Knowledge that Transforms

This paper studies a model of “classifications manipulation” in which accounting reports consist of one of two binary classifications, preparers of accounting reports prefer one classification over the other, an accounting standard designates the official requirements that have to be met to receive the preferred classification, and preparers may engage in “classifications manipulation” in order to receive their preferred accounting classification. The possibility of classifications manipulation creates a distinction between the official classification described in the statement of the accounting standard and the de facto classification, determined by the “shadow standard” actually adopted by preparers. The paper studies the selection and evolution of accounting standards in this context. Among other things, the paper evaluates “efficient” accounting standards, it determines when there will be “standards creep,” it introduces and analyzes the notion of a Nash accounting standard, and it compares the standards set by sophisticated standard–setters to those set with less knowledge of firms’ financial reporting environments.

We use Dealscan , a database of private corporate lending agreements, to provide large–sample tests of the debt covenant hypothesis. Dealscan offers several advantages over the data available in previous studies, principally larger and more representative samples and the availability of extensive actual covenant detail. These advantages allow us to construct powerful tests in which we find clear support for the debt covenant hypothesis. We also use these data to provide broad evidence on the economic role of debt covenants. We find that private lenders set debt covenants tightly and use them as “trip wires” for borrowers, that technical violations occur relatively often, and that violations are not necessarily associated with financial distress. Finally, since we measure covenant slack directly, we report evidence that the extensively–used leverage variable is a relatively noisy proxy for closeness to covenants.

This study presents empirical evidence on the ex post costs of employee stock option (ESO) grants to issuing firms and examines whether the Black–Scholes [1973] model provides reasonable estimates of these values. Because there are no market prices for ESOs, the traditional avenues for testing option–pricing models are unavailable. This research relies instead on techniques from the economic forecasting literature, viewing model values as forecasts of the options’ payoff. The theoretically appropriate rate at which to discount ESO payoffs is derived under the maintained hypothesis that the Black–Scholes model is valid. This rate is used in estimating ex post ESO costs at the time of grant, which are then compared with Black–Scholes estimates using Theil’s [1966] tests of forecast rationality. Based on a sample of 966 ESO grants over 1963–1984, the results suggest that the Black–Scholes model, adjusted for concavity in the time to exercise using the Hemmer, Matsunaga, and Shevlin [1994] procedure, appears to provide reasonable estimates of ex post ESO costs for the average ESO grant. However, there is significant variability in the amount of model error on an individual grant basis.

We empirically investigate valuations of Internet firms at various stages of the initial public offering (IPO) from two perspectives. First, we examine the association between the valuation of Internet IPOs and a set of financial and nonfinancial variables, which prior anecdotal or empirical evidence suggests may serve as value drivers. Second, we document differences in IPO valuations between Internet and non‐Internet firms as well as across different stages in the IPO process—i.e., initial prospectus price, final offer price, and first trading day price—within each set of firms. Our primary two conclusions are as follows. First, there are noticeable differences between valuations of Internet and non‐Internet firms, especially at the prospectus and final IPO stage. Specifically, the valuation of non‐Internet firms generally follows the conventional wisdom regarding valuation: positive earnings and cash flows are priced, while negative earnings and negative cash flows are not. The valuation of Internet firms, however, departs from conventional wisdom, with earnings not being priced, and negative cash flows being priced perhaps because they are viewed as investments. This difference between the two classes of firms may be expected, given the age and unique nature of the Internet industry. Second, there are significant differences between the initial valuation of firms at the prospectus and IPO stage and their valuation by the stock market at the end of the first trading day. For non‐Internet firms, the difference is largely ascribed to the relative offering size. For Internet firms, however, the differences are with respect to positive cash flows, sales growth, R&D, and high‐risk warnings, in addition to the relative offering size.

Since 1995, managers of thousands of firms have voluntarily disclosed the expected date of their firm’s next quarterly earnings announcement to Thomson Financial Services Inc. These disclosures are approximately 500% more accurate than the simple time–series expected report dates used in prior accounting research. These disclosures are also informative. On average, managers who miss their own expected date eventually report earnings that fall about one penny per share below consensus forecasts for each day of delay. Investors respond by sending the price of late–announcing stocks down at the missed expected report date and continue to send them down as the reporting delay lengthens, consistent with our “day late, penny short” result. Despite this, we find that the market response at the time earnings are announced still depends on whether the announcement is early, on time, or late relative to the firm’s own expected report date.

