Knowledge that Transforms

I examine publicly released annual earnings forecasts issued in conjunction with stock recommendations by mutual fund managers of actively managed open‐end mutual funds. I find that mutual fund manager annual earnings forecasts systematically overestimate the earnings number later disclosed at the annual earnings announcement. In further analyses, I attempt to distinguish between two explanations for this forecast bias: an untruthful reporting bias (market manipulation) and a truthful cognitive bias (optimism). These explanations generate different predictions about the timing of changes in fundholdings of forecasted securities between the forecast release and annual earnings announcement dates. I interpret my findings as more consistent with an optimism explanation for mutual fund manager annual forecast bias and less consistent with a market manipulation explanation for this bias. I am, however, unable to eliminate an unobservable selection bias either in the decision of the mutual fund manager to report a forecast publicly or in the media’s decision to publish that forecast as an explanation for my finding that mutual fund manager forecasts are biased.

This study examines differences in auditors’ search behaviors associated with the preferences of audit management (reviewer preferences) and the nature of the required response (belief versus action) in the context of an accounts receivable collectibility review. I find that auditors facing reviewers who expressed concern about auditors spending time specifically looking for evidence inconsistent with explanations provided by the client (credence preference) examined fewer evidence items and followed a more client‐prompted search (i.e., a search for evidence that follows directly from the client’s explanation) than those facing reviewers who expressed concern about auditors’ ready acceptance of client explanations without adequate justification (skepticism preference) and those facing reviewers who expressed no specific concern (unknown preference). Further, auditors in the action conditions examined fewer evidence items and spent less time per evidence item than those in the judgment conditions. Additional analyses also indicate that auditors who were held accountable to a reviewer with an unknown preference generally responded as if the reviewer maintained a skepticism preference.

We analyze the stock market’s valuation of electric utility “stranded costs” (i.e., costs that might become unrecoverable under deregulation), and investigate whether stranded costs that have arisen as a result of voluntary firm business decisions are valued differently from those that are more directly linked to regulatory mandates. Further, we study whether investor valuations differ across jurisdictions. Finally, we examine the relation between investor valuation of stranded costs and the decision by utilities to make stranded cost‐related disclosures in their financial statements voluntarily. We find that investors anticipate that, on average, approximately 10% of total stranded costs will be borne by utility shareholders. Stranded costs arising from voluntary operating or investing decisions made by utilities are valued more negatively than those associated with mandatory power purchase contracts, consistent with investors assigning a higher recovery probability to the latter. Investor valuations of stranded costs associated with utility generating investments do not differ systematically across jurisdictions. We find that stranded costs are valued less negatively for voluntary disclosers not just in the year of disclosure but also in the preceding two years, implying that it is not disclosure per se that favorably influences valuation. Voluntary disclosers operate in jurisdictions that have more clearly established stranded cost recovery mechanisms, suggesting that both stranded cost disclosure and valuation are prompted by reduction in uncertainty about recoverability.

This study investigates whether the ability of book‐to‐market to predict returns derives from systematic errors in the market’s expectation of future earnings. We extend Beaver and Ryan (1996, 2000) by decomposing book‐to‐market into a more persistent (bias) component and a delayed recognition (lag) component. We find that both components are related to analyst expectations of future earnings, but the lag component is the dominant factor across all forecast horizons. Similarly, we find that the lag component explains most of the inverse relation between book‐to‐market and future returns. Given that lag is constructed by regressing book‐to‐market ratios on lagged price changes, our results are consistent with the lag component capturing systematic stock price reversals. We find that the components have unique relations with subsequent earnings forecast revisions, and controlling for these relations substantially mitigates the components’ ability to predict returns. Our component‐level analysis provides insight into how expected future earnings, summarized in book‐to‐market ratios help to explain this market anomaly.

This paper investigates the role of the stock of unionized labor in determining equity investment risk. I estimate a labor stock measure based on expected compensation costs, and use the ratio of labor stock to total assets as a risk proxy. At the median, the labor stock is comparable in magnitude to total assets. Regression estimates show the associations between labor‐based risk proxies and equity market risk measures are both economically and statistically significant. In addition, the labor‐based measures provide risk information over and above information contained in standard risk proxies such as financial and operating leverage.

This study evaluates corporate voluntary disclosure of forward‐looking information under the safe harbor provision of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. Using a sample of 523 computer hardware, computer software, and pharmaceutical firms, we find a significant increase in both the frequency of firms issuing earnings and sales forecasts and the mean number of forecasts issued following the Act’s passage. To provide more direct evidence that our findings are attributable to the Act reducing firms’ legal exposure, we develop a proxy for litigation risk and examine whether the increase in disclosure is more pronounced for firms at greatest risk of a lawsuit. As expected, we find that the change in disclosure is increasing in firms’ ex ante risk of litigation. Finally, we report that the safe harbor had no adverse impact on the quality of forward‐looking information. Forecast errors, whether directional or non‐directional, were not significantly affected by the Act’s passage.

We develop a model of auditor‐client accounting negotiation, using the elements of negotiation examined in the behavioral negotiation literature, elaborated to include accounting contextual features indicated in the accounting literature and suggested by interviews with senior practitioners. We use a questionnaire structured according to the model to describe the elements, contextual features and associations between the two groups in a sample of real negotiations chosen by 93 experienced audit partners. The paper demonstrates important aspects of the sampled accounting negotiations and makes suggestions for further empirical and model development research.

We study a principal‐agent model in which there is an option to defer a capital project approval decision. A control (incentive) problem makes the option to wait valuable when it would not have been valuable otherwise. Deferring the project approval decision has both a cost and a benefit. The cost of waiting is that the agent’s uncertainty regarding future project cost realizations cannot be exploited. However, by delaying the first project’s approval decision, the principal can condition its approval on the agent’s cost report of the second project. Such conditioning can be valuable in the provision of incentives because of a diversification effect.

We examine how an auditor’s ability to terminate a multi‐period client relationship provides the auditor with a real option whose value depends on the nature of informational asymmetry between the incumbent and other potential auditors. In particular, we isolate conditions under which the auditor’s private and public sources of information behave as complements rather than substitutes. In such circumstances, increasing the likelihood of publicly provided information induces the auditor to expend more (rather than less)resources in private information gathering activities.

Existing research indicates that firms with high accruals are more likely to experience future earnings problems, but that investors' expectations, as reflected in stock prices, do not appear to anticipate these problems. In this paper, we directly examine the published opinions of two types of professional investor intermediaries to see if they provide investors with information concerning the future earnings problems experienced by firms with high accruals. First, we examine the earnings forecasts of sell‐side analysts. We show that analysts' earnings forecasts do not incorporate the predictable future earnings declines associated with high accruals. Second, we examine the behavior of independent auditors. We find no evidence that auditors signal the future earnings problems associated with high accruals through either their audit opinions or through auditor changes. Overall, our evidence indicates that analysts and auditors do not alert investors to the future earnings problems associated with high accruals, thus corroborating previous findings that investors do not appear to anticipate these problems.