Publisher Summary The work extends the results of an earlier paper by Hahn ; it presents a model of a barter economy with a sequence of markets in which each trader operates with his own transaction technology. An equilibrium is proved to exist and the efficiency of equilibrium is discussed.

[The Ramsey model of optimal capital accumulation is reconsidered under the additional restriction that gross investment must be nonnegative. An effective characterization of the optimal solution in open-loop form is obtained. It is shown, however, that in general no restriction can be placed on the number of intervals in which the non negativity constraint is binding.]

The question of returns to scale in public utilities is a much debated issue. In this study, the productive process of electricity generation is examined and a modified substitution model is employed, permitting differentiation between returns to scale to labor and to other factors. The method employed here allows us to isolate the impact of technological progress on (steam) electricity generation. We find that increasing returns to scale prevail throughout, and that the main impact of technology was registered during the 1950's. This study covers the period 1937-59.

[In order to develop a theory of coalition formation and maintenance, we first establish a valuation criterion for each individual player in a given coalition structure. Various stability concepts based on it are then developed and studied.]

[A treatment of taxation based on considerations of political and economic power in a majority-vote democratic context is the topic of this article. Agents are endowed with gross incomes and have concave von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities for money. Taxation policies are decided by majority vote, but each citizen retains a certain basic right that prevents the majority from arbitrarily expropriating his income. The resulting non-transferable utility cooperative game is analyzed by means of the Harsanyi-Shapley-Nash value.]