I examine markets for flexible commitment devices populated by agents who value both commitment and ‡exibility, and whose preferences exhibit varying degrees of time inconsistency. I show that, if the agents’ time inconsistency is observable, then both a profit-maximizing monopolist and a welfare-maximizing planner help each agent commit to the efficient level of ‡exibility. If instead the agents’ time inconsistency is unobservable, the monopolist and the planner face a screening problem. I find that, to screen a more time-inconsistent from a less time-inconsistent agent, the monopolist and (possibly) the planner inefficiently curtail the ‡exibility of the device tailored to the first agent, and include unused options in the device tailored to the second agent. My results have important policy implications for designing special savings devices, that use tax incentives to help

Modeling intergenerational altruism is crucial to evaluate the long‐term consequences of current decisions, and requires a set of principles guiding such altruism. We axiomatically develop a theory of pure, direct altruism: Altruism is pure if it concerns the total utility (rather than the mere consumption utility) of future generations, and direct if it directly incorporates the utility of all future generations. Our axioms deliver a new class of altruistic, forward‐looking preferences, whose weight put on the consumption of a future generation generally depends on the consumption of other generations. The only preferences lacking this dependence correspond to the quasi‐hyperbolic discounting model, which our theory characterizes. Our approach provides a framework to analyze welfare in the presence of altruistic preferences and addresses technical challenges stemming from the interdependent nature of such preferences.