Knowledge that Transforms

ABSTRACT We study a principal's choice to centralize or delegate decisions to an agent when delegation can be used to encourage the agent to communicate potential problems. We find that the principal may choose centralization either to exercise better control over the agent's actions or to provide stronger incentives. Delegation emerges in equilibrium only if the costs of effort to acquire information for both the principal and the agent are sufficiently high. We find that increases in the principal's penalties for an incorrect decision may increase the principal's expected payoff, owing to optimal organizational responses. In addition, catastrophic risk, the risk of incorrectly accepting a defective audit (or product), may be greater under centralization than under delegation. Furthermore, catastrophic risk can be increased by well‐intentioned legislative efforts to decrease such risk by, for example, increasing the agent's penalties for failing to take a corrective action, because the organizational structure may change.

In this paper, I draw parallels between the literatures on the effects of law on the financial development of countries and on the effects of accounting standards on financial reporting outcomes. My central thesis is that these literatures are complementary in terms of what they have to say about understanding the effects of law, regulations and accounting standards on economic and financial reporting outcomes. Moreover, both literatures suggest that U.S. securities laws and financial reporting standards have taken a more regulatory direction over time. I then take these themes and draw implications for the effects of the adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) around the world at the time of adoption and over time.

ABSTRACT We explore the market response to announcements of first‐time going‐concern (GC) audit opinions and, for a subset of these cases, their subsequent withdrawal, from 1993 to 2005. We find that the market fully responds to GC withdrawal announcements but underreacts to the GC announcements themselves, resulting in a downward drift of −14% over the one‐year period subsequent to the GC opinion. This result is robust to alternative explanations documented in prior literature. However, after adjusting for transactions costs, the opportunity to earn profits by trading on this market anomaly is limited. We demonstrate that despite such clear adverse signals about the firm's continuing financial viability, this information is not being fully impounded by the market on a timely basis. Our findings differ from those of others who suggest that there is no pricing anomaly associated with GC opinions in the United States. We show that this is likely due to important issues with their research methods.

ABSTRACT We document that: (1) the incidence of bond trade increases during the days surrounding earnings announcements, (2) there is a bond‐price reaction to the announcement of earnings, and (3) there is a positive association between annual bond returns and both annual changes in earnings and annual analysts' forecast errors. All of these effects are larger when earnings convey bad news or when the underlying bond is more risky. Taken together, our results suggest that the nonlinear payoff structure of bond securities affects the role of accounting earnings in the bond market.

ABSTRACT This paper provides evidence about the unintended consequences arising when small companies are exempted from costly regulations—these firms have incentives to stay small. Between 2003 and 2008, the SEC postponed compliance with Section 404 of the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) for “non‐accelerated filers” (firms with public float less than $75 million). We hypothesize and find that some of these firms had an incentive to remain below this bright line threshold. Moreover, we document that these firms remained small by undertaking less investment, making more cash payouts to shareholders, reducing the number of shares held by non‐affiliates, making more bad news disclosures, and reporting lower earnings than control firms. Finally, there is no evidence that firms remaining small are doing so to maintain insiders' private control benefits. These findings have implications beyond SOX because numerous federal and state regulations exempt small firms via bright line size thresholds.

ABSTRACT A principal‐components analysis demonstrates that common earnings factors explain a substantial portion of firm‐level earnings variation, implying earnings shocks have substantial systematic components and are not almost fully diversifiable as prior literature has concluded. Furthermore, the principal components of earnings and returns are highly correlated, implying aggregate earnings risks and return risks are related. In contrast to previous studies, the correlation we report between the systematic components of earnings and returns is stable over time. We also show that the earnings factors are priced, in the sense that the sensitivities of securities' returns to the earnings factors explain a significant portion of the cross‐sectional variation in returns, even controlling for return risk. This suggests earnings performance is an underlying source of priced risk. Our evidence that the information sets of returns and earnings are jointly determined implies cash flow risk and return risk are not fully separable, and raises the possibility that it is the common variation of earnings and returns that is priced.

ABSTRACT This paper shows that major components of modern manufacturing processes, such as inventory management and cross‐training, play a significant control role. In our model, workers possess information that is critical to efficient ongoing operations. An organizational design that motivates workers to optimally apply this information leverages both the production schedule and worker–management communication. Management's use of these controls results in work‐in‐process (WIP) inventory that appears excessive from a pure job‐scheduling perspective, but is optimal when control issues are considered. Empirical work testing pure job‐scheduling theories of modern manufacturing practices has yielded mixed results. We provide control‐related interpretations for these empirical findings, and also provide novel predictions regarding the link between inventory levels and the nature of operational information asymmetries. Overall, our model highlights the importance of recognizing both control and scheduling issues when analyzing production processes.

ABSTRACT Prior research documents mean reversion in firm profitability and growth under the implicit assumption that profitability and growth of all firms revert to a common benchmark at the same rate. However, a large body of academic research suggests that there are systematic interindustry differences (e.g., industry barriers to entry) that differentially affect firm performance based on industry membership. We evaluate the relative forecast accuracy of mean reverting models at the industry and economywide levels and find that industry‐specific models are generally more accurate in predicting firm growth but not profitability.

ABSTRACT This study analyzes the information conveyed by the restatements of financial reports. We argue that restatements contain news about the investment projects of the restating firms' competitors. This news causes competitors to revise their beliefs about the projects' value, and to modify their subsequent investment decisions. Accordingly, we hypothesize that changes in competitors' investments after restatement announcements are related to news in the restatements. Consistent with our prediction, we find that changes in competitors' investments following restatement announcements are significantly related to various proxies for news in the restatements, such as competitors' and restating firms' abnormal returns at the restatement announcements. We conclude that restatements convey information about the investment projects of restating firms' competitors.