Gul and Pesendorfer (2001) model the static behavior of an agent who ranks menus prior to the experience of temptation. This paper models the dynamic behavior of an agent whose ranking of menus itself is subject to temptation. The representation for the agent's dynamically inconsistent choice behavior views him as possessing a dynamically consistent view of what choices he “should” make (a normative preference) and being tempted by menus that contain tempting alternatives. Foundations for the model require a departure from Gul and Pesendorfer's idea that temptation creates a preference for commitment. Instead, it is hypothesized that distancing an agent from the consequences of his choices separates normative preference and temptation.

The agent is modeled as a current self that optimally incurs a cognitive cost of empathizing with future selves. The model unifies well‐known experimental and empirical findings in intertemporal choice and enriches the multiple selves model with a notion of self‐control. The defining feature of the model is magnitude‐decreasing impatience: greater patience toward larger rewards. Two behavioral definitions of magnitude‐decreasing impatience are provided and the model is characterized under each of them.