[In his paper, extasciicircum1 Roth has used a three-person game example to illustrate certain difficulties connected with generalizations of the Shapley value for games without side payment. This note argues that cooperative solution concepts in general often give rise to similar difficulties, and that the best way of avoiding them is to analyze cooperative games by means of noncooperative bargaining models.]

The von Neumann-Morgenstern theory of games does not yield determinate solutions (corresponding to unique payoff vectors) for two-person variable-sum games and for n-person games. The present paper outlines a general theory of rational behavior in game situations which does yield determinate solutions for all classes of games. The theory is based on two classes of rationality postulates: those defining rational behavior as'such, and those defining rational expectations concerning the other players' behavior. It is argued that this new approach greatly increases the possibilities for the application of game theory in economics and the other social sciences.

John C. Harsanyi, Approaches to the Bargaining Problem Before and After the Theory of Games: A Critical Discussion of Zeuthen's, Hicks', and Nash's Theories, Econometrica, Vol. 24, No. 2 (Apr., 1956), pp. 144-157