. Thus, we analyze the informational structure of an economy with differential information from a different and new viewpoint. In particular we address the following questions: How do coalitions of agents share their private information? How can one measure the information advantage or superiority of an agent? Is each agent's private information verifiable by other members of a coalition? Do coalitions of agents pool their private information? Do agents have an incentive to report their true private information? What is the correct concept of a value allocation in an economy with differential information? Do value allocations exist in an economy with differential information? We provide answers to each of these questions.]