This paper studies whether and how environmental, social, and governance (ESG) disclosure regulations imposed on banks generate transmission effects along the lending channel. I use a setting of U.S. firms borrowing from non‐U.S. banks and exploit the staggered adoption of ESG disclosure regulations in banks’ home countries. I find that exposed borrowers of affected banks improve their environmental and social (E&S) performance following the disclosure mandate. Consistent with banks enhancing both their engagement and selection activities, affected banks impose more environmental action covenants in loan contracts, and they are more likely to terminate a borrower with bad E&S records following the regulation. Further evidence shows that the transmission effects are stronger when a disclosure regulation is well‐enforced (as indicated by a greater increase in banks’ disclosure) and among borrowers with greater switching costs. Collectively, the findings document the role of lending relationships in transmitting the real effect of ESG disclosure regulations from banks to borrowing firms

This paper examines how increased competition among environmental, social, and governance (ESG) rating agencies relates to ESG rating quality. We exploit the entry of Sustainalytics as a new ESG rating agency in 2010. We conduct a difference‐in‐differences analysis and provide three main findings. First, we find that higher competition decreases incumbents' ESG rating disagreements of the same scope. The negative relation between competition and ESG rating disagreement persists for same‐scope rating metrics not covered by Sustainalytics, suggesting that neither learning nor herding drive the results. The relationship between competition and rating disagreement strengthens for firms with more ESG disclosures, which generally require more effort to analyze. Second, we find that incumbents' ratings of ESG concerns are more strongly associated with future negative ESG news for firms additionally covered by Sustainalytics. This finding is consistent with competition improving ratings' ability to predict future negative ESG incidents. Third, we find that incumbents evaluate more difficult‐to‐measure outcome metrics for firms covered by Sustainalytics, consistent with competition inducing more effort. Overall, our findings suggest that competition serves as an implicit disciplining mechanism of ESG rating agencies' quality

We examine whether and, if so, how retail consumers change their shopping in response to firm‐specific negative environmental, social, and governance (ESG) news. Using an event study methodology, we do not find significant changes in consumer foot traffic in response to negative ESG news, on average. However, the average consumer reacts negatively when such news is covered by national or global media outlets, which elevates consumer awareness. In addition, we provide evidence of the heterogeneity in responses to negative ESG news across consumer groups. Consumers in more ESG‐conscious counties, as measured by county ESG preferences, income, education, and political ideology, reduce store visits in response to negative ESG news. In contrast, consumers in the least ESG‐conscious counties increase their visits in response to negative ESG news. These opposing reactions explain the insignificant average consumer response to negative ESG news. Furthermore, the ESG‐conscious consumers' negative reaction is, at most, modest, dissipating within six weeks. Overall, our findings suggest that firms face divergent responses to ESG activities from different consumer groups, underscoring the divisive nature of ESG issues

We examine firms' trade‐offs in their voluntary disclosure decisions following negative media coverage of climate change incidents. By combining a keyword discovery algorithm and a fine‐tuned BERT model, we identify “hard” and “soft” climate disclosures on Twitter. Our findings indicate that firms tend to issue climate tweets as a rapid response to negative climate incidents. Additionally, firms with a history of hard climate change disclosure, as measured by ESG reports, are more likely to issue climate‐related responses than firms without such a history. Furthermore, we show that prior hard disclosure is associated with hard responses when the incident receives moderate media attention, but with soft responses when the incident receives low media attention. Our findings provide empirical insights for dynamic disclosure theory by illustrating how prior disclosure shapes firms' response strategies to negative media coverage