Auditing, Performance evaluation, Decision justifiability, Auditor expertise

Peter A. Firmin, Seymour S. Goodman, Thomas E. Hendricks, James J. Linn, University Cost Structure and Behavior: An Empirical Study, Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 6, Empirical Research in Accounting: Selected Studies 1968 (1968), pp. 122-155

In deciding how much information about their firms’ customers to disclose, managers face a trade off between the benefits of reducing information asymmetry with capital market participants and the costs of aiding competitors by revealing proprietary information. This paper investigates the determinants of managers’ choices to disclose information about their firms’ customers using a comprehensive data set of customer‐information disclosures over the period 1976–2006. We find robust evidence in support of the hypothesis that proprietary costs are an important factor in firms’ disclosure choices regarding information about large customers.

We merge portfolio theories of home bias with corporate finance theories of insider ownership to create the optimal corporate ownership theory of the home bias. The theory has two components: (1) foreign portfolio investors exhibit a large home bias against countries with poor governance because their investment is limited by high optimal ownership by insiders (the “direct effect” of poor governance) and domestic monitoring shareholders (the “indirect effect”) in response to the governance and (2) foreign direct investors from “good governance” countries have a comparative advantage as insider monitors in “poor governance” countries, so that the relative importance of foreign direct investment is negatively related to the quality of governance. Using both country‐level data on U.S. investors' foreign investment allocations and Korean firm‐level data, we find empirical evidence supporting our optimal corporate ownership theory of the home bias.

Earnings Patterns, Increasing Earnings, Valuation

Mary E. Barth, Greg Clinch, Revalued Financial, Tangible, and Intangible Assets: Associations with Share Prices and Non-Market-Based Value Estimates, Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 36, Studies on Enhancing the Financial Reporting Model (1998), pp. 199-233

*University of Southern California; tUniversity of Colorado at Boulder. We would like to thank Gilbert Bloom of KPMG Peat Marwick, Bob Rosen of Ernst & Young, Wayne Gazur, Robert Jamison, Sally Jones, Stewart Karlinsky, and David Mason for their assistance in validating the instruments; Eugene Willis and the AICPA for allowing us to collect data at the National Tax Education Program; Stephen Conrad of Arthur Andersen, John Lanning of KPMG Peat Marwick, Jerry Marrs of Ernst & Young, and Randy Stein of Coopers & Lybrand for allowing us to collect data at their respective firms; Minou Bohlin, Linda Levy, David Mason, and Paul Walker for their research assistance; and Vairum Arunachalam for his assistance in collecting data. The authors also gratefully acknowledge the helpful comments of three anonymous referees, Alison Ashton, Robert Ashton, C. Brian Cloyd, David Frederick, Joan Luft, Robert Libby, Laureen Maines, Mark Nelson, Michael Roberts, Frank Selto, D. Shores, Ira Solomon, Rick Tubbs, S. Mark Young, and workshop participants at Arizona State University, Cornell University, Duke University, Indiana University, the University of Illinois Tax Symposium, the Journal of Accounting Research Conference, University of Texas at Arlington, University of Utah, and University of Wisconsin. Finally, the financial support of the KPMG Peat Marwick Foundation and the University of Colorado is gratefully acknowledged. 1 We infer expertise in this study from the level of performance in a specific task, here issue identification in tax planning. This inference is consistent with much of the literature on expertise in accounting and other disciplines (e.g., Bonner and Lewis [1990],

This paper analyzes the valuation of a compensation contract from a manager's perspective. This perspective is appropriate, for example, in research on the incentive effects of a compensation plan, because such effects are determined by how the manager's actions affect his valuation of his compensation. In contrast, in a study of the cost-effectiveness of a compensation plan, the shareholders' perspective is appropriate. Measuring the value to a manager of his compensation is difficult because some of the diverse components of compensation packages (e.g., executive stock options and restricted stock) have payoffs that are uncertain when the compensation is granted. In most empirical studies, each component is valued independently (without consideration of the structure of the compensation package as a whole), and these values are summed. Moreover, the values are frequently determined using formulas for publicly traded securities with similar payoff structures (i.e., from the perspective of security market participants). Market imperfections create divergence between managers' and shareholders' valuations of a component of a compensation scheme. In particular, moral hazard and adverse selection issues cause shareholders to tie

Despite issuing extensive guidance related to the evaluation of accounting estimates, the PCAOB continues to identify deficiencies related to the audit of estimates through their inspections process. We examine whether PCAOB inspections lead to more accurate audited accounting estimates, defined as those that more closely match economic reality, by examining a significant estimate within the banking industry. We find that in contrast with the PCAOB's goal of more accurate and unbiased estimates, allowance for loan losses (ALL) estimates become less accurate and more conservative with higher levels of ALL‐related inspection findings for public company audits. We find no evidence of auditor response to PCAOB inspection findings for private‐company audits, which are not subject to PCAOB inspection. Overall, our findings cast doubt on the efficacy of PCAOB inspections in improving estimate accuracy and suggest that firms are managing inspection risk to the potential detriment of audit quality.

We study a relatively recent change in voluntary disclosure practices by management, namely, the issuance of cash flow forecasts. We predict and find that management issues cash flow forecasts to signal good news in cash flow, to meet investor demand for cash flow information, and to precommit to a certain composition of earnings in terms of cash flow versus accruals, thus reducing the degree of freedom in earnings management. Our results also suggest that management discloses good news in cash flow to mitigate the negative impact of bad news in earnings, to lend credibility to good news in earnings, and to signal economic viability when the firm is young. Our finding that management cash flow forecasts primarily convey good news is in contrast to the generally negative nature of management earnings guidance and suggests that different incentives drive firms' disclosure of different financial information.