In this article I examine the response of investors and analysts of nonannouncing firms to the earnings report of the first announcers in the industry. The error in the earnings forecast of the first announcer is found to be informative about the errors in the contemporaneous earnings forecasts of subsequent announcers in the industry. However, investors and analysts do not appear to fully incorporate the information from the first announcers’ news in their revised earnings expectations for subsequent announcers. This apparent underreaction to the first announcers’ news leads to predictable stock returns for subsequent announcers in the days following the first announcement. Results of this study can be seen as further evidence of investor and analyst underreaction to publicly available information.

This paper investigates whether the market rewards firms meeting current period earnings expectations, and whether any such reward reflects the implications of meeting expectations in the current period for future earnings or reflects a distinct market premium. We document that abnormal annual returns are significantly greater for firms meeting expectations, controlling for the information in the current year’s earnings. We then test whether firms meeting expectations experience higher returns simply because their expected future earnings are also higher. We find firms meeting expectations have significantly higher earnings forecasts and realized earnings than firms that do not. We find that controlling for these higher future earnings, firms meeting expectations in one or two years do not receive a greater valuation than their fundamentals would suggest. We find, however, that the market assigns a higher value to firms that meet expectations consistently, controlling for an estimate of the firm’s fundamental value.

Previous research (Rendleman, Jones, and Latane [1987]; Freeman and Tse [1989]; Bernard and Thomas [1990]; and Ball and Bartov [1996]) indicates that security prices do not fully reflect predictable elements of the relation between current and future quarterly earnings. We investigate whether this finding also holds for the special items component of earnings. Given that special items are prominent in financial analysis and are assumed to have relatively straightforward implications for future earnings (special items are assumed to be largely transitory), one might expect that prices would fully impound the implications of special items for future earnings. Based on the “two‐equation” approach used in Ball and Bartov [1996] and other studies (e.g., Abarbanell and Bernard [1992]; Sloan [1996]; Rangan and Sloan [1998]; and Soffer and Lys [1999]), we find that while prices reflect relatively more of the effects of special items compared to other earnings components, we still reject the null hypothesis that prices fully impound the implications of special items for future earnings. The “two‐equation” approach assesses the consistency of coefficients in a pair of prediction and pricing equations, and thus depends on an assumed functional form. However, a less structured abnormal returns methodology like that used in Bernard and Thomas [1990] also supports the conclusion that the implications of special items are not fully impounded in prices. Specifically, a trading strategy based only on the sign of special items earns small but statistically significant abnormal returns during a 3‐day window four quarters subsequent to the original announcement of special items.

This paper examines how various revenue recognition rules affect the incentive properties of accounting information in a stewardship setting. Our analysis demonstrates that if revenues are recognized according to the realization principle, a single performance measure based on aggregated accounting information can be used to provide desirable production and effort incentives to the manager. In contrast, mark‐to‐market accounting does not provide efficient aggregation of raw information to solve the stewardship problem. Mark‐to‐market accounting, though sensible from a valuation perspective, fails to provide desirable incentives because it relies on the anticipated, rather than the actual, performance of the manager. We also consider a setting in which the manager can control the timing of the firm’s sales. It then becomes desirable to modify the realization principle and apply the lower‐of‐cost‐or‐market valuation rule. The desirable accounting thus exhibits a conservative bias.

This paper investigates the extent to which taxes affect a corporation’s decision to allocate its defined benefit plan’s assets between equity and bonds. Prior theoretical research shows that if a corporation integrates its financial policy and pension investment policy, differences in tax rates create an arbitrage opportunity. The firm’s tax benefits from the arbitrage should be positively related to the percentage of its pension assets allocated to bonds. Consistent with this prediction, but contrary to prior empirical work, this paper finds firms’ tax benefits are positively and significantly associated with the percentage of their pension assets invested in bonds.