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Folklore Theorems, Implicit Maps, and Indirect Inference

Econometrica 2012 80(1), 425-454
The delta method and continuous mapping theorem are among the most extensively used tools in asymptotic derivations in econometrics. Extensions of these methods are provided for sequences of functions that are commonly encountered in applications and where the usual methods sometimes fail. Important examples of failure arise in the use of simulation-based estimation methods such as indirect inference. The paper explores the application of these methods to the indirect inference estimator (IIE) in first order autoregressive estimation. The IIE uses a binding function that is sample size dependent. Its limit theory relies on a sequence-based delta method in the stationary case and a sequence-based implicit continuous mapping theorem in unit root and local to unity cases. The new limit theory shows that the IIE achieves much more than (partial) bias correction. It changes the limit theory of the maximum likelihood estimator (MLE) when the autoregressive coefficient is in the locality of unity, reducing the bias and the variance of the MLE without affecting the limit theory of the MLE in the stationary case. Thus, in spite of the fact that the IIE is a continuously differentiable function of the MLE, the limit distribution of the IIE is not simply a scale multiple of the MLE, but depends implicitly on the full binding function mapping. The unit root case therefore represents an important example of the failure of the delta method and shows the need for an implicit mapping extension of the continuous mapping theorem.

Sparse Models and Methods for Optimal Instruments With an Application to Eminent Domain

Econometrica 2012 80(6), 2369-2429
We develop results for the use of LASSO and Post-LASSO methods to form firststage predictions and estimate optimal instruments in linear instrumental variables (IV) models with many instruments, p, that apply even when p is much larger than the sample size, n.We rigorously develop asymptotic distribution and inference theory for the resulting IV estimators and provide conditions under which these estimators are asymptotically oracle-efficient.In simulation experiments, the LASSO-based IV estimator with a data-driven penalty performs well compared to recently advocated many-instrument-robust procedures.In an empirical example dealing with the effect of judicial eminent domain decisions on economic outcomes, the LASSObased IV estimator substantially reduces estimated standard errors allowing one to draw much more precise conclusions about the economic effects of these decisions.Optimal instruments are conditional expectations; and in developing the IV results, we also establish a series of new results for LASSO and Post-LASSO estimators of non-parametric conditional expectation functions which are of independent theoretical and practical interest.Specifically, we develop the asymptotic theory for these estimators that allows for non-Gaussian, heteroscedastic disturbances, which is important for econometric applications.By innovatively using moderate deviation theory for self-normalized sums, we provide convergence rates for these estimators that are as sharp as in the homoscedastic Gaussian case under the weak condition that log p = o(n 1/3 ).Moreover, as a practical innovation, we provide a fully data-driven method for choosing the user-specified penalty that must be provided in obtaining LASSO and Post-LASSO estimates and establish its asymptotic validity under non-Gaussian, heteroscedastic disturbances.

Clocks and Trees: Isomorphic Dutch Auctions and Centipede Games

Econometrica 2012 80(2), 883-903
We report an experiment on effects of varying institutional format and dynamic structure of centipede games and Dutch auctions. Centipede games with a clock format unravel, as predicted by theory but not reported in previous literature on two-player tree-format centipede games. Dutch auctions with a tree format produce bids close to risk neutral Nash equilibrium bids, unlike previous literature on clock-format Dutch auctions. Our data provide a new, expanded set of stylized facts which may provide a foundation for unified modeling of play in a class of games that includes centipede games and Dutch auctions.