Matching estimators for average treatment effects are widely used in evaluation research despite the fact that their large sample properties have not been established in many cases. The absence of formal results in this area may be partly due to the fact that standard asymptotic expansions do not apply to matching estimators with a fixed number of matches because such estimators are highly nonsmooth functionals of the data. In this article we develop new methods for analyzing the large sample properties of matching estimators and establish a number of new results. We focus on matching with replacement with a fixed number of matches. First, we show that matching estimators are not N1/2-consistent in general and describe conditions under which matching estimators do attain N1/2-consistency. Second, we show that even in settings where matching estimators are N1/2-consistent, simple matching estimators with a fixed number of matches do not attain the semiparametric efficiency bound. Third, we provide a consistent estimator for the large sample variance that does not require consistent nonparametric estimation of unknown functions. Software for implementing these methods is available in Matlab, Stata, and R.

This paper considers tests of the parameter on an endogenous variable in an instrumental variables regression model. The focus is on determining tests that have some optimal power properties. We start by considering a model with normally distributed errors and known error covariance matrix. We consider tests that are similar and satisfy a natural rotational invariance condition. We determine a two-sided power envelope for invariant similar tests. This allows us to assess and compare the power properties of tests such as the conditional likelihood ratio (CLR), the Lagrange multiplier, and the Anderson-Rubin tests. We find that the CLR test is quite close to being uniformly most powerful invariant among a class of two-sided tests. Copyright The Econometric Society 2006.

We consider large double auctions with private values. Values need be neither symmetric nor independent. Multiple units may be owned or desired. Participation may be stochastic. We introduce a very mild notion of “a little independence.” We prove that all nontrivial equilibria of auctions that satisfy this notion are asymptotically efficient. For any α>0, inefficiency disappears at rate 1/n2-α.

This paper develops a generalization of the widely used difference-in-differences method for evaluating the effects of policy changes. We propose a model that allows the control and treatment groups to have different average benefits from the treatment. The assumptions of the proposed model are invariant to the scaling of the outcome. We provide conditions under which the model is nonparametrically identified and propose an estimator that can be applied using either repeated cross section or panel data. Our approach provides an estimate of the entire counterfactual distribution of outcomes that would have been experienced by the treatment group in the absence of the treatment and likewise for the untreated group in the presence of the treatment. Thus, it enables the evaluation of policy interventions according to criteria such as a mean-variance trade-off. We also propose methods for inference, showing that our estimator for the average treatment effect is root-N consistent and asymptotically normal. We consider extensions to allow for covariates, discrete dependent variables, and multiple groups and time periods. Copyright The Econometric Society 2006.