Knowledge that Transforms

We provide results from an experiment designed to assess whether mandatory rotation and/or retention of auditors increases auditors' independence by reducing their willingness to issue reports biased in favor of management. Auditors' reporting is compared across the following four regimes: one that does not require either rotation or retention, a second that requires retention only, a third that requires rotation only, and a fourth that requires both rotation and retention. We find that the rotation requirements in the third and fourth regimes decreased auditor‐subjects' willingness to issue biased reports, relative to the two regimes in which rotation was not imposed. In these other two regimes, however, many manager‐subjects voluntarily retained the same auditor‐subjects over multi‐periods. While the long running interactions between manager‐ and auditor‐subjects resulted in more favorable reports by auditor‐subjects (a lower level of independence), the established relationships also induced manager‐subjects to make higher investments.

This study evaluates corporate voluntary disclosure of forward‐looking information under the safe harbor provision of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. Using a sample of 523 computer hardware, computer software, and pharmaceutical firms, we find a significant increase in both the frequency of firms issuing earnings and sales forecasts and the mean number of forecasts issued following the Act’s passage. To provide more direct evidence that our findings are attributable to the Act reducing firms’ legal exposure, we develop a proxy for litigation risk and examine whether the increase in disclosure is more pronounced for firms at greatest risk of a lawsuit. As expected, we find that the change in disclosure is increasing in firms’ ex ante risk of litigation. Finally, we report that the safe harbor had no adverse impact on the quality of forward‐looking information. Forecast errors, whether directional or non‐directional, were not significantly affected by the Act’s passage.

We develop a model of auditor‐client accounting negotiation, using the elements of negotiation examined in the behavioral negotiation literature, elaborated to include accounting contextual features indicated in the accounting literature and suggested by interviews with senior practitioners. We use a questionnaire structured according to the model to describe the elements, contextual features and associations between the two groups in a sample of real negotiations chosen by 93 experienced audit partners. The paper demonstrates important aspects of the sampled accounting negotiations and makes suggestions for further empirical and model development research.

This study analyzes the relation between auditors' perceived business risk and audit fees to determine whether audit firms or their clients bear the expected legal costs of business risk. We predict that hourly audit fees and the number of audit hours are increasing in business risk. Using confidential survey data collected by a large international accounting firm for 422 audits, we find that high business risk increases the number of audit hours, but not the fee per hour. This implies that firms perceive firm‐level differences in business risk and obtain compensation through billing additional hours, not by raising the hourly charge.

I show that median earnings surprise has shifted rightward from small negative (miss analyst estimates by a small amount) to zero (meet analyst estimates exactly) to small positive (beat analyst estimates by a small amount) during the 16 years, 1984 to 1999. I show that a rightward temporal shift in median surprise from negative to positive describes earnings, but neither profits nor losses. Median profit surprise shifts within the positive quadrant, from zero to one cent per share. Median loss surprise shifts within the negative quadrant from extreme negative (about ‐33 cents per share) to zero. I show that the median surprise for profits exceeds that for losses in every year. I document significant positive temporal trends in both meet and beat analyst estimates for both profits and losses, but I find a greater frequency of profits that either meet or beat analyst estimates in every year. I find a significant positive temporal trend in positive profits that are “a little bit of good news,” and a significant negative temporal trend in managers who report losses that are an “extreme amount of bad news.” My results are robust to the four internal validity threats I consider—namely temporal changes in: (1) analyst forecast accuracy, (2) the mix of earnings of one sign preceded by earnings of another sign four quarters ago, (3) the timeliness of the most recent analyst forecast, and (4) the I/B/E/S definition of actual earnings. I find that managers of growth firms are relatively more likely than managers of value firms to report good news profits. I show that when they do report positive profit surprises, managers of growth firms are more likely to report “a little bit of good news” in every year.

Prior research suggests that financial analysts’ earnings forecasts and stock prices underreact to earnings news. This paper provides evidence that analysts and investors correct this underreaction in response to the next earnings announcement and to other (non‐earnings‐surprise) information available between earnings announcements. Our evidence also suggests that analysts and investors underreact to information reflected in analysts’ earnings forecast revisions and that non‐earnings‐surprise information helps correct this underreaction as well. Controlling for corrective non‐earnings‐surprise information significantly increases estimates of the degree to which analysts’ forecasting behavior can explain drifts in returns following both earnings announcements and analysts’ earnings forecast revisions.