Knowledge that Transforms

This paper examines why private firms choose to be financially transparent or opaque by conducting a field experiment with more than 25,000 firms in Germany. We inform a randomly chosen set of firms about a disclosure option that allows eligible firms to restrict access to their otherwise publicly available financial statements. We also vary the messaging in subtle ways to induce experimental variation in the probability that firms take transacting (capital providers or customers and suppliers) versus non‐transacting stakeholders (competitors or general interest parties) into consideration when making their filing decision. Based on each firm's actual filing decision, we find that treated firms are 15% more likely to restrict access to their financial statements. This intention‐to‐treat effect is persistent and concentrated among firms that should derive lower net benefits from disclosure (smaller, more mature firms in less capital‐intensive industries). These findings indicate that informational constraints affect firms’ disclosure practice. Additionally, we show that the treatment effect is almost 40% larger for firms that have a higher, exogenously induced, probability of considering non‐transacting stakeholders when making their disclosure decision. By analyzing subsequent firm activity and complementary survey evidence, we also provide suggestive evidence that disclosure requirements put an undue burden on very small private firms.

We investigate how audit firms balance the tension between professional responsibility and client service by examining changes in partner assignments following adverse internal control opinions (ICOs). We find that partners are significantly more likely to be reassigned when they issued an adverse ICO to any of their clients in the previous year. Further, partners issuing adverse ICOs experience unfavorable changes in their client portfolios in the form of lower fees and less prestigious assignments. We find that consequences are more negative when adverse ICOs are issued to clients that are more important to the local office and that there are no consequences when partners issue continuing adverse opinions to clients they have “inherited” from an original adverse ICO partner. We also find that the consequences are stronger for partners of non‐Big 4 audit firms that are likely to be more sensitive to client service considerations. The negative portfolio effects we observe persist for at least three years, and our findings are robust to restrictions involving mandatory partner rotation and adverse ICOs that lead to client loss. Overall, our results are consistent with adverse ICO partners experiencing negative consequences as audit firms respond to client service incentives in the area of internal controls over financial reporting.

We examine if the effectiveness of business tax subsidies varies based on state disclosure laws. The prior accounting literature on government disclosure documents substantial variation in the quality of such disclosures, raising questions about their effectiveness for monitoring. State and local business subsidies for investment and employment have tripled in size over the past 30 years, but transparency problems inhibit clear assessments of whether subsidies achieve their intended outcomes. We examine both internal disclosure laws, which mandate subsidy reporting by the granting state agency to other state oversight agencies, and external disclosure laws, which mandate reporting to the public. We find positive effects of subsidies on local employment when subsidies are subject to internal disclosure laws; by implementing such regimes, governments could forego 1.2–1.7 subsequent subsidies per county, saving 419.0–593.5 million in aggregate. In contrast, we observe little effect of external disclosure, which we show is due to governments either substituting to other types of incentives or posting stale information that impedes public monitoring. We contribute to the government disclosure literature by demonstrating the real employment effects of internal government disclosures, and we provide policy‐relevant evidence about the conditions under which external disclosure regimes facilitate public monitoring.

Substantial evidence suggests that regulatory agencies in the United States can be captured by the politicians who oversee them. We provide novel evidence of a federal agency in which capture is limited: the United States Patent and Trademark Office. Although patent applications from politically connected applicants are slightly more likely to be approved despite being of lower ex post quality, additional analyses suggest these outcomes are not indicative of capture. In particular, the disclosure quality of connected patents' legal claims increases more than unconnected patents during the review process, narrowing the scope of the patents and constraining the intellectual property rights. Furthermore, connected patents are no more likely than others to be litigated ex post, suggesting these patent grants are not spurious. Our findings provide insights into how the design of a regulator can limit the benefits that accrue to politically connected firms.

The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development introduced country‐by‐country reporting (CbCR) for multinational enterprises (MNEs) to help tax authorities combat tax‐motivated income shifting. This study uses confidential U.S. tax administrative data from 2011 to 2018 to examine the effect of U.S. CbCR adoption on the tax‐motivated income shifting and real activities of U.S. MNEs. We first document that while U.S. CbCR provides the Internal Revenue Service with incremental information about the location of U.S. MNEs’ global activities relative to existing U.S. tax return disclosures, substantial overlap exists between U.S. CbCR and existing disclosures. In contrast with prior CbCR studies in cross‐country settings, we fail to find evidence of a change in U.S. MNEs’ tax‐motivated income shifting or a reallocation of real activities based on tax incentives in response to U.S. CbCR using multiple empirical approaches. Overall, our study leverages U.S. tax administrative data to provide insights into the impact of the CbCR initiative on U.S. MNEs.

Technology acquirers face significant information asymmetry when identifying appropriate acquisition targets. We exploit plausibly exogenous variation in the costs of gathering technological information as the result of patent library openings. We find that, after local patent libraries open, firms become more active in technological acquisitions, acquirers prefer targets that are geographically or technologically close to a lesser extent, completion rates for technology M&A increase, and performance improves. Post‐merger innovation output is enhanced through more collaboration between inventors of acquirers and their targets. Overall, our study sheds new light on the importance of information‐gathering costs in corporate takeovers and on the search for human capital synergies.

This study examines the capital market implications of common investor relations (IR) representation, a phenomenon in which multiple public firms share the same external IR representative. Using a difference‐in‐differences research design, I document that common IR representation is associated with greater overlap in institutional ownership and sell‐side analyst coverage as well as similarities in disclosure practices among clients—even those operating in different industries. These effects culminate in heightened return comovement among firms sharing IR representation. My findings provide insight into the role of IR companies as capital market gatekeepers and suggest that when a firm outsources its IR function, the IR company influences its capital market connectivity.

We explore whether firms internalize the product market concerns of their economically linked peers by examining merger and acquisition decisions in the context of customer–supplier relations. Given the extensive transfer of capital, knowledge, and information between merging parties, we hypothesize that customers’ competition concerns discourage their suppliers from engaging in vertically conflicted transactions (i.e., acquisitions of their customers’ rivals or suppliers to those rivals). Consistent with our hypothesis, we find that suppliers are less likely to engage in such transactions when their customers are subject to higher product market competition. Moreover, the effect is more pronounced when suppliers and customers have greater relationship‐specific investments and when customers face heightened proprietary information concerns. Using plausibly exogenous variation in common ownership between customers and their rivals as a shock to customers’ competition concerns, we conclude that the link between customers’ competition concerns and supplier acquisitions is likely causal. Our findings suggest that firms alter their investment and strategic decisions in response to the product market competition concerns of their economically related peers.

Visionary CEOs have strong beliefs about the right course of action for their firms. How should a board of directors that does not necessarily share the visionary CEO's confidence advise and monitor the CEO? We consider a model in which the board can acquire costly information about the firm's optimal strategic direction. The board not only advises the CEO on strategy, but also must approve it, and the CEO exerts effort to implement the strategy. We find that the board gathers less information when the CEO believes more strongly in his vision. Further, depending on the strength of the CEO's belief bias, the board either plays an advisory role, a monitoring role, or a rubberstamping role. The model predicts that in firms that are led by highly visionary CEOs, boards are passive in that they acquire little information and rubberstamp the visionary's proposal. Nevertheless, shareholders prefer the visionary over an unbiased manager in industries in which obtaining information about the correct course of action is difficult and costly.