In an economy with complete markets, the owners of a firm will unanimously desire the firm to maximize profits if it is a perfect competitor. We generalize this result to an economy with incomplete markets. We show that if competitive conditions prevail-that is, if each firm is negligible relative to the aggregate economy-a firm's shareholders will want the firm to maximize the (net) market value of its shares. This result holds whether or not the so-called spanning condition is satisfied. However, while there may be agreement about what goal the firm should pursue, there may be disagreement among shareholders about how best to pursue this goal.

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Most analyses of the principal-agent problem assume that the principal chooses an incentive scheme to maximize expected utility subject to the agent's utility being at a stationary point.An important paper of Mirrlees has shown that this approach is generally invalid.We present an alternative procedure.If the agent's preferences over income lotteries are independent of action, we show that the optimal way of implementing an action by the agent can be found by solving a convex programming problem.We use this to characterize the optimal incentive scheme and to analyze the determinants of the seriousness of an incentive problem.'Support from the U.K.

[In an economy with incomplete markets, firms' profits at different dates and contingencies cannot be aggregated into a single index and so profit maximization is not well-defined. In this paper we propose an objective for firms to pursue which is a generalization of the idea of profit maximization. We show that, if firms' managers can transfer current income between shareholders at the first date, and if shareholders have what we call competitive perceptions concerning the effect of a change in production plan on share prices, then each firm will maximize a weighted sum of shareholders' private valuations of the firm's production plan, where the weights are the initial shareholdings. We then define, and prove the existence of, a competitive equilibrium in which firms pursue this proposed objective. Finally, we analyze the optimality properties of the competitive equilibrium.]