We establish the existence of pure strategy equilibria in monotone bidding functions in first-price auctions with asymmetric bidders, interdependent values, and affiliated one-dimensional signals. By extending a monotonicity result due to Milgrom and Weber (1982), we show that single crossing can fail only when ties occur at winning bids or when bids are individually irrational. We avoid these problems by considering limits of ever finer finite bid sets such that no two bidders have a common serious bid, and by recalling that single crossing is needed only at individually rational bids. Two examples suggest that our results cannot be extended to multidimensional signals or to second-price auctions. Copyright The Econometric Society 2004.

In an effort to improve the small sample properties of generalized method of mo-ments (GMM) estimators, a number of alternative estimators have been suggested. These include empirical likelihood (EL), continuous updating, and exponential tilt-ing estimators. We show that these estimators share a common structure, being members of a class of generalized empirical likelihood (GEL) estimators. We use this structure to compare their higher order asymptotic properties. We find that GEL has no asymptotic bias due to correlation of the moment functions with their Jacobian, eliminating an important source of bias for GMM in models with endo-geneity. We also find that EL has no asymptotic bias from estimating the optimal weight matrix, eliminating a further important source of bias for GMM in panel data models. We give bias corrected GMM and GEL estimators. We also show that bias corrected EL inherits the higher order property of maximum likelihood, that it is higher order asymptotically efficient relative to the other bias corrected estimators.

Previous research has shown that under a suitable no-jump condition, the price of a defaultable security is equal to its risk-neutral expected discounted cash flows if a modified discount rate is introduced to account for the possibility of default. Below, we generalize this result by demonstrating that one can always value defaultable claims using expected risk-adjusted discounting provided that the expectation is taken under a slightly modified probability measure. This new probability measure puts zero probability on paths where default occurs prior to the maturity, and is thus only absolutely continuous with respect to the risk-neutral probability measure. After establishing the general result and discussing its relation with the existing literature, we investigate several examples for which the no-jump condition fails. Each example illustrates the power of our general formula by providing simple analytic solutions for the prices of defaultable securities.

We show that optimal monetary and fiscal policies are time consistent for a class of economies often used in applied work, economies appealing because they are consistent with the growth facts. We establish our results in two steps. We first show that for this class of economies, the Friedman rule of setting nominal interest rates to zero is optimal under commitment. We then show that optimal policies are time consistent if the Friedman rule is optimal. For our benchmark economy in which the time consistency problem is most severe, the converse also holds: if optimal policies are time consistent, then the Friedman rule is optimal.

We study the long-run sustainability of reputations in games with imperfect public monitoring. It is impossible to maintain a permanent reputation for playing a strategy that does not play an equilibrium of the game without uncertainty about types. Thus, a player cannot indefinitely sustain a reputation for noncredible behavior in the presence of imperfect monitoring.

This paper considers learning rules for environments in which little prior and feedback information is available to the decision maker. Two properties of such learning rules are studied: absolute expediency and monotonicity. Both require that some aspect of the decision maker's performance improves from the current period to the next. The paper provides some necessary, and some sufficient conditions for these properties. It turns out that there is a large variety of learning rules that have the properties. However, all learning rules that have these properties are related to the replicator dynamics of evolutionary game theory. For the case in which there are only two actions, it is shown that one of the absolutely expedient learning rules dominates all others.