The asymptotic refinements attributable to the block bootstrap for time series are not as large as those of the nonparametric iid bootstrap or the parametric bootstrap. One reason is that the independence between the blocks in the block bootstrap sample does not mimic the dependence structure of the original sample. This is the join-point problem. In this paper, we propose a method of solving this problem. The idea is not to alter the block bootstrap. Instead, we alter the original sample statistics to which the block bootstrap is applied. We introduce block statistics that possess join-point features that are similar to those of the block bootstrap versions of these statistics. We refer to the application of the block bootstrap to block statistics as the block–block bootstrap. The asymptotic refinements of the block–block bootstrap are shown to be greater than those obtained with the block bootstrap and close to those obtained with the nonparametric iid bootstrap and parametric bootstrap.

The local Whittle (or Gaussian semiparametric) estimator of long range dependence, proposed by Künsch (1987) and analyzed by Robinson (1995a), has a relatively slow rate of convergence and a finite sample bias that can be large. In this paper, we generalize the local Whittle estimator to circumvent these problems. Instead of approximating the short-run component of the spectrum, ϕ(λ) , by a constant in a shrinking neighborhood of frequency zero, we approximate its logarithm by a polynomial. This leads to a "local polynomial Whittle" (LPW) estimator. We specify a data-dependent adaptive procedure that adjusts the degree of the polynomial to the smoothness of ϕ(λ) at zero and selects the bandwidth. The resulting "adaptive LPW" estimator is shown to achieve the optimal rate of convergence, which depends on the smoothness of ϕ(λ) at zero, up to a logarithmic factor. Copyright The Econometric Society 2004.

We study the long-run sustainability of reputations in games with imperfect public monitoring. It is impossible to maintain a permanent reputation for playing a strategy that does not play an equilibrium of the game without uncertainty about types. Thus, a player cannot indefinitely sustain a reputation for noncredible behavior in the presence of imperfect monitoring.

this paper, we study the use of these intervals as CIs for the partially identified parameter f(P,#). Our most basic finding is Lemma 2.1: Lemma 2.1 Let CN0 0, CN1 0, # #, and P #P