Knowledge that Transforms

ABSTRACT This study examines whether auditors can effectively use nonfinancial measures (NFMs) to assess the reasonableness of financial performance and, thereby, help detect financial statement fraud (hereafter, fraud). If auditors or other interested parties (e.g., directors, lenders, investors, or regulators) can identify NFMs (e.g., facilities growth) that are correlated with financial measures (e.g., revenue growth), inconsistent patterns between the NFMs and financial measures can be used to detect firms with high fraud risk. We find that the difference between financial and nonfinancial performance is significantly greater for firms that committed fraud than for their nonfraud competitors. We also find that this difference is a significant fraud indicator when included in a model containing variables that have previously been linked to the likelihood of fraud. Overall, our results provide empirical evidence suggesting that NFMs can be effectively used to assess fraud risk.

ABSTRACT In recent years, the proportion of after‐hours earnings announcements has increased to more than 40%. For after‐hours announcements, earnings‐related volume and price changes are not observed on the Compustat or I/B/E/S earnings announcement date, but one trading day later. This study demonstrates the importance of accounting for after‐hours announcements for event studies around earnings announcements.

ABSTRACT We examine whether analysts' incentives are associated with street earnings. Because prior research argues that analysts' incentives to promote stocks increase in the extent to which the stock exhibits glamour characteristics, we predict that analysts are more likely to make income‐increasing adjustments in determining street earnings for glamour stocks than for value stocks. We find that analysts are more likely to exclude expense items from street earnings for glamour stocks than for value stocks and that excluded expense items help predict future earnings for glamour stocks but not for value stocks. Overall, our results suggest that analysts' self‐interest influences street earnings and this self‐interest leads to street earnings that are less useful in predicting future earnings for glamour stocks.

ABSTRACT Not surprisingly, the recent accounting scandals look different when viewed from the perspectives of the political/regulatory process and of the market for corporate governance and financial reporting. We do not have the opportunity to observe a world in which either market or political/regulatory processes operate independently, and the events are recent and not well researched, so untangling their separate effects is somewhat conjectural. This paper offers conjectures on issues such as: What caused the scandalous behavior? Why was there such a rash of accounting scandals at one time? Who killed Arthur Andersen—the Securities and Exchange Commission, or the market? Did fraudulent accounting kill Enron, or just keep it alive for too long? What is the social cost of financial reporting fraud? Does the United States in fact operate a “principles‐based” or a “rules‐based” accounting system? Was there market failure? Or was there regulatory failure? Or both? Was the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act a political and regulatory overreaction? Does the United States follow an ineffective regulatory model?

ABSTRACT This study provides insights into the forces and constraints that shape analyst research coverage along country and sector dimensions and the impact of the structure of an analyst's portfolio on forecast accuracy. We find that analyst specialization by country and sector is sensitive to the extent to which firms within a country or sector and firms across country‐sectors are exposed to common economic forces, the potential for revenue generation, and broker culture. Our tests indicate that existing research on the relation between analyst portfolio structure and forecast accuracy may suffer from an endogeneity bias. We use our analysis of analyst specialization to develop controls for this bias. Once we employ these controls, we find that country diversification is associated with superior forecast accuracy. However, the relation between sector diversification and forecast accuracy is context‐specific. Specifically, sector diversification enhances forecast accuracy in an international context, while it detracts from forecast accuracy in a domestic U.S. context.

ABSTRACT In this study, we examine whether managers delay disclosure of bad news relative to good news. If managers accumulate and withhold bad news up to a certain threshold, but leak and immediately reveal good news to investors, then we expect the magnitude of the negative stock price reaction to bad news disclosures to be greater than the magnitude of the positive stock price reaction to good news disclosures. We present evidence consistent with this prediction. Our analysis suggests that management, on average , delays the release of bad news to investors.

ABSTRACT Accounting performance measures such as earnings and cash flows are useful for both valuation and performance evaluation purposes. However, little evidence exists on whether there is any association between these two roles. In this study, we provide large sample empirical evidence that the value relevance of earnings explains a significant amount of the cross‐sectional variation in the pay‐sensitivity of earnings and the incremental value relevance of cash flows explains variation in the marginal pay‐sensitivity of cash flows. We document that while both value relevance and compensation weight on earnings decline from the subperiod of 1993 to 1997 to the subperiod of 1998 to 2003, both value relevance and compensation weight on cash flows increase from the earlier subperiod to the later subperiod. Overall, our results provide additional evidence that value relevance of a performance measure plays a significant role in its use for performance evaluation.

ABSTRACT A vast literature following Hayn [1995] and Burgstahler and Dichev [1997] attributed the so‐called “discontinuities” in earnings distributions around zero to earnings management. Despite recent evidence that these discontinuities are likely caused by other factors, researchers and teachers continue to point to the shapes of these distributions as evidence of earnings management. We provide three sets of further evidence that these discontinuities are likely caused by factors other than earnings management: (1) we provide, as an example, a detailed analysis of the severe effects of sample selection in a recent study; this study erroneously concludes that the shape of an earnings distribution is evidence of earnings management, (2) we provide a simple explanation for the shape of the earnings distribution that is most often cited as evidence of earnings management; the relation between earnings and prices differs with the magnitude and the sign of earnings, and (3) we provide further examples that support the main point of our paper; evidence beyond the mere shape of a distribution must be brought to bear before researchers can draw conclusions regarding the presence/absence of earnings management.

ABSTRACT We examine management discretion to decide when and how much to write down an asset, in a unique case where a tracking stock provides an observable market value for the asset. We find that, despite market evidence that Inco Ltd.'s financial statements substantially overvalued the Voisey's Bay nickel mine throughout 1997 to 2000, management chose not to write down the mine until 2002. Inco management used an independent fairness opinion to justify its December 2000 redemption of the tracking stock at 25% of its initial value, indicating almost surely that Inco management was aware of the generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) impairment. This case illustrates that GAAP's reliance on undiscounted cash flows for impairment decisions allows huge unrecorded disparities between book and market value. The management discretion exercised in this case provides a concrete example of the subjectivity inherent in fair valuation.

ABSTRACT Using more than 350,000 sell‐side analyst recommendations from January 1994 to August 2006, this paper examines the predictive content of aggregate analyst recommendations. We find that changes in aggregate analyst recommendations forecast future market excess returns after controlling for macroeconomic variables that have been shown to influence market returns. Similarly, changes in industry‐aggregated analyst recommendations predict future industry returns. Changes in aggregate analyst recommendations also predict one‐quarter‐ahead aggregate earnings growth. Overall, our results suggest that analyst recommendations contain market‐ and industry‐level information about future returns and earnings.