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Heteroskedasticity-Robust Standard Errors for Fixed Effects Panel Data Regression

Econometrica 2008 76(1), 155-174 open access
The conventional heteroskedasticity-robust (HR) variance matrix estimator for cross-sectional regression (with or without a degrees-of-freedom adjustment), applied to the fixed-effects estimator for panel data with serially uncorrelated errors, is inconsistent if the number of time periods T is fixed (and greater than 2) as the number of entities n increases. We provide a bias-adjusted HR estimator that is √nT-consistent under any sequences (n T ) in which n and/or T increase to ∞. This estimator can be extended to handle serial correlation of fixed order.

Admissibility in Games

Econometrica 2008 76(2), 307-352
Suppose that each player in a game is rational, each player thinks the other players are rational, and so on. Also, suppose that rationality is taken to incorporate an admissibility requirement-that is, the avoidance of weakly dominated strategies. Which strategies can be played? We provide an epistemic framework in which to address this question. Specifically, we formulate conditions of rationality and mth-order assumption of rationality (RmAR) and rationality and common assumption of rationality (RCAR). We show that (i) RCAR is characterized by a solution concept we call a self-admissible set; (ii) in a type structure, RmAR is characterized by the set of strategies that survive m + 1 rounds of elimination of inadmissible strategies; (iii) under certain conditions, RCAR is impossible in a complete structure.

Admissibility in Games

Econometrica 2008 76(2), 307-352
Suppose that each player in a game is rational, each player thinks the other players are rational, and so on. Also, suppose that rationality is taken to incorporate an admissibility requirement—that is, the avoidance of weakly dominated strategies. Which strategies can be played? We provide an epistemic framework in which to address this question. Specifically, we formulate conditions of rationality and mth-order assumption of rationality (RmAR) and rationality and common assumption of rationality (RCAR). We show that (i) RCAR is characterized by a solution concept we call a “self-admissible set”; (ii) in a “complete” type structure, RmAR is characterized by the set of strategies that survive m+1 rounds of elimination of inadmissible strategies; (iii) under certain conditions, RCAR is impossible in a complete structure.