We study commodity taxation and characterize the Laffer curve, a trade-off between tax rates and revenue, in noncompetitive markets. Pricing in these markets leads to incomplete tax pass-through and agents re-optimize their purchase and pricing decisions in response to any tax change. We use detailed data from Pennsylvania, a state that monopolizes retail sales of alcoholic beverages, to estimate a model of demand for horizontally differentiated products that ties consumers' demographic characteristics to heterogeneous preferences for spirits. We find that under the state's current tax policy, spirits are overpriced. Distillers respond to decreases in the tax rate by increasing wholesale prices, which limits the state's revenue gain to only 13% of the incremental tax revenue predicted under the common assumption of perfect competition. The strategic response of noncompetitive firms to changes in taxation therefore flattens the Laffer curve significantly.

implies and is implied by additive separability of choice of treatment equations in terms of observed and unobserved variables. These results follow from properties of binary matrices developed in this paper. We investigate conditions under which unordered monotonicity arises as a consequence of choice behavior. We characterize IV estimators of counterfactuals as solutions to discrete mixture problems.

We investigate the role of uncertainty in business cycles. First, we demonstrate that microeconomic uncertainty rises sharply during recessions, including during the Great Recession of 2007–2009. Second, we show that uncertainty shocks can generate drops in gross domestic product of around 2.5% in a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with heterogeneous firms. However, we also find that uncertainty shocks need to be supplemented by first†moment shocks to fit consumption over the cycle. So our data and simulations suggest recessions are best modelled as being driven by shocks with a negative first moment and a positive second moment. Finally, we show that increased uncertainty can make first†moment policies, like wage subsidies, temporarily less effective because firms become more cautious in responding to price changes.