Knowledge that Transforms

The Journal of Accounting Research is proud to recognize our top referees of the previous calendar year. The senior editors selected those named below for their “2022 Excellence in Refereeing” based on the quality and the number of reviews they had performed for the journal during the 2022 calendar year. We thank the referees for their invaluable services to the journal. Jannis Bischof, University of Mannheim Matthew Bloomfield, University of Pennsylvania Pietro Bonetti, IESE Business School Thomas Bourveau, Columbia University Mark Bradshaw, Boston College Matthias Breuer, Columbia University Jung Ho Choi, Stanford University Yiwei Dou, New York University Raphael Duguay, Yale University Travis Dyer, Brigham Young University Henry Eyring, Duke University Fabrizio Ferri, University of Miami Henry Friedman, University of California, Los Angeles Stephen Glaeser, University of North Carolina João Granja, University of Chicago Nicholas Guest, Cornell University Steven Kachelmeier, University of Texas, Austin John Kepler, Stanford University Sehwa Kim, Columbia University Ranjani Krishnan, Michigan State University Lian Fen Lee, Boston College Miao Liu, Boston College Yao Lu, Cornell University Daniele Macciocchi, University of Miami Charles McClure, University of Chicago Mihir Mehta, University of Michigan Maximilian Muhn, University of Chicago James Omartian, University of Michigan Gaizka Ormazabal, IESE Business School Hong Qu, Kennesaw State University Thomas Rauter, University of Chicago Delphine Samuels, University of Chicago Timothy Shields, Chapman University Nemit Shroff, MIT Lorien Stice-Lawrence, University of Southern California Stephen Stubben, University of Utah Andrew Sutherland, MIT Sorabh Tomar, Southern Methodist University Rahul Vashishtha, Duke University Felix Vetter, University of Mannheim Dushyantkumar Vyas, University of Toronto Charles Wang, Harvard Business School Clare Wang, University of Colorado, Boulder Edward Watts, Yale University TJ Wong, University of Southern California Gaoqing Zhang, University of Minnesota Frank Zhou, University of Pennsylvania Christina Zhu, University of Pennsylvania Luo Zuo, Cornell University

ABSTRACT We study the economic impact of private equity (PE) investments on local governments, which are important corporate stakeholders. Examining over 11,000 deals and private firm data in Europe, we document that target firms' effective tax rates and total tax expenses decrease by 15% and 13% after PE deals. At the same time, target firms expand their capital expenditures and firm boundaries, but do not increase employment. Using administrative data on the public finances of German municipalities and exploiting the geographical and time‐series variation in PE deals, we document that PE activity is negatively associated with local governments' tax revenues and spending. This result is likely driven by reduced tax payments of PE portfolio firms, accompanied by only modest positive spillovers of PE investments on regional economic growth. Collectively, our findings suggest that corporate tax efficiency serves as a cost‐cutting channel in the PE sector and constrains the finances of local governments.

ABSTRACT We examine the joint response to political uncertainty along two margins: changes in real activity and voluntary disclosure. We focus on within‐firm variation in exposure to ex ante competitive U.S. gubernatorial elections using data on preelection poll margins and firms’ state exposures. Despite real activity falling in the years leading up to a close election, we find that voluntary disclosure increases both in frequency and content, including mentions of risk in filings that reference states holding elections. Our tests use a decomposition of 8‐K filings into real activity and voluntary disclosure to address the endogenous complementarity between these two responses. These results hold when using alternative ex ante measures of political uncertainty based on term‐limited incumbents, historically competitive offices, or state legislature gridlock. Both effects of political uncertainty are stronger for firms in highly regulated industries and weaker for those least exposed to the local market, linking the real activity and disclosure responses to uncertainty.

ABSTRACT We investigate ethnic minority and nonminority sell‐side analysts’ participation in public earnings conference calls. We find that minority analysts are underrepresented in conference call Q&A sessions, and minority analysts who do participate on the calls experience lower levels of prioritization than do nonminority analysts. Minority analysts’ lower participation rates are partially but not fully mediated by characteristics such as experience, work environment, and stock rating favorability. Additionally, firm and conference call fixed effects mediate approximately half the magnitude of lower minority participation rates. Extroverted minority analysts participate at higher rates, but the negative association between minority status and conference call participation is exacerbated when calls are more time constrained, when executive teams are less diverse, and when analysts are from less prestigious brokerage houses. Overall, we document the underrepresentation of minority analysts on earnings conference calls and provide evidence suggesting both analysts’ and managers’ choices influence minority analysts’ participation rates.

ABSTRACT I examine the effects of the U.S. Greenhouse Gas (GHG) Reporting Program, which requires thousands of industrial facilities to measure and report their GHG emissions. I show that facilities reduce their GHG emissions by 7.9% following the disclosure of emissions data. The evidence indicates that benchmarking—whereby facilities use the disclosures of their peers to assess their own relative GHG performance—spurs emission reductions. Firms' concerns about future legislation appear to motivate this behavior and measurement alone (without disclosure) seems not to reduce emissions. My study highlights how mandatory GHG disclosure can create real effects for peers.

ABSTRACT We explore whether municipalities with public sector unions exploit aspects of governmental (or “fund”) accounting to obscure the availability of discretionary resources in fund balance accounts, relative to municipalities without public sector unions. We first investigate whether governments with unions report higher proportions of discretionary resources outside of the general fund, a primary measure of financial health, and instead within less prominent fund types. Second, we explore whether governments with unions report lower ratios within accessible general fund balance account categories – that is, report lower proportions of unreserved fund balance. Primary findings are consistent with both hypotheses. Although somewhat mixed, cross‐sectional analyses reveal that effects are magnified when unions have more bargaining power, as proxied by the ability to strike or the absence of state right‐to‐work laws. Further analysis corroborates cross‐sectional findings by examining difference‐in‐differences specifications surrounding the quasi‐exogenous shock of Wisconsin's 2011 weakening of state public sector union laws and Ohio's time‐varying union contract negotiations. Overall, the evidence suggests that governments with unions shelter resources to avoid the appearance of large discretionary amounts available.

ABSTRACT Using Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) inspection data from 2006 to 2018, we examine the use of auditor‐employed specialists in audit engagements. First, we find that the use of specialists is increasingly prevalent and related to clients’ size and complex accounting estimates. Second, the use of specialists is positively associated with the incidence of audit process deficiencies (identified by PCAOB inspections) but is not associated with output‐based audit‐quality proxies (restatements or absolute discretionary accruals). Hence, although process deficiencies are more likely to occur in engagements with higher use of specialists, financial reporting quality is not negatively impacted. Third, the use of specialists is positively associated with the likelihood of goodwill impairments and negatively associated with engagement profitability. Finally, cross‐sectional tests suggest that board accounting expertise is a salient condition for more effective use of specialists. Collectively, our findings align with concerns noted by the PCAOB and prior experimental and survey studies. Although specialists assist auditors with the audit of complex estimates, engagements with comparatively high specialist use entail an incremental risk of audit process deficiencies.

ABSTRACT Managers often face the choice between promoting an internal employee and hiring an external candidate. Using an interactive experiment, we examine the drivers of managers’ promote/hire decisions and internal employees’ behavior before and after those decisions. Consistent with gift exchange theory, we find that employees exert costly effort to increase the chance of being promoted, and they raise their effort level as the promote/hire decision becomes imminent. Managers respond by promoting those who exert high effort, despite employees’ inferior ability compared to external candidates. Results suggest that managers view employees’ past effort as both a gift to reciprocate and a signal of their future effort. Moreover, we find that managers are more likely to promote internally rather than hire externally under a less precise performance measurement system, and this result is driven by managers who observe low employee output. Finally, we find that total effort is significantly higher when managers promote internally versus hire externally.

ABSTRACT George Floyd's murder caused many firms to reveal how exposed they are to racial diversity issues. We examine investor and firm behaviors after this socially significant event to provide evidence on the valuation effects of the exposure and ensuing corporate responses. We develop a text‐based measure of a firm's exposure to racial diversity issues from conference call transcripts and find that, after the murder of George Floyd, firms with diversity exposure experience a stock price decrease of approximately 0.7% around the date of the conference call. We provide evidence that this effect is attributable to race‐related exposure and not gender‐related exposure. Initiatives taken by firms mitigate the negative market reaction. We document that firms with racial diversity exposure respond by appointing Black directors. The stock market views appointments of Black directors more favorably after George Floyd's murder, except when they are perceived as symbolic. We also find that firms with greater exposure to racial diversity are more likely to establish diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) departments, appoint DEI leaders, specify diversity goals, increase supply chain diversity, and donate to racial justice causes. Our paper provides evidence that exposure to racial diversity issues adversely affects firm value, and companies address the exposure by taking actions.

ABSTRACT We study the role of a relatively new type of external firm monitor, an on‐site government‐appointed Corporate Monitor, and assess whether such appointments reduce firms' propensity to violate laws. Using a sample of deferred and nonprosecution agreements, we first document the determinants of Monitor appointment. We find firms that voluntarily disclose wrongdoing and have more independent directors are less likely to have Corporate Monitors, whereas those with more severe infractions, mandated board changes, and increased cooperation requirements are more likely to have Monitors. We find such appointments are associated with an 18%–25% reduction in violations while the Monitor is on site, however, the effect does not persist after the Monitorship ends. Using a semisupervised machine learning method to measure changes in firms' ethics and compliance norms, we find that the reduction in violations is associated with changes in ethics and compliance that also do not persist. Finally, we document that firms under Monitorship experience a persistent reduction in innovation, highlighting a previously unexplored cost of these interventions. Overall, our results suggest that, although Corporate Monitors on site are associated with fewer violations, firms revert to previous levels of violations following Monitors' departure.