Knowledge that Transforms

Mutual funds experiencing large outflows (inflows) tend to decrease (expand) their positions, creating downward (upward) price pressure in the stocks held in common by them (Coval and Stafford [2007]). This study shows that corporate insiders exploit the resulting mispricing by buying (selling) their company's stock if it is subject to such fire sales (purchases) by funds. We also show that the likelihood of option grants is greater for stocks that are subject to mutual fund fire sales. Finally, we show that both the insider trading and the option granting activities help speed up the correction of the flow-driven mispricing. Overall, this study illustrates that insiders enhance personal benefits by trading on their personal account and influencing the timing of option grants in response to mispricing due to flow-driven fund trading. Moreover, these activities help improve the informational efficiency of stock price.

We investigate the joint hypothesis that (1) tax expense contains information about core profitability that is incremental to reported earnings and (2) that information is reflected in stock prices with a delay. We find that seasonally differenced quarterly tax expense, our proxy for tax expense surprise, is related positively to future returns. This anomaly is separate from previously documented pricing anomalies based on financial and tax variables. Additional investigation reveals that tax expense surprise is related positively to changes in future quarterly earnings and tax expense, and both those future changes are related positively to future returns. While the returns to investing in predictable future earnings changes has been documented before, these results suggest that predicting changes in future tax expense also generates incremental future returns.

We document a counter‐intuitive finding regarding analyst forecasts of quarterly earnings per share (EPS): magnitudes of deviations from benchmarks—individual forecasts versus consensus (dispersion) and consensus versus actual (forecast error)—do not vary with scale. Seasonally differenced EPS, or time‐series forecast error, also exhibits substantial lack of variation with scale, but only for firms followed by analysts. This lack of variation with scale is not observed for analyst and time‐series forecasts for (a) EPS for some countries, (b) sales and cash flows for all countries, and (c) stock splits. We propose and investigate different explanations for these puzzling regularities that have important implications for practice and research. We believe the cause is managerial smoothing of EPS designed to reduce across‐firm variation in EPS volatility.

I examine how verification of financial statements influences debt pricing. I use a large proprietary database of privately held U.S. firms, an important business sector in which the information environment is opaque and financial statement audits are not mandated. I find that audited firms have a significantly lower cost of debt and that lenders place more weight on audited financial information in setting the interest rate. Further, I provide evidence of a mechanism for this increased financial statement usefulness: accruals from audited financial statements are better predictors of future cash flows. Collectively, I provide novel evidence that audited financial statements are more informative and that this significantly influences lenders’ decisions.

In this paper, I examine a new approach for measuring earnings quality, defined as the closeness of reported earnings to “permanent earnings,” based on firm decisions with regard to capital and labor investments. Specifically, I measure earnings quality as the contemporaneous association between changes in the levels of capital and labor investment and the change in reported earnings. This approach follows the reasoning that (1) firms make investment decisions based on the net present value (NPV) of investment projects and (2) reported earnings with higher quality should more closely associate with real investment decisions. I find that measures of earnings quality based on managerial labor and capital decisions correlate positively with earnings persistence and have incremental explanatory power relative to earnings-quality measures used in the accounting literature. Furthermore, investment-based earnings-quality measures are less informative when managers tend to overinvest.

I examine the timeliness of write-downs taken by U.S. financial institutions during the financial crisis of 2007–2008. The timeliness of write-downs is measured by benchmarking the quarterly accounting write-down schedule with the devaluation schedule implied by exposure-specific credit indices such as the ABX. The results show that the accounting write-downs are less timely than the devaluations implied by credit indices. In a cross-sectional analysis of the determinants of the timeliness of write-downs, I document that corporate governance quality, regulatory investigations, and litigation pressure are positively related to the timeliness of write-downs, whereas the write-downs by firms with higher financial leverage, tighter regulatory constraints, and more complex exposures are less timely. I control for numerous exposure-specific characteristics and document that less risky exposures and exposures that were affected later during the financial crisis were written down later. Regarding the consequences of timeliness, I find that the exposure to risky assets is reflected faster in stock returns for firms with timelier write-downs.

We investigate how managers contribute to the provision of earnings guidance by examining the association between top executive turnovers and guidance. Although firm and industry characteristics are important determinants of guidance, we conclude that CEOs participate in firm-level policy decisions, whereas CFOs are involved in the formation or discussion of guidance. Among firms that historically issued frequent guidance, breaks in guidance following CEO turnovers are relatively permanent and are potentially attributable to firm-initiated changes in guidance policy. Breaks following CFO turnovers, however, likely reflect uncertainty on the part of the newly appointed executive—they are concentrated in the two quarters following the turnover, are associated with the background of the newly appointed CFO, and extend to the relative precision of the guidance. Among firms that did not issue guidance historically, we find some evidence that newly appointed externally hired CEOs increase the likelihood of providing guidance.

Accruals correlate closely with the determinants of the conditional equity premium at both the firm and the aggregate levels. The common component of firm‐level accruals, which cannot be diversified away by aggregation, explains the positive relation between aggregate accruals and future stock market returns. The residual component, which accounts for most variation in firm‐level accruals, is responsible for the negative cross‐sectional relation between firm‐level accruals and future stock returns. Consistent with the risk‐based explanation, aggregate accruals, as a proxy for the conditional equity premium, forecast changes in aggregate economic activity. Moreover, we document a similar comovement of earnings with the conditional equity premium at both the firm and the aggregate levels, which helps explain the negative relation between changes in aggregate earnings and contemporaneous market returns.

Using a sample of U.S. financial institutions, we exploit recent mandatory disclosures of financial instruments designated as fair value level 1, 2, and 3 to test whether greater information risk in financial instrument fair values leads to higher cost of capital. We derive an empirical model allowing asset-specific estimates of implied betas, and find evidence that firms with greater exposure to level 3 financial assets exhibit higher betas relative to those designated as level 1 or level 2. We further find that this difference in implied betas across fair value designations is more pronounced for firms with ex ante lower-quality information environments: firms with lower analyst following, lower market capitalization, higher analyst forecast errors, or higher analyst forecast dispersion. Overall, the results are consistent with a higher cost of capital for more opaque financial assets, but also suggest that differences in firms' information environments can mitigate information risk across the fair value designations.

Moods are low-intensity affective states that individuals bring to a decision, and may be especially important when the balanced scorecard (BSC) is used for performance evaluation purposes. We propose that financial incentives can motivate decision-makers to correct mood congruency biases, in which judgments and decisions are consistent with moods. In experiment 1, participants rated the performance of one division manager based on two accounting measures and another manager based on a 16-measure BSC; there were mood congruency biases at both levels of information load. Financial incentives to make benchmark-consistent judgments eliminated bias in the former condition but not in the BSC condition. In experiment 2, incentives were offered and performance evaluations were based on an eight-measure BSC; mood congruency bias was eliminated. Results suggest that management control systems, specifically financial incentives, should be included in future affect correction research